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A b s t r a c t
This thesis seeks to provide a cognitive account o f the speech act o f assertion and its 
relationship to the indicative mood. It starts by critically reviewing the literature on 
assertion and the uses to which it has been put in linguistic and philosophical 
research. Through this review, key issues relating to assertion and mood are 
identified. These are then addressed in subsequent chapters.
The second chapter lays the ground for a cognitive account o f assertion and the 
indicative. It outlines the theoretical framework employed (Sperber & W ilson’s 
Relevance Theory) and considers to what extent this is challenged by claims 
discussed in the previous chapter regarding the primacy o f  assertion over a 
conception o f belief. Then, two distinct types o f mental representation are identified 
according to whether or not they aim at consistency.
This distinction is crucial to the third chapter, in which a new relevance-theoretic 
account o f the indicative mood is developed and the conditions under which it can 
result in assertoric effects are identified. This follows a discussion o f previous 
relevance-theoretic approaches to mood, in which it is argued that the approach 
adopted o f matching moods to world-types cannot adequately explain the lack of 
assertoric potential o f non-indicatives. The new approach rests on the claim that 
indicatives are unique in presenting the proposition expressed as potentially relevant 
in its own right in a context. Assertoric effects result when this potential is exploited 
so that the proposition expressed is presented as relevant in its own right to an 
individual.
The final chapter throws the analysis o f the indicative into relief by proposing an 
account of the Spanish subjunctive predicated on the claim that this form is 
incapable o f presenting the proposition expressed as relevant in its own right.
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The task of the theory o f meaning is to give an account o f how language functions, 
in other words, to explain what, in general, is effected by the utterance o f a sentence 
in the presence o f hearers who know the language to which it belongs -  an act which 
is, even in the simplest o f cases, by far the most complicated o f all the things we do.
Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis o f  Metaphysics, p.21
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
While a link between assertoric force and the indicative mood is, to some degree, 
supposed by virtually all those who write on the subject, researchers have tended to 
concentrate on either the force side or the mood side o f the relationship. The result is 
that those who examine the act o f assertion in great detail generally have little to say 
about what it is exactly that makes the indicative mood the preferred form for 
perform ing this act, whereas those who do consider the latter question don’t, on the 
whole, concern themselves with issues relating to the nature o f assertion and its 
place in a theory o f linguistic meaning.
This division o f labour has probably been a wise research strategy, given that any 
attempt to consider the assertion/indicative relationship in detail will need to address 
philosophical, linguistic and psychological concerns simultaneously. And within 
these fields many more sub-fields will be touched upon: in philosophy, the study o f 
assertion has to do with, among others, the philosophy o f mind, o f language, and 
with epistemology and ethics; while in linguistics it raises semantic, syntactic and 
phonological questions. Little wonder, then, that an overarching account has not 
often been attempted.
Indeed, to pitch the problem in this way is perhaps to raise expectations for this 
thesis too high, so it needs to be emphasised that the aim is not to address all the 
issues raised in all the fields and sub-fields listed in the previous paragraph. Rather, 
the aim is to map out a meeting-ground where the different concerns might come 
together and their impact on each other be seen. This task is less daunting than it 
might once have been, as there is now a psychologically plausible and 
philosophically defensible theory of linguistic communication through which it 
might be tackled: Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory.
Surprisingly, little has been said about assertion within this framework, and the little 
that has been said about the indicative mood has primarily been the result o f
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concerns with other forms, such as the subjunctive and the imperative. Indeed, one 
question which will need to be considered is whether the notion o f assertion has a 
role in the theory, or whether it is best regarded as a composite term, reducible to 
other theoretical primitives.
The approach taken in this thesis is as follows: first the literature on assertion is 
reviewed so that what is meant by this term can be more clearly identified. Although 
fundamental to much discussion of linguistic communication, the term ‘assertion’ is 
often quite happily used without definition, the assumption presumably being that 
there is a general consensus on its meaning. However, a survey o f the literature 
reveals differences in opinion about what assertion is and to what extent it is linked 
to the indicative mood. This discussion also brings to light the views o f authors who 
think that assertion deserves a far more fundamental place in semantic theory than it 
is generally afforded.
Once the notion o f assertion has been analysed, the way is open to develop a 
cognitive characterisation using the tools made available by Relevance Theory. This 
is done in chapter 2, though not before some of the ramifications o f ideas discussed 
in chapter 1 have been worked through. Particular attention is given to the question 
o f whether the primacy of assertion over belief argued for by some o f the authors 
reviewed in chapter 1 is a challenge to intentional accounts of human 
communication.
Because Relevance Theory is a cognitive model o f linguistic communication, once 
an adequate characterisation of assertion in relevance-theoretic terms has been 
achieved, it is possible to relate this to the processing o f indicative clauses, so that 
the contribution made by mood to the interpretation o f an utterance as assertoric can 
be distinguished. O f course, it is also necessary to understand what happens when 
this mood is not interpreted assertorically, and when it is embedded. This is done in 
chapter 3, after previous relevance-theoretic approaches to mood have been 
considered and their weaknesses highlighted.
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Given a notion o f assertion which is adequately connected to linguistic mood, the 
way is then open to apply this to problems in linguistics, where the notion of 
‘assertivity’ has been employed. One such case is the indicative/subjunctive contrast 
in Spanish, which has often been discussed in terms o f assertion and non-assertion. 
The shortcomings o f this approach are identified in chapter 4, as are those o f model- 
theoretic approaches to the same problem. It is then shown how the account of the 
indicative/non-indicative contrast developed in chapters 2 and 3 can be applied to 
this problem with the result that the insights from the previous two approaches are 
retained and their limitations overcome.
Before commencing, though, a terminological point. The terms ‘indicative’ and 
‘declarative’ are often used interchangeably. However, there are, o f course, 
important differences. ‘Declarative’ is a term that can be applied to sentences, word 
order and intonation patterns, whereas ‘indicative’ is perhaps only accurately applied 
to verbs. However, it is common to talk of indicative clauses, and that practice is 
followed here. Moreover, as this thesis aims to provide a unified account o f both 
em bedded and main-clause uses of indicative clauses, it is useful to be able to refer 
to both as one type. Consequently, the term ‘declarative’ is not often used here, 
except when discussing the work of authors who employ this term. But this is simply 
to ignore for the sake o f convenience, rather than to deny, the important role played 
by prosody and word order in the identification of the force o f an utterance.
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C h a p t e r  1: P e r spec t iv e s  on  a s se r t io n  and  m o o d
1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
As a central aim o f this thesis is to examine the place o f the notion o f assertion in a 
theory o f utterance interpretation, it is essential to begin with a sound understanding 
both o f the nature o f this phenomenon and o f the use to which this notion is put in 
theorising about language and language use. Given such an understanding, it will be 
possible to consider whether it has a part to play in a cognitive theory o f utterance 
interpretation, and, if  so, what that part is.
For such an apparently fundamental notion, assertion is surprisingly hard to pin 
down. It is perhaps best characterised, at this stage at least, by contrast rather than by 
definition. Assertion contrasts, on the one hand, with other basic speech-acts such as 
requesting/commanding and questioning, and, on the other, with other stances 
towards propositions employed in communication, such as presupposition. This 
second contrast is particularly useful, for it reminds us that a key feature of assertion 
-  that it commits the speaker to the truth o f the proposition expressed -  is not unique 
to assertion, for speakers are also committed to the truth o f what they presuppose. 
The contrast with presupposition is useful in another way too: it highlights the fact 
that assertion involves manifestly presenting a proposition as worthy of adoption, 
whereas presupposition is generally thought of as treating a proposition as already 
accepted by one’s audience. Another possible contrast is between the psychological 
attitudes related to assertion and directive speech-acts such as commands: assertion 
is related to belief, whereas directives are related to desire. Finally, assertion is 
typically associated with the indicative mood, while the other basic speech-acts are 
associated with the imperative and interrogative moods.
This chapter will review the discussion of both the act o f assertion and its 
relationship to the indicative mood. First, the relationship between assertion and 
truth will be discussed. As will be seen, there is a strong case to be made that 
assertions, rather than propositions, should be viewed as the primary bearers o f truth.
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If this is the case, then the forms which enable or facilitate the making o f assertions 
become o f crucial importance. Thus, the indicative mood, the form most closely 
related to the act o f  assertion, will be discussed in section 3. O f particular interest 
will be claims that the indicative mood should not be granted any special status in 
relation to assertion. Section 4 will focus on the special place assertion has in 
theories o f linguistic communication (as opposed to theories o f linguistic meaning) 
that rely on a convention o f truthfulness. Section 5 will consider claims that the 
putative relationship between assertion and truth is too coarse-grained, and that only 
truth as evidenced by knowledge warrants assertion. Much theorising about assertion 
results from Frege’s insistence that assertions, in logic at least, must be marked as 
such in order that they be distinguished from the mere expression o f a thought. This 
view and some o f  its consequences will be discussed in section 6.
While most o f  the literature discussed in this chapter looks at assertion from a 
philosophical point o f view, section 7 takes a more linguistic perspective in that it 
looks at the role assertion plays in discussions of information structure, where it is 
often contrasted with presupposition.
2 A s s e r t i o n , t r u t h  a n d  m e a n i n g
The need for a notion o f assertion is rarely argued for. Rather, it is generally treated 
as a phenom enon that needs to be explained. Debates therefore tend to centre on 
issues such as whether assertoric force is encoded by indicative mood; whether 
assertions need to be explicitly marked in a system of logical symbolism; whether 
assertion is related most closely to knowledge or to belief; and whether the assertoric 
use o f language should have special status in a theory of language use. Although he 
would undoubtedly have much to say on all these issues, Dummett stands out from 
other writers in the prominence he gives to assertion as the foundation o f a theory of 
linguistic meaning. For Dummett, as will be seen below, assertion underpins any 
theory o f  linguistic meaning that relies on the notion o f truth. More recently, Barker 
(2004) has expressed agreement with Dummett’s claim that truth must be analysed
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in terms o f assertion, though for different reasons. Each o f these authors’ work will 
be examined in turn.
2.1 Being true, obtaining and being called 'TRUE ’
At the risk o f stating the obvious, truth is central to any notion o f assertion: 
assertions are judged in terms of truth and falsity. Moreover, anyone wanting to 
justify the use o f a notion of assertion in a theory o f linguistic meaning will 
immediately point to the need to link utterances to the world in a systematic way 
through the notion o f truth. However, there is an opaqueness in the way the term 
’true’ is employed in much linguistic theorising, and it is important to be clear about 
which o f the possible senses of ‘true’ is being made use o f at any time. This
ambiguity has been pointed out recently by Garcia-Carpintero (2004), and it is also
discussed by Dummett (1981) and Barker (2003; 2004). It stems from the commonly 
made observation that a set o f utterances such as (1) have a crucial element o f 
meaning in common:
(1) a. Peter closes the door
b. Close the door, Peter
c. Did Peter close the door?
Assuming that the individual denoted by ‘Peter’ and the door referred to by the NP 
‘the door’ are the same in each case, as well as the sense o f ‘close’ and the implicit 
time reference, then what the sentences in (1) have in common is that they represent 
a state o f affairs in which Peter closes the door at a certain time. They differ, o f 
course, in how they represent that state of affairs. This common core o f meaning has 
been given a number o f names: a ‘sentence radical’ (W ittgenstein 1958: 11), a 
‘phrastic’ (Hare 1970/1971, 1971, 1989), ‘descriptive content’, or ‘the proposition 
expressed’. As Green (2000) points out, Wittgenstein’s term employs an illuminative 
analogy from chemistry. Chemists distinguish between a ‘radical’ and a ‘functional 
group’, the former being a group of atoms normally incapable o f independent 
existence, the latter being a grouping of these in a compound. W ittgenstein’s term
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highlights the feeling that the common core meaning o f (1) cannot generally play a 
role in com m unication independently o f its realisation in a sentence o f one of the 
types exemplified. Though this claim could perhaps be challenged by pointing to 
infinitival utterances, which might be argued to express a forceless proposition, the 
analogy is nevertheless a useful way of fleshing out the intuition that what the 
utterances in (1) share is something which, although crucial to their meaning, cannot 
easily be extracted and analysed in the way that, say, a constituent NP can. Whatever 
the merits o f  W ittgenstein’s analogy, though, the term most commonly employed 
today to refer to this core meaning is probably the last o f those listed above: ‘the 
proposition expressed’.
One way o f viewing a proposition is as a function from a possible world to a truth 
value. On this view, a proposition, given a possible world as an argument, returns 
either ‘TR U E’ or ‘FALSE’ as its value, depending on whether the state o f affairs 
described by the proposition obtains in that world. It is not hard to see how this 
might usefully play a role in the evaluation of any o f the three utterances in (1). If 
the proposition returned ‘TRUE’ given the world at the time referred to by the 
utterance, the statement in (1 )a would be judged true, the command in (1 )b would be 
judged to have been obeyed,1 and ‘yes’ would be an appropriate response to the 
question in (1 )c.2 Note, though, that while returning the value ‘TRUE’ is common to 
all three evaluations, only in the first is the word ‘true’ employed. As will be seen 
below, this is a very important point, as it suggests that the value that is returned by 
a proposition on the proposition-as-a-function view is not the natural-language ‘true’ 
that we apply to assertions.
Noting this apparent ambiguity, Garcia-Carpintero (2004: 152-153) distinguishes 
between a proposition obtaining and a statement being true. If (1 )b is obeyed or (1 )c
1 As long as Peter had closed the door as a result o f the speaker’s utterance o f  (1 )b.
: Indeed, an analysis o f  mood along these lines is given by Segal (1990).
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elicits the response ‘yes’, that is because the proposition it expresses obtains. When 
the proposition expressed by an utterance such as (l)a  obtains, however, the 
utterance is said to be true. The same distinction is drawn by Barker (2003), for 
whom a proposition is a set of worlds and a proposition can be said to obtain in a 
particular world if  that world is included in that set. The question then becomes 
whether there is any substance to this distinction, or whether a proposition’s 
obtaining and an utterance’s being true are essentially the same thing.
In one respect they are certainly different: ‘obtains’ is neutral about direction o f fit, 
whereas ‘true’, as applied to assertions, clearly entails a word-to-world direction of 
fit.3 That is to say that an utterance can be said to be true only if the proposition it 
expresses obtains independently o f the utterance. If, though, the proposition 
expressed obtains as a result of the utterance, such as when a directive utterance 
such as (1 )b is obeyed, giving a world-to-word fit, then the term ‘true’ cannot be 
applied.4
There is another way that the two terms differ, though this is perhaps harder to 
grasp. It relates to a point made by Dummett (1993) concerning the need for 
disquotational theories o f meaning to be embedded within a theory o f assertion. A 
common strategy in attempting to provide a semantics for a natural language is to 
attempt to detail the truth conditions of that language in a series o f Tarskian T- 
sentences such as (2):
(2) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white
In (2), a sentence o f the object language is given in quotation on the left-hand side of 
the equation, and its truth-conditions given on the right-hand side in the meta-
* Sec Humberstone (1992) for discussion o f the notion o f  direction o f fit.
4 As such, ‘obtains’ and ‘true’ correspond, to a large degree, to Recanati’s distinction (which he 
eventually rejects) between broad and narrow senses o f ‘true’ (1987: 143-154).
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language (which is the same as the object language in this case, but needn’t be). 
Rather than attem pt the impossible task o f listing the T-sentences for all sentences of 
the object language, however, an attempt is made to specify the truth conditions for 
the language compositionally, such that T-sentences for all the sentences in a 
language can be derived. This approach, one exposition o f it being Larson & Segal 
(1997), is termed ‘disquotational’ because it seeks to link language to the world by 
expressing the m eaning o f a quoted expression through the use o f a language for 
which one has knowledge o f meaning (Larson & Segal 1997: 50-51). The claim 
made by a T-sentence is not a correspondence in meaning between two quoted 
sentences, as in (3), but between a quoted sentence and facts about the world 
expressed in a language the theorist has knowledge of, hence the term 
‘disquotational’.
(3) ‘Snow is w hite’ is true i f f ‘La nieve es blanca’ is true
Following Davidson (1967/2001), it has often been suggested that sentences such as 
(2) can be employed as a characterisation of the semantic competence of a speaker 
o f a language such as English. The idea is that a person understands a language only 
if she can match sentences and their truth conditions. However, it is not clear that all 
a speaker knows o f a language can be expressed in these terms. Aside from the need 
to deal with context sensitivity, there also appear to be some elements of 
linguistically encoded meaning which do not affect truth-conditions, such as the 
much-discussed connective ‘but’, which appears to make no greater contribution to 
truth-conditions than ‘and’, but cannot be substituted by ‘and’ without loss of 
meaning (see Carston 2002b: 50-56 for discussion of this point and other problems 
associated with attempting to account for semantic competence in this way).
The issue Dummett raises is different, however. He notes that attempting to 
characterise knowledge o f  the semantics o f a language in terms o f truth-conditions 
entails ascribing a grasp o f the notion o f truth to the individual to whom this 
knowledge is being attributed. The question then becomes one o f establishing the
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grounds on which this ascription would be justified. In other words, what licenses 
the attribution o f the concept of truth to an individual? Dummett’s answer to this 
question is that the only way an individual can demonstrate a grasp o f truth is by 
demonstrating competence in the practice of assertion. To the view that assertion 
should be analysed as the expression of belief (from which its connection with truth 
would be derived), Dummett responds that it is a mistake to attempt to explicate 
assertion (and therefore truth) in these terms, because a central element o f what it 
means to have a concept o f belief (i.e. a conception o f truth) is only explainable in 
terms o f  assertion.
He argues for this position in the following way. Suppose, he says, we want to 
ascribe to an individual a conception of belief. That is, we want to be able to 
attribute to an individual an understanding that other people have beliefs and that 
they express these when they make assertions. To make such an ascription, he 
argues, one must also attribute to that individual knowledge o f what truth is, for to 
understand the nature o f belief entails grasping that beliefs can be true or false. On 
what grounds, then, would we be justified in attributing an understanding o f truth 
and falsity to an individual? The only behaviour that justifies the attribution o f truth 
to another individual, he argues, is competent assertion. But if this is the case, then 
truth and assertion are inextricably linked and one cannot therefore analyse assertion 
in terms o f belief, for the correct analysis of belief makes use o f a notion (i.e. truth) 
which must itself be explained by reference to assertion. Therefore, Dummett 
argues, assertion must come before belief in the order o f explanation (1993: 219- 
2 2 1).5
For Dummett, this is a purely philosophical issue, and he does not consider the 
question o f whether his arguments have any consequences for the development o f a
5 Note that, by claiming assertion is prior to belief, Dummett is making a point about conceptual or 
analytical priority, or the correct order o f explanation (1993: 217). He is not claiming that having a 
language is a prerequisite for having beliefs.
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concept o f belief in the human child, or, moreover, in the human species. It is worth 
considering, however, whether this might be the case. Many theories o f linguistic 
communication, such as Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory, follow Grice in 
viewing linguistic meaning in terms of intention attribution. According to such 
theories, the intentions that need to be attributed to a speaker when interpreting her 
utterance are quite complex, and are often characterised as involving belief 
attribution. Such theories would appear to predict, therefore, that a conception of 
belief is a prerequisite for competent assertion. As Breheny (forthcoming) points 
out, this view is challenged by the empirical data, which shows that children are 
competent asserters before they can demonstrate possession o f a full conception of 
belief. Dum m ett’s argument suggests that children might need to develop 
competence in assertion as a stepping-stone to competence in belief attribution. This 
issue will be discussed in some detail in section 3 o f chapter 2.
Returning to current concerns, if assertion and truth are inextricably linked, so that 
one concept cannot be explained without reference to the other, then any account of 
meaning which makes use o f the notion o f truth must be embedded in a theory of 
assertion, Dummett argues. Failure to realise this amounts to the predicate in a T- 
sentence not being fully disquotational, rendering (2) as (4) (though Dummett 
him self doesn’t put it this way):
(4) ‘Snow is w hite’ is ‘TRUE’ iff snow is white
In other words, unless one has a disquotational knowledge o f the meaning of the 
word ‘true’, all a T-sentence such as (4) explicates is the knowledge necessary to 
assign an arbitrary value to a sentence given certain conditions. As Dummett puts it: 
“no one can sensibly be said to know the theory o f truth [...] if that is all he knows 
about truth. Unless he knows, in some implicit manner, what truth is, he cannot be 
said to know a sentence to be true, or to know that it is true under such-and-such 
conditions; all that he can be said to know is that it is to be called  ‘true’, absolutely 
or under such-and-such conditions” (1993: 220). To have a disquotational
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understanding o f truth is thus to be a competent asserter, according to Dummett, and, 
a characterisation o f semantic competence in terms of truth-conditions accounts only 
for the Fregean sense o f the sentences o f a language. For a complete account o f the 
meaning o f a language, a theory of force is also needed. Without this, there is a 
failure to distinguish between a sentence’s being true and its merely being called 
‘TR U E’.
The distinction between being called ‘TRUE’ and being true is essentially the same 
as that between obtaining and being true. In judging an assertion as merely ‘TRUE’, 
an individual would be saying, in effect, that the proposition expressed by the 
utterance obtains. This is why Dummett argues that Davidson’s theory o f meaning is 
in fact a theory o f  Fregean sense (1993: 222). For Dummett, ( l)a  to c share the same 
sense, but differ in force. Barker and Garcia-Carpintero would say that they express 
the same proposition and that this can be judged as obtaining or not: “ ‘Obtains’ 
applies indifferently to what is linguistically encoded by utterances in different 
moods [ ...]  A disquotational theory o f truth is adequate as an account o f what we 
here mean by ‘obtains’, but it does not suffice to account for the invidious ‘true’ 
(Garcia-Carpintero 2004: 152). What the notation ‘TRUE’ employed here does that 
the term ‘obtain’ does not is highlight the fact that, in some semantic theorising, 
knowledge o f  truth is smuggled in for free, as it were.
Dum m ett’s most forthright presentation of this view is in Mood, force and  
convention  (1993), which he wrote as a response to Davidson’s (1979/2001) claim 
that the indicative mood is a forceless form.6 Dummett’s aim is to show that this 
cannot be the case by convincing us that the notion of assertion cannot be made 
sense o f  without positing a form conventionally associated with it. His arguments for 
this echo his arguments for the priority o f assertion over belief, outlined above. In
6 Davidson (1979/2001) was itself a response to Dummett (1981). See also Davidson (1984/2001) and 
Dummett (1995: 113-122).
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order to be justified in ascribing a notion o f truth to an individual, he argues, we 
must identify a behaviour which demonstrates that the individual grasps that notion. 
This behaviour, Dummett claims, is just the appropriate use o f linguistic forms 
conventionally specified for uttering truths, i.e. the making o f assertions using 
sentences in the indicative mood. Without positing such a convention, we have no 
behavioural characteristic that justifies attributing a conception o f truth to an 
individual.7
This claim might appear to lead Dummett to the untenable position that the 
indicative is a failsafe indicator of force. This is certainly how Davidson appears to 
have read him, but, as will be seen in section 3, Dummett’s position is actually 
weaker than this. As regards his claims about the primacy o f assertion in the analysis 
o f belief (i.e. that assertion is conceptually/analytically prior to belief), one might 
want to challenge this by pointing to a non-linguistic animal which demonstrates a 
grasp o f the notion o f belief. The clearest way to demonstrate that an animal has the 
notion o f belief would be to show it has an understanding o f false-belief. This could 
be done, for example, by showing that one animal could correctly predict the 
behaviour o f  another by attributing a false belief. Call and Tomasello (1999) 
attempted to do just this in a non-verbal, false-belief attribution experiment with 
chimpanzees and orangutans. Their results suggest that non-human primates do not 
have this ability. Moreover, in a review of the literature they note that few studies 
have shown any evidence that non-humans have this ability. Thus, it seems that, 
should he wish to apply his analysis empirically, Dummett has nothing to fear from 
this line o f a ttack .s
7 Stainton (1993; 1997) would object that assertions can be made by uttering non-sentential forms, but 
Dummett’s point, at least as expressed in Mood, force and convention, is that the notion o f  assertion 
could not exist without this conventional link with indicative sentences, not that assertions can only 
be performed using complete sentences in the indicative mood.
* Cf. Dummett (1981: 354): “A dog can be trained to bark when a stranger approaches the house; but 
one reason why we should be disinclined to describe the dog’s barking as asserting that a stranger is
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Alternatively, one might want to suggest that an understanding o f belief, and thus of 
truth, is genetically hard-wired in humans and thus not reliant on the notion of 
assertion. But D um m ett’s point relates to the understanding o f truth by theorists. His 
point is that such an analysis requires a prior analysis o f the act o f assertion. To be 
sure, one can say that a mental representation is true if it corresponds systematically 
to a state o f affairs in the world, but when challenged to explain: ‘What does ‘true’ 
m ean?’, one would have to do so without relying on the act of assertion. Dummett’s 
claim is that one cannot. That said, as was noted above, Dummett’s conceptual 
analysis could be employed to raise some probing questions about the development 
o f human verbal communication, a point that will be returned to in the next chapter.
On the other hand, one might grant that assertions are the primary bearers o f truth, 
but disagree with Dum m ett’s Fregean view of language. This, as will be seen below, 
is what Barker does.
2.2 Assertion as the meaning o f  indicative clauses
As was noted in the previous section, one author who stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between a proposition obtaining and an assertion being true is Barker 
(2003; 2004). Barker, however, has a very original view o f just what it means to 
judge an assertion as true. For him, truth is not primarily a matter o f correspondence 
between a propositional form and a state of affairs. Rather, he sees judging an 
assertion to be true as expressing agreement with the speaker that a certain cognitive 
state indicated by the assertion is the appropriate one to be in, given how the world 
is.
To see how this works, it is necessary to consider the two types o f assertion that 
Barker postulates: reportive and expressive. The first of these appears, on the
approaching is that he couldn’t bark in order to deceive us into thinking that a stranger was 
approaching.”
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surface, to be similar to what might be called the ‘standard view ’ o f assertion as the 
employment o f a propositional form to faithfully represent the world. The second, 
however, is quite distinct in that judging an assertion o f this type to be true does not 
rely on correspondence between a proposition and a state o f affairs, but on sharing 
internal states. And, as will be seen, it is this sharing o f internal states which, Barker 
argues, actually underlies all uses of the predicate ‘true’ as applied to assertions, be 
they reportive or expressive.
The reportive/expressive distinction is itself derived from the ontology that Barker 
postulates. On his view, the world consists o f objects, properties and situations, the 
last o f which he terms ‘complexes’ (in order to avoid confusion with other semantic 
theories that use the term ‘situation’ to denote possible states o f affairs). Complexes 
are made up o f objects, properties and relations and are parts o f the actual world, not 
mere possibilities. Crucially, for Barker, there are no logically complex complexes: 
“there are no complexes that are negative, universal, conditional or disjunctive” 
(2004: 4), because there are no such entities as these in the world.
One immediate consequence o f this ontology is that only assertions o f logically 
simple propositions can be analysed in terms o f correspondence between the 
proposition expressed and the way the world is. If there are no negative complexes, 
for example, then negative statements cannot be judged true or false on the basis of 
their correspondence to how the world is. This is why Barker needs a conception of 
truth that does not rely on correspondence.
In order to see how Barker’s notions o f assertion and truth operate, consider first a 
logically simple assertion, one which could, on his view, employ correspondence to 
represent a state o f affairs in the world (i.e. a complex).
(5) It’s raining.
This would express the proposition in (6):
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(6) <raining in place p at time t>
While the proposition expressed by the assertion is clearly a representation of the 
world, this in itself, argues Barker, is not what makes it truth-apt: as was shown 
above, other sentence types, such as imperatives and interrogatives, can be argued to 
express propositions, but they are not truth apt.9 Rather, what makes an assertion 
truth-apt for Barker is the presence of a special kind of intention advertised, he 
argues, by the employment of the indicative mood.
Moods indicate intentions for Barker because he characterises the meanings of 
sentences as speech-act types (proto-acts), and the meaning of the indicative mood, 
in these terms, is a proto-assertion, so that when someone utters a sentence in the 
indicative mood, she presents herself as having the intention to assert. This is not to 
say, though, that she necessarily has this intention, nor that she is necessarily 
understood to have this intention by her audience. However, if she does have the 
intention that she presents herself as having, and this is recognised by the audience, 
then she is thereby asserting (2004: 7).
If the indicative is a proto-assertion, then the question arises of just what being an 
actual assertion consists in. Barker argues that an assertion has two basic 
components: a representational element and an intentional element. On the one hand, 
the speaker intends to represent a certain complex, while, on the other, she intends 
her behaviour to have a certain effect on her audience. The effect she intends, he 
argues, is that her audience both attribute to her a certain cognitive state (e.g. the 
belief that it is raining, in the case o f (5)) and either adopt, confirm or reject that
9 Barker also points out that an NP such as ‘Fred’s being pink’ expresses the same proposition (i.e. 
represents the same complex) as the corresponding sentence ‘Fred is pink’ but only the latter is truth- 
apt (2004: 73).
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cognitive state in their own case.10 Judging a reportive assertion such as (5) to be 
true is thus to judge the cognitive state attributed to the speaker to be an appropriate
one to be in. While this judgment clearly depends to some degree on correspondence
between a state o f affairs and the representation employed, Barker agues that it 
would be a mistake to see this correspondence alone as justification for the 
application o f the predicate ‘true’. Rather, he claims that it is the fact that the 
speaker has presented her own mental state for adoption, confirmation, or rejection 
that permits the felicitous application o f ‘true’ (2004: 8-9). To see why he rejects 
correspondence as the basis for truth, it is necessary to look closely at his distinction 
between reportive and expressive assertions.
The difference between a reportive assertion and an expressive assertion can be 
illustrated by considering two utterances which, according to Barker, represent the 
same complex (i.e. express the same proposition) but have different truth conditions:
(7) There is probably life on Mars
(8) I strongly believe that there is life on Mars
(9) <strongly believes, speaker, <there is life on M a r s »
Barker argues that both (7) and (8), spoken by the same speaker under the same 
circumstances, would represent the complex/express the proposition in (9). Clearly 
this complex is an internal state o f the speaker, but it is still part o f the world. 
However, the assertions in (7) and (8) are truth-conditionally distinct because one 
would judge (7) to be true only if one also believed that there was life on Mars, but 
could judge (8) as true even if one did not believe in life on Mars, provided one 
believed that this speaker has this belief (2004: 30).
10 Barker speaks o f  this intention in terms o f  “defending a commitment to a cognitive property” 
(2004: 8). As far as possible, Barker’s technical vocabulary is avoided here.
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Rather than argue that (7) and (8) express distinct propositions (perhaps, for 
example, by attempting a modal analysis o f (7)), Barker seeks to explain the 
difference in truth conditions in terms o f the intentions associated with each one. (8) 
is a reportive assertion in his terms, and is analysed in the same way as (5) above: 
the hearer judges it to be true only if the epistemic state indicated by the 
representational content o f the utterance is accepted as an appropriate one to be in, 
given the way the world is. An expressive assertion such as (7) is distinct in that the 
speaker represents herself as having a certain internal state, but rather than put 
forward the fact that she has this state for adoption, confirmation, or rejection by her 
audience (as is the case in a reportive assertion such as (8)), she puts forward the 
mental state itself. Another way o f putting this is to say that statements about 
internal states and expressions o f internal states both employ, on Barker’s story, a 
representation o f  the following format:
(10) Speaker has internal state X
His distinction between reportive and expressive assertions can then be understood 
in terms o f what the speaker intends her audience to adopt, confirm or reject. In the 
case o f a reportive assertion about an internal state, it is a belief of the form ‘Speaker 
has internal state X ’; in the case o f an expressive assertion, it is the internal state X 
itself. Judging an expressive assertion to be true is thus to agree with the speaker that 
the internal state represented by the assertion is an appropriate one to be in (2004: 9- 
11). It differs from a reportive assertion in that the state the audience is invited to 
agree with is not representational. In other words, when a reportive assertion is 
judged true, there is a correspondence between a representation and a complex but 
this correspondence is absent in the case o f expressive assertions. For Barker, 
though, this does not mean that the term ‘true’ is being applied differently in each 
case. In both cases, he argues, what the application o f the predicate ‘true’ indicates is 
acceptance o f the epistemic state the speaker presents herself as being in (2004: 9), 
regardless o f  whether or not this state is to be judged appropriate on grounds of 
correspondence.
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Barker argues that this conception o f truth is not subjective: it is not the case, he 
argues, that characterising the use o f ‘true’ as an expression o f agreement on the 
appropriate cognitive state to be in reduces truth to mere agreement. W hether a 
given internal state is indeed the appropriate one to be in depends on how the world 
is, i.e. an objective fact. It is a mistake, though, to see logically complex truths as 
being derived from a direct correspondence between a representation and how the 
world is, he says. Rather, the relationship is an indirect one: “In short, the truth o f 
logically complex sentences is constrained by the extralinguistic world but not 
directly -  by actually representing logically complex world-parts -  but indirectly, by 
expressing those cognitive states that are integral parts o f systems directed towards 
objective representation.” (2004: 16-17). Thus, a negative statement such as (11) is 
correctly judged true if the state it expresses is the correct one for a human to be in 
when referring to a state o f affairs in which there is no rain. Barker’s claim though, 
is that this state is not a representational one: there is no correspondence between the 
internal state and the state o f affairs in the world which justifies that internal state.
(11) I f  s not raining
While Barker’s view of assertion is original and stimulating, adopting it would 
represent a major break with traditional semantic theory. As he is keen to point out, 
his ‘pragmatic conception o f truth’ is a major departure from what he terms ‘the 
semantic conception o f truth’, based on correspondence, which dates back at least to 
Frege (Barker 2004: 12). However, there are points that can be drawn from Barker 
that will be o f use in this thesis but that will not entail adopting wholesale his 
speech-act theoretic approach.
First, Barker’s division of assertion into a representational and a communicative 
component (see, in particular, 2004: 44-45 for a clear statement to this effect) is 
important as it highlights the fact that assertions -  the bearers o f truth -  are 
representations. Despite his insistence that correspondence between the
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representational content o f an assertion and the world is not what is central to truth- 
aptness, his view does have it that representationhood is a necessary condition of 
truth-aptness, albeit not a sufficient one. (As will be seen later, this view is shared by 
the account o f assertion developed in this thesis.) Viewing representations, rather 
than propositions, as the primary bearers o f truth is important because it places truth- 
bearers in the physical, rather than an abstract, realm. Propositions, whether 
conceived o f as functions from possible worlds to truth values, or as sets of possible 
worlds, are abstract entities. Representations, by contrast, are necessarily physical 
things.
Second, along with other accounts o f assertion, such as Stalnaker’s (to be discussed 
often in the coming pages), D um m etf s and Garcia-Carpintero’s, Barker emphasises 
that assertion has, as an essential element, the intention to influence the thoughts of 
others. Where Barker differs is that he does not see this effect as necessarily 
resulting from the acceptance, by the hearer, o f the proposition expressed as a true 
description o f how the world is. It is not clear, though, that this element of assertion 
is central to their truth-aptness (though it may be central to an adequate conception 
o f assertion), as one can also call a belief true, even though beliefs per se have no 
communicative function.11
Before concluding this section, it is important to point out that the picture painted 
here o f Barker’s account is but a sketch. As well as views on assertion, he also has 
interesting views on mental representation that will not be touched on here (2004: 
chs. 7 & 8). Moreover, he argues that his speech-act theoretic approach to semantics 
can deal with a number o f problems central to linguistic semantics, such as those 
presented by definite descriptions, without positing a logical form radically distinct 
from surface structure. In the end, then, its merits will largely boil down to how
11 Barker would object to this, o f  course, because for him it is this communicative function which is 
essential to an assertion’s being judged true or false
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successful these claims are, but it is beyond the scope o f this thesis to evaluate 
them .12
3 A s s e r t i o n  a n d  i n d i c a t i v e  m o o d
It was noted above that the sentences in (1) are often said to express the same 
proposition but differ in an important respect. One use a theorist might want to make 
o f the notion o f assertion is to differentiate the indicative from the other two 
sentence types. (Indeed, Barker does this by viewing declarative sentences as proto­
assertions.) It was shown in section 2.1 that Dummett considers it crucial that the 
indicative be seen as a conventional marker o f assertoric force, and would 
distinguish (1 )a from (1 )b and c by virtue o f this. This section looks at objections to 
this move and considers whether the indicative might be better described as a form 
which conveys no information about force.
While no author appears to want to deny any link whatsoever between linguistic 
mood and force, there are those, such as Davidson (1979/2001), who deny that the 
indicative is specified for a particular illocutionary function. Davidson’s reasons for 
thinking this are twofold. First, he argues that there are many cases where assertions 
are made without the main clause o f the sentence being indicative ((12) and (13) 
below), while at the same time many indicative sentences are used to perform non- 
assertoric acts, as in (14), where an indicative is used to give a command, and in 
cases where there is no commitment to truth, such as fiction and jokes.
(12) Did you notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again?
(13) Notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again
(14) In this house we remove our shoes before entering
12 An attempt to explicate linguistic meaning in terms o f illocutionary act potential in more traditional 
speech-act terms than Barker’s can be found in Alston (2000).
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Secondly, according to Davidson, any link between mood and force in language 
could always be undermined by what he terms ‘the autonomy of linguistic meaning’:
Once a feature o f language has been given conventional expression, it can be used to serve 
many extra-linguistic ends; symbolic representation necessarily breaks any close tie with 
extra-linguistic purpose. Applied to the present case, this means that there cannot be a form 
o f speech which, solely by dint o f its conventional meaning, can be used only for a given 
purpose, such as making an assertion or asking a question (1979/2001: 113)
In other words, even if  there were such a thing as a marker o f assertoric force in 
natural language, then its use would not guarantee that an assertion had been made, 
in much the same way that the fact that there is a conventional sign ‘chair’ used to 
denote a chair does not guarantee that, on each occurrence o f its use, it will be used 
to make this denotation (due, o f course, to features o f language use such as metaphor 
and metonymy). These two observations lead Davidson to conclude that, as far as 
the indicative mood and assertion are concerned, there is no need to posit any 
linkage. Rather, the indicative can be used to make assertions or not, “as is our 
wont” (1979/2001: 119), and also as a building block for the other moods.
There are a number o f issues raised by these claims. Firstly, it is necessary to look 
closely at the details o f Davidson’s positive claims for the analysis of mood and 
Dummett’s response to these. This will lead to a discussion of Recanati’s reasons for 
also claiming that indicative is a forceless mood. Then, the claim Davidson makes 
under the heading o f ‘the autonomy o f linguistic meaning’ will be examined more 
closely. This has been subjected to close scrutiny by Green (1997), who argues that, 
on one reading o f it, there is a class o f counter-examples. Next, just what 
relationship one should expect to find between mood and force will be considered. 
Jokes, fictions and the like are often held up as counter-examples to the claim that 
the indicative is a marker o f assertion. This supposes that anyone claiming that mood 
encodes force must thereby claim that it encodes seriousness. It needs to be asked 
how realistic this is. Finally, how main-clause and embedded mood markers are
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related must be considered. Until then, however, all mention o f 
indicative/imperative/interrogative clauses will refer only to main-clause use.
3.1 Davidson 's par atactic analysis
Davidson posits a paratactic analysis o f non-indicative mood, whereby the utterance 
o f an imperative such as (15)a, for example, is to be analysed as a double utterance, 
as in (15)b:
(15) a. Put on your hat
b. My next utterance is imperative. You will put on your hat
Davidson does not want to say that imperative sentences are in fact two indicative
sentences. Rather, what (15)b shows, he says, is the semantics o f an imperative
sentence in terms o f two sets o f truth conditions: those o f the mood-setter and those 
o f the ‘indicative core’. When an imperative is used without imperatival force, as in 
(13), the mood setter will be false. Nor does Davidson want to claim that mood- 
setters assert that the next utterance has the force described: they characterise it as 
having this force but do not assert that they have it, he says, for only speakers can 
assert. Davidson also argues that his account explains why non-indicatives do not 
have a truth-value: each utterance of a non-indicative consists semantically in two 
utterances with distinct truth-conditions, but, as these are not conjoined, the 
utterance itself has no truth value. He deals with non-assertoric moods in a parallel 
manner.
Dummett’s strategy against Davidson’s paratactic account o f mood is to argue that it 
relies on indicative sentences being neutral in terms of their potential illocutionary 
force. This is, o f  course, what Davidson himself is claiming, but Dummett is keen to 
show just why Davidson must say this. Dummett then goes on to show how such a 
view is untenable.
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To show that indicatives must be force-neutral on Davidson’s account, Dummett 
first considers the implications of analysing the indicative in the same way that 
Davidson proposes to analyse the other moods. On this view, an assertion such as 
(16)a would be analysed as in (16)b:
(16) a. You are eating your lunch now
b. My next utterance is assertive. You are eating your lunch now
The next step in Dummett’s argument is to insist that, despite Davidson’s 
protestations to the contrary, the mood-setter in cases such as (15)a must be analysed 
as assertoric, for, if not, then the speaker won’t have asserted anything at all but 
simply have expressed two propositions.13 This means that the mood-setter must be 
analysed as being marked for assertoric use, i.e. indicative. But if  this is the case, 
then a problem of infinite regress arises, for the truth conditions o f (15)b must be 
represented as (17):
(17)  My next utterance is assertive. My next utterance is assertive. My next
utterance is imperative. You will put on your hat
In other words, every assertion will require an assertion to the effect that an assertion 
has been made, ad  infinitum.
This observation hangs on Dummett’s claim that the mood setter must itself have a 
mood because it must have force. But Davidson’s claim, as Dummett himself 
recognises, is that indicatives do not have a mood-setter but are recognised as having 
assertoric force on some occasions and lacking it on others, depending on the 
speaker’s intentions. Therefore, Davidson could argue that, even if his account does
11 This may not be a wholly accurate representation o f Davidson’s views: he says that mood-setters 
don’t assert, but he doesn’t say that speaker’s don’t assert when they utter them.
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require that mood-setters have assertoric force, this in no way commits him to the 
view that these are indicatives in the mood-indicating sense, for the indicative mood, 
on his story, is not a prerequisite of assertoric force. This resolves the problems o f 
infinite regress, but, crucially, it commits Davidson to the view that indicatives are 
mood-less, a position that Dummett sees as untenable. In addition to the reasons 
outlined in section 2, he makes the following claim:
To make out that the indicative mood was really a non-mood, one would have to show that 
its use gave no indication whatever o f the force attached to the utterance. This is impossible 
to do: at the very least, the use o f the indicative mood is a prima-facie indication that the 
speaker is attaching to what he says a force distinct from any o f those which the 
interrogative, imperative, and optative moods are typically used to convey (1993: 207)
In other words, at the very least the indicative conveys what mood it is not, and that
in itself is a type o f mood in that it indicates what information is about force is not
being communicated.
Further problems arise from the close application o f Davidson’s own analysis to the 
examples that he puts forward to undermine the view that the indicative mood and 
assertoric force are linked, such as (12) and (13):
(12) Did you notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again?
(13) Notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again
(18) a. My next utterance is interrogative. You noticed that Joan is wearing
her purple hat again 
b. My next utterance is assertive. You noticed that Joan is wearing her
purple hat again
(19) a. My next utterance is imperative. You notice that Joan is wearing her
purple hat again
b. My next utterance is assertive. You notice that Joan is wearing her
purple hat again
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In these cases, Davidson would have it that the mood indicates a double utterance so 
that they would be interpreted, initially at least, as having the truth conditions in
(18)a and (19)a respectively. However, as these are examples o f an interrogative and 
an imperative being used to make assertions, the mood-setter would be judged as 
false and the utterances reinterpreted as in (18)b and (19)b respectively. But this is 
intuitively wrong: if  these are indeed assertions, then surely what the speaker is 
asserting is the content o f the embedded indicative clause (that Joan is wearing her 
purple hat again), not the content of the whole sentence (that the hearer noticed that 
Joan is wearing her purple hat again). But this means that Davidson must provide an 
explanation o f how the content o f the indicative subordinate clause is picked out as 
the content o f the assertion, and he must do this without any appeal to the fact that 
the mood o f these clauses is indicative (Dummett 1993: 208-209).
So Davidson’s paratactic story fails on two counts: it cannot deal with his own 
examples o f sentences uttered without the force their mood would normally be taken 
to have indicated, and it relies on an untenable view o f indicatives as mood-less 
sentence radicals.14
3.2 Recanati ’s performative concerns
The claim made by Dummett in the quotation above is open to challenge in the 
following manner: one could argue that the indicative mood can be used with any of 
the forces normally associated with the other moods. If this were the case, then 
employing the indicative would not signal that one was not performing an act for 
which one o f the other moods was specified. Indeed, there is some evidence that 
might be taken to suggest that the indicative mood does have this range o f uses:
(20) You will take o ff your shoes before entering
(21) I wonder what your name is
14 Davidson’s account is also criticised by (Hamish 1994: 420-421) and Hornsby (1986).
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It could be claim ed that the speaker o f (20) is employing an indicative to give a 
command, while (21) is being used to ask a question. O f course, it might be objected 
that (20) is not a true indicative because o f the modal ‘will’, and that (21) contains 
an embedded question, yet these examples will do to give the flavour o f the sort o f 
evidence that m ight be put forward against Dummett’s claim that the indicative must 
give some indication o f force if only by virtue o f not being one of the other moods: 
if  it can potentially be used with any force conventionally associated with the other 
moods, then the hearer is given no linguistic indication of the force intended.
One author who does claim that the indicative is force-neutral is Recanati (1987), 
and he does so precisely because o f its apparent non-assertoric use.15 Recanati 
adopts this view o f indicatives (or, to use his terminology, declarative sentences) in 
order to preserve his claim that explicit performatives such as (22) do not 
communicate their directive force through an indirect speech act:
(22) I order you to leave the room
He feels he would be committed to this view by accepting that indicatives were 
specified for assertoric force because this would lead to what he terms a “Gricean” 
analysis o f perform atives such as (23), (24) and (25) (taken from Recanati 1987: 
140):
(23) It’s yours. [Said in response to “Your car is great; I wish I had one like it.”]
(24) The floor is now open to debate
(25) Prisoners condemned to death will be beheaded
15 Note that being force-neutral need not mean being mood-less. Force-neutrality might itself be the 
information encoded by the indicative mood.
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Each o f these examples is a case of an indicative sentence being used not to report a 
state o f affairs but to bring one about. If it were accepted that if  one necessarily 
performed an assertion by seriously uttering an indicative sentence, then the obvious 
way to analyse these would be as cases o f Gricean implicature, the inference being 
as follows:
(26) The speaker has asserted that P 
P is false
The speaker is aware that P is false
Therefore the speaker has flouted the Maxim o f Quality by saying what he 
believes to be false
The speaker is adhering to the Co-operative Principle
Therefore the speaker must be performing an act other than assertion
Therefore the speaker is directing me to .. ./declaring that ...
No doubt (26) could be tightened up somewhat, but it conveys the spirit o f the 
inference that the hearer would be expected to draw. Recanati’s problem is that this 
approach leads naturally to a parallel analysis o f explicit performatives such as (22), 
thus making all such utterances instances o f indirect speech. On such an analysis, the 
speaker o f (22) indicates, through his use o f the indicative mood, that he is asserting 
that he is ordering the hearer to leave the room. On the crucial assumption that an 
assertion can only be judged true when the correspondence between the proposition 
expressed and the state o f affairs it describes holds independently o f that assertion, 
the speaker would therefore be overtly asserting something that was false and 
thereby warrant an interpretation of an indirect, directive speech-act.
One can see why this might not be attractive to a speech-act theorist: (22) sounds 
about as direct a way o f giving an order as you can get. Moreover, as Recanati is 
keen to stress, such an analysis is at odds with Austin’s (1976) claim that the 
assertoric use o f declaratives is not privileged with respect to their other uses, as 
exemplified by (23), (24) and (25). To see it as privileged was, according to Austin,
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to succumb to the ‘descriptive fallacy’, whereby one sees the informative use of 
language as more fundamental than its other uses, such as naming, betting, 
promising and so on. By regarding indicatives as force-neutral, Recanati is able both 
to avoid the descriptive fallacy and have it that explicit performatives are direct 
speech acts.
It is not clear that Recanati needs to do this, though. The view Dummett puts 
forward in Mood, force and convention is that mood is merely an indicator of 
illocutionary force, not a determinant. It is a tactical tool available to allow speakers 
to achieve their communicative aims. On this view, the inference used to interpret
(23), (24) and (25) is more like:
(27) The speaker has expressed P using a form conventionally specified for the
utterance o f truths/making assertions.
P is false
The speaker is aware that P is false
Therefore the speaker cannot be using this form with its conventional force
Again, (27) could certainly be tightened up, and it leaves the remainder of the 
interpretation process unspecified, but the key point is clear: the inference does not 
rely on the premise that the speaker has made an assertion and therefore the resulting 
illocutionary force does not have to be classified as indirect. It therefore does not 
follow that one needs to postulate that the indicative is force-neutral in order to 
maintain the intuition, if  one has it, that (22) is a direct order. All that is needed is 
the recognition that an entity conventionally specified in some manner for one use 
can nevertheless be put to other uses (cf. Hamish 1994: 430). Moreover, these 
further uses may also have a conventional element.
O f course, Dummett (1993) was not available to Recanati, whose Meaning and force  
(1987) predates it. Dum m ett’s earlier writing on assertion in his book on Frege’s 
philosophy o f language (1981) does not distinguish the tactical role o f mood
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markers. Indeed, in the earlier publication he appears to equate force and the 
speaker’s point, whereas in the latter he explicitly distinguishes the tactical notion of 
force from the strategic notion of the speaker’s point. That said, however, Recanati 
(1987: § 60) does take Dummett (1981) to task over his conception o f assertion, as 
will be seen in section 3.4.1,16
3.3 The autonomy o f  linguistic meaning?
It was shown above that Davidson argues that there could be no conventional marker 
o f force such that the presence o f this marker would necessarily endow an utterance 
with the requisite force. This thesis has been challenged by Green (1997; 2000). 
Green claims that certain forms, if uttered in the performance o f a speech act, do 
inevitably result in the speaker being committed to the truth o f a particular 
proposition, or to holding it under another mode of commitment, such as conjecture. 
The condition ‘if uttered in the performance of a speech act’ is important for G reen’s 
analysis. He does not want to claim that, merely by speaking one o f the forms that he 
discusses, one thereby performs an illocutionary act associated with that form, 
regardless o f whether one is engaged in linguistic communication. For instance, an 
actor who used a particular form would not be taken to have performed the act 
conventionally associated with it beyond the realms o f the dramatic representation 
she was engaged in.17 If such a form existed, it would be a ‘strong illocutionary
16 For an account o f explicit performatives that argues that a speaker performs the act associated with 
a performative verb by stating under certain conditions that she is doing so, see Ginet (1979). 
Unfortunately, Ginet does not address the issue o f why these ‘statements’ cannot be described as true 
or false.
17 That the mere act o f  speaking a linguistic form as part o f  a dramatic representation might have 
consequences beyond the realms o f that representation may seem the sort o f possibility that only 
occurs to philosophers. As Green (1997: 222) points out, however, in certain societies (as, indeed, in 
the UK in not too distant times) blasphemous language cannot be spoken on stage without the actor 
suffering consequences.
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force indicator’, or ‘strong ifid’, in G reen’s term s.18 A ‘weak ifid’ is thus a form 
such that to utter that form in the performance o f a speech act is thereby to perform 
the act associated with it.
Candidates for the status o f  weak ifid are parenthetical performatives such as ‘I 
claim ’ and ‘I suppose’, and Urmson (1952) certainly suggests that their function is to 
indicate how the proposition expressed by the main clause is to be taken. However, 
as Green (1997: 232) points out, any indication they might give is a rather weak one, 
cancellable by elements o f the discourse. Thus, (28) is significantly affected by 
embedding in the discourse (29), so that the parenthetical can no longer be read as an 
indicator o f force, but must be read as contributing directly to the proposition 
expressed by the sentence, which the speaker is questioning, as in (30). In (31), 
however, the speaker manages both to question the proposition that Mary is 
extremely creative and to remain committed to it.
(28) Mary, I claim, is extremely creative
(29) Let us ask if  the following is true: Mary, I claim, is extremely creative
(30) Let us ask if  the following is true: I claim Mary is extremely creative
(31) Let us ask if the following is true: Mary, as I claim, is extremely creative
Green distinguishes forms such as ‘I claim ’ from those such as ‘as I claim’ by 
labelling the latter ‘robust weak ifids’, ‘robust’ because they make the same 
contribution to force regardless of whether they are embedded. Notice how these 
robust weak ifids also survive embedding in the antecedent o f a conditional, unlike 
their non-robust counterparts:
(32) If Mary, I claim, is extremely creative, then she’s bound to be a depressive
ls See Hare (1989) for claims that such a form could, in principle, exist. Green (1997) discusses 
Hare’s view.
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(33) If Mary, as I claim, is extremely creative, then she’s bound to be a depressive
The scope o f T claim ’ in (32) is unclear, though a reading on which it applies to the 
whole sentence is probably the most likely.19 Add ‘as’ to the parenthetical, however, 
and the scope is clearly narrow, showing that embedding has no effect on 
parentheticals o f this type.
‘A s’-parentheticals, Green argues, indicate illocutionary force in two ways. First, all 
‘as’-parentheticals, regardless of whether the speaker is the subject, are ‘weak 
indicators o f assertoric commitment’ in that they commit the speaker to the complex 
proposition formed by that transformation in (34):
(34) />, a s N P V - > N P V t h a t P
So, the speaker o f (35)a is committed to (35)b:
(35) a. Mary, as I claim/as Peter believes, is extremely creative
b. 1 claim that/Peter believes that Mary is extremely creative
Second, first-person attitudinal ‘as’-parentheticals warrant what Green terms ‘a weak
ifid elimination inference’, as illustrated by (36) (where ‘ is a sign o f assertoric
20commitment):
(36) a. Mary, as I claim, is extremely creative
b. |-1 claim that Mary is extremely creative
c. |- Mary is extremely creative
19 See Ifantidou (2001) for extensive discussion of the scope o f parentheticals.
20 The origins o f  the sign ‘ will be discussed in section 6.
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The move from (36)a to (36)b follows because ‘as’-parentheticals are weak 
indicators o f assertoric commitment, while the elimination o f ‘I claim that’ is due to 
the fact that to claim is a form of assertion.21 A speaker who uses (36)a in a speech 
act (assertoric or otherwise) is thus committed both to (36)b & c, even, as was seen 
earlier, if  (36)a is embedded in the antecedent o f a conditional, as (33) (repeated 
here) shows.
(33) If Mary, as I claim, is extremely creative, then she’s bound to be a depressive
Furthermore, the mode o f commitment need not be assertoric. Consider (37) (where 
‘A ’ is a mode o f commitment indicated by the subscript):
(37) a. Mary, as I conjecture, is extremely creative
b. I conjecture that Mary is extremely creative
c. A  conjecture Mary is extremely creative
Saying (37)a in the performance o f a speech act commits the speaker to holding the 
proposition that Mary is extremely creative as a conjecture.
Notice, though, that in discussing robust weak ifids, the talk has been of 
illocutionary commitment rather than o f illocutionary force. In (31), the speaker 
manages both to question the proposition that Mary is extremely creative and to 
remain committed to it, but she cannot be said to both questioning the truth o f and 
asserting that proposition.
(31) Let us ask if the following is true: Mary, as I claim, is extremely creative
21 This holds only if one accepts that assertion is a genus o f speech-acts. Williamson (1996), as will 
be seen in section 5, does not.
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Green explains this by arguing that robust weak ifids do not mark force, but 
commitment. In other words, ‘as I claim’ in the latter discourse serves not to mark 
the complement as being uttered with assertoric force but to indicate assertoric 
commitment to the proposition expressed by the complement.
The set o f propositions that one is assertorically committed to is larger than the set 
o f propositions that one asserts, for it includes all those propositions that follow from 
what one has asserted, even those of which one is ignorant. Thus, when he asserts P, 
an individual commits him self to all that follows from P, such that if he later accepts 
that a consequence o f P is false, then he must also withdraw his commitment to P. 
What is happening in (31), Green argues, is that the proposition that Mary is 
extremely creative is being put forward as a question, and the speaker, while 
expressing assertoric commitment to this proposition, is not asserting it. She is not 
asserting it, for Green, because she is not putting it forward for acceptance as part o f 
the common ground. Thus, Green appears to follow Stalnaker (1978) in viewing the 
proffering o f a proposition for inclusion in the common ground as an essential 
feature o f assertion, for weak ifids are, Green argues, a means o f expressing 
commitment to a proposition without risking rejection by one’s audience (2000: 
465-470).22
The importance o f G reen’s work on weak ifids for the study o f assertion is primarily 
that it shows how, as long as one restricts oneself to their occurrence in genuine 
speech-acts, the type o f commitment one has to a proposition can be linguistically 
communicated in a robust manner. As such, they are evidence against a reading of 
what Geach (1965) calls Frege’s point.
It’s not clear that G each’s Frege point and Green’s are identical, though they are 
related. For Geach, the point is that the same proposition may occur both asserted
22 Stalnaker’s view o f assertion will be discussed in detail in chapter 2.
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and unasserted, as in the case in modus ponens, where P occurs unasserted in the 
antecedent o f the conditional and asserted in the minor premise. For Green, the point 
is that if a form is embeddable, it cannot be an illocutionary force indicator. Both 
points stem from Frege’s distinction between grasping a thought and judging it as 
true, a distinction which, according to Frege, cannot be marked linguistically.
Green’s argument is that ‘as’-parentheticals, being robust weak ifids, undermine 
Frege’s point as long as one applies it only to their use the performance o f speech- 
acts. However, although Green’s observations regarding ‘as’-parentheticals do pose 
a challenge for Frege’s point, they form only a very restricted set. Moreover, 
labelling these forms indicators o f illocutionary fo rce  somewhat masks Green’s 
claim that these are not in fact indicators that a speech-act has been performed in 
addition to that performed by the utterance o f the main clause. The view Green 
seems to be defending is that there is a sub-species o f illocutionary force which 
entails an expression o f the commitment associated with an illocutionary act without 
performing that act (so that expressing assertoric commitment is a species o f force 
distinct from asserting, for example). Weak ifids are indicators o f illocutionary force 
only in this weaker sense. That said, what Green does show is that, despite 
Davidson’s arguments concerning the autonomy o f linguistic meaning, a linguistic 
form which is a failsafe indicator o f a certain type o f illocutionary force does exist, 
as long as one restricts the cases considered to those constituting an act o f linguistic 
communication.
Finally, Green’s distinction between asserting and expressing assertoric commitment 
underlines the fact that there is more to assertion than merely committing oneself to 
the truth o f what one says: one must also put forward the content o f what one says 
for acceptance or rejection by one’s audience.
3.4 Force and speaking seriously
In a number o f places in the literature on assertion, on force more generally, and on 
mood, a link between speaking with a certain force and speaking seriously is
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highlighted. Again, this is usually done in the context o f discussions concerning the 
extent to which mood can be thought o f as a marker o f force. The argument is 
generally this: indicative mood cannot be a determinant o f assertoric force because 
o f the existence o f linguistic practices involving the use o f the indicative which do 
not involve the speaker making an assertion. Davidson lists play, pretence, jokes, 
and fiction, and says that at times it is even unclear whether a writer is asserting or 
not, as in historical novels (1979/2001: 110-112). McGinn (1977: 303) adds 
implicature to the list and Recanati discusses irony in this vein (1987: 263). Hamish 
(1994: 430), in attempting to develop a speech-act account o f the meaning o f mood- 
markers, is keen to have seriousness as a condition on a mood conveying the force 
associated with it. (As seriousness proves hard to pin down, however, he opts instead 
for literalness.)23 Most o f these cite Frege (1918-19/1997), who discusses the speech 
o f actors in a play as an example o f the use o f the indicative without assertoric force.
While it is clear that merely using the indicative does not commit the speaker to the 
truth o f the proposition expressed regardless o f her intentions and contextual 
considerations, there is more to be said about the alleged counter-examples to this 
claim than is commonly done. The most obvious observation to make is that they 
don’t form a natural class but need to be considered separately. With this in mind, 
the following will be analysed as counter-examples to the view that the indicative 
necessarily commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition she expresses: fiction; 
implicature; irony; recitation.
3.4.1 Fiction
Under this heading comes any form of storytelling in which it is clear that the 
communicator is not aiming to provide testimony. In other words, the communicator 
is not attempting to describe how things are in the world. This includes novels, jokes 
and plays, including impromptu ‘plays’ such as those performed by children 
engaged in play. Now clearly, the speaker who utters (38) while engaged in one of
23 Hamish’s approach to mood will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
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these activities has not made an assertion in the sense o f saying something true about 
the world, otherwise it would not be possible to account for the confusion caused by 
the radio broadcast o f Orson Wells’ The War o f  the Worlds, when many listeners 
mistook a play for factual reporting:
(38) The Martians have landed
However, speakers o f indicative sentences in fictions do undertake a commitment of 
sorts: that is, they undertake to be consistent, for a story teller who contradicts 
herself will be rebuked by her audience in a manner parallel to the rebuke meted out 
to a reporter who gets her facts wrong. Clearly the consequences are more serious in 
the latter case, given libel laws, but it is necessary to ask to what extent the 
difference is due to the institutional setting. Reporting and storytelling intuitively 
have much in common, and the fact that the indicative mood is used in both and that 
that they both involve a commitment to consistency is worth analysing. One obvious 
approach is to consider them representations o f different worlds, reporting being a 
representation o f the actual world and storytelling a representation o f another 
possible world. Given that a set o f propositions can be analysed as consistent if it is 
true in at least one possible world, this perhaps provides a means o f relating truth, 
consistency and the indicative mood across both assertoric and certain non-assertoric 
uses o f this form. This possibility will be explored more fully in chapters 2 and 3.
On the question o f how best to analyse the speech o f actors in plays, Frege (1918- 
19/1997: 63) held that the expression o f what appear to be assertions by actors are in 
fact utterances o f forceless sentences. Dummett (1981: 311) objects that, if  this were 
the case, then the observer would have no idea o f what the actors were pretending to 
be doing, and that, rather than doing less than asserting, actors are in fact doing 
more, in that they are following conventions o f assertion within the conventions o f 
dramatic representation. Recanati (1987: 260-266) disagrees with Dummett, arguing 
that a distinction needs to be made between the force indicated by an utterance and 
the actual force. Mood, he claims, is an indicator o f force, but its presence does not
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guarantee the force indicated; and the speech of actors has only the indication of 
force, not force itself. However, Recanati (1987: 263) also uses the distinction 
between indicated force and actual force to explain the difference between A ’s and 
B’s utterances in (39):
(39) A: You are an imbecile
B: Oh, I am an imbecile! Thank you very much
In A ’s utterance, the force is both indicated and actual (i.e. he is asserting that B is 
an imbecile), while in B’s it is merely indicated. The problem for Recantati is that a 
dialogue such as (39) could easily arise in a play, and a means must therefore be 
found o f explaining how the difference between the two utterances is noted by the 
audience. Dummett’s claim that A is asserting the proposition he expresses while at 
the same time indicating that he does so only within the conventions of dramatic 
representation explains how the audience recognises how A ’s utterance differs from 
B’s. Recanati, however, is committed to the view that both A ’s and B’s utterances, if 
they occur in dramatic representation, only indicate force and that in neither 
utterance is the potential force realised. He therefore has no account o f how the 
difference between them is recognised by the audience.24
Thus, fiction and dramatic representation have a role to play in the analysis of 
assertion, but they do not stand up as examples of the indicative used with none of 
the effects o f assertion: the effects are restricted rather than absent, and this is what 
needs to be explained.25
24 It is not clear how Recanati reconciles the force-less analysis o f the indicative he gives in section 
40 o f Meaning and force  with the view he appears to hold in section 60 o f the indicative as an 
indicator o f  assertoric force.
25 A claim similar to Recanati’s is made by Pendlebury: “Asserting, asking, and ordering have 
something in common even when they do not involve the same proposition, namely the commitment 
that is present when one speaks seriously and fo r  oneself but missing when, for example, one reads
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3.4.2 Implicature
McGinn says that “a speaker’s saying something in order to get across some 
implicature o f what he literally says is not in general to be counted as an assertion of 
that thing” (1977: 303). This statement requires further consideration, in particular 
the qualification ‘in general’. For present purposes, implicatures can be divided into 
two types: those that rely on the proposition expressed by the utterance as a premise 
in their derivation and those which do not.
(40) A: I’m hungry
B: I cooked last night ( im p lic a tu re : You should cook tonight)
(41) A: We should invite the Joneses to dinner
B: Yes, they’re such good company ( im p lic a tu re : We shouldn’t invite the
Joneses to dinner)
In (40), B is stating that he cooked the previous night in order to imply that it is A ’s 
turn to cook this time. In such a case, A must employ the proposition that B cooked 
the night before in order to arrive at the intended meaning. In (41), by contrast, it is 
crucial that A does not employ the proposition expressed by B ’s utterance if he is to 
arrive at the intended ironic interpretation.26 In the former case, it seems clear that B 
has made an assertion, while in the latter not. However, it is hard to see how one 
could justify the claim that cases of the type exemplified by (40) are less general 
than those like (41). So implicature is not a good case o f the indicative not being 
used assertorically. Irony, meanwhile, is, and so that must be considered.
aloud, or quotes, or reports someone else’s words” (1986: 368, original emphasis). However, even 
when reading aloud one needs to be able to distinguish propositions expressed in the indicative mood 
but not asserted from those expressed in that mood and asserted (by, say, a character in the novel 
being read aloud).
26 In Relevance Theory, this difference is captured nicely by whether or not the proposition expressed 
is an explicature o f the utterance.
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3.4.3 Irony and interpretive use
It is clearly not the fact that it relies on implicature that makes B’s reply in (41) non- 
assertoric. Rather, it is the fact that B is disassociating him self from the proposition 
she expresses. In Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 224-243), this is 
explained by analysing irony as a case o f ‘interpretive use’, i.e. o f a representation 
being used not to represent a state of affairs (‘descriptive use’) but to represent 
another representation. In the case above, B’s response represents a thought he is 
ridiculing, not one he is entertaining as true. Other cases o f interpretive use include 
reported speech and summary. Being engaged in one o f these cases o f interpretive 
use, however, does not necessarily mean that the speaker is not asserting anything. 
In (42) the writer compares two views o f evolution. The first he attributes to 
Lamarck, but this view is now universally rejected, and the author goes to lengths to 
make it clear that he is not asserting any of the claims he describes (as shown by the 
underlined phrases). There is a marked difference between this and his account o f 
Darwin’s views, where he is quite happy to have the views attributed to himself, 
these now being almost universally accepted, o f course. The point is that both 
paragraphs are predominately cases o f interpretive use, but the speaker can still be 
taken to have asserted much o f the content o f the latter, for in this case the 
interpretive use comes with an attitude of agreement. Thus, interpretive use is not 
necessarily at odds with assertion, though irony, a sub-type o f interpretive use, most 
certainly is.
(42) In 1809, a French naturalist by the name o f Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) published a 
book called Zoological Philosophy. In this book, Lamarck claimed that the environment 
directly moulded the form o f  an organism. He said that the environment caused organisms to 
acquire small changes which were then passed on to the next generation. For example, 
fossils had shown that the ancestors o f giraffes had short necks. Lamarck suggested that 
competition for food at ground level encouraged these ancestors to sketch upwards in order 
to reach higher vegetation. According to Lamarck, this habitual stretching caused their necks 
to lengthen slightly and this characteristic was passed on to their offspring (whose necks 
would further stretch and so on). Over many generations, Lamarck claimed, these slight 
changes would accumulate to produce modem long-necked giraffes. Lamarck's explanation 
for adaptation is known as the inheritance o f acquired characteristics. It is an instructionist
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theory. Living things are pictured as malleable entities which the environment can directly 
shape, or instruct.
In 1859, Charles Darwin (1809-82) published The Origin o f  Species, in which he offered a 
wholly new explanation for adaptation. Darwin pointed out that there exists a great diversity 
o f living things. Even within one species, each individual is slightly different, such 
variations occur quite independently o f the environment - they are random. However, in the 
intense competition o f life, even the tiniest o f variations can affect the fitness o f an 
individual. For example if, by chance, one o f the giraffe's short-necked ancestors happened 
to have a slightly longer neck than the others, it would be able to reach leaves its fellow 
creatures could not. This characteristic would give the animal a survival advantage and it 
would therefore leave more offspring in the next generation than its fellow creatures would. 
Because the variations are inherited, beneficial ones become more common in the 
population, whereas disadvantageous variations become less common. The population 
becomes better and better adapted to the environment. Darwin's theory is selectionist. 
Characteristics occur initially by chance and are then selected by the environment.27
3.4.4 Recitation
McGinn also points to recitation as a case of force-less language use. There is little 
to say about this, other than to express general agreement with McGinn. However, 
one could point to the oath read aloud when giving testimony in court as a counter­
example. In this case, institutional conventions make the reading aloud o f a certain 
text a forceT/w// event.
It has been shown, then, that many o f the examples o f putative force-less language 
use actually benefit from closer scrutiny. Fiction and dramatic interpretation, in 
particular, have much in common with clear-cut cases o f assertion and it will be 
necessary to bear this in mind when developing a new analysis of assertion and 
mood in later stages o f this thesis (in particular, during chapter 3 section. 2.3).
27 The Man who Made Up his Mind, BBC Education
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3.5 Embedded m ood
A possible use one might make of the notion of assertoric force is to explain the 
difference between embedded and independent indicative clauses. Some sort o f 
distinction is needed in order to explain the double occurrence o f P in a modus 
ponens argument, as given schematically in (43):
(43) P—»Q 
P____
Q
The premise o f this argument would be redundant if P in the first premise were 
asserted. Characterising it as an unasserted constituent o f a more complex 
proposition, which is asserted, removes this problem.
Much more will be said about this in section 6: at this stage the question of mood, 
force and embedding will be considered more generally. Broadly, two issues will be 
discussed: whether embedded clauses can carry assertoric force and whether mood 
in embedded clauses makes any contribution to meaning when it does not convey 
force.
On the question o f whether embedded clauses can carry assertoric force, there are 
two views in the literature. Dummett (1981) is quite clear that only the proposition 
expressed by the main clause o f an indicative sentence is asserted, while other 
authors, such as Geach (1965), have it that that certain embedded clauses are also 
asserted.
Dummett’s view is motivated by his concern to defend the view that the indicative 
can be seen as the natural language equivalent o f Frege’s assertion sign. However, a 
simple declaration o f this position would have it that the antecedents of indicative 
conditionals are asserted, which is clearly not the case (as has just been noted), or 
that the speaker performs as many assertions as there are indicatives in her sentence,
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which is also an undesirable position to have to defend. Restricting force indicators 
to the main clause o f a sentence, as Dummett does, avoids these problems.
Geach, on the other hand, has it that subordinate clauses introduced by ‘the fact that’ 
are asserted by the speaker, as are those introduced by factive verbs such as ‘point 
out’. In cases such as (44) and (45) the speaker is said to have performed a double- 
barrelled assertion, with one assertion committing the speaker to the proposition 
expressed by the main clause, and the other to that expressed by the subordinate 
clause.
(44) Peter is aware o f the fact that his wife has arranged a surprise party for him
(45) Peter pointed out that Chomsky is an American citizen
Interestingly, Geach also claims that such a double-barrelled assertion takes place 
with ‘under the illusion that’, as in:
(46) Peter is under the illusion that he is the son o f God
In this case, however, the embedded assertion is the negation o f the embedded 
clause (i.e. that Peter is not the son of God), so, for Geach, it appears that asserted 
propositions do not have to be explicitly expressed, but can be implicitly 
communicated. Thus, it seems that for Geach commitment, through entailment, to 
truth is all that is required for a proposition to be asserted.
Also relevant here (again) is Urmson’s (1952) notion of the parenthetical use of 
certain verbs, such as ‘suppose’:
(47) a. I suppose that’s his wife
b. That’s his wife, I suppose
c. That, I suppose, is his wife
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While a case might be made to the effect that the presence o f suppose in (47)b or c is 
in fact syntactically detached from the ‘that’s his w ife’-clause and that, 
consequently, this clause is not embedded (Ifantidou 2001), (47)a is also open to the 
same interpretation as (47)b and c, and in this case it certainly appears that the 
embedded clause is the main assertion of the utterance. Parentheticals have been 
analysed by a num ber o f authors (Blakemore 1990/91; Ifantidou 2001; Wilson & 
Sperber 1993) as consisting o f two utterances, one o f the proposition expressed by 
the embedding clause and one o f that expressed by the embedded clause. Whether 
these are double assertions, however, is not clear, and will ultimately depend on how 
assertion is defined.
It seems, then, that though one might not want to go as far as Geach, it will be hard 
to deny that certain embedded clauses can have assertoric force in that they commit 
the speaker to the truth o f the proposition they express and put forward that 
proposition for acceptance, confirmation or rejection by the hearer. Consequently, 
Dummett’s position on this issue is hard to maintain. That said, it may be that on 
closer inspection a number o f cases where the speaker is committed to the truth of an 
embedded clause are better analysed as cases of presupposition due to a lack o f an 
informative intention, (44) being a case in point. This will depend on how assertion 
is related to information structure, a topic to be discussed in section 7.
Moving to the second issue, it does indeed seem that mood can make a contribution 
to the meaning o f embedded clauses on those occasions when it does not indicate the 
force o f the utterance.
(48) a. Rick thinks he knows that Sam will play it again
b. Rick thinks he knows whether Sam will play it again
(49) a. Peter insists that Mary went to the party
b. Peter insists that Mary go to the party
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In (48), which is due to Pendlebury (1986: 363), a and b have different truth 
conditions: (48)a would be true if Rick answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Will Sam 
play it again?’; while (48)b could be true whether he answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Similarly, (49)a and b clearly differ in meaning. O f course, these only show that 
embedded mood affects meaning if one accepts that the subordinate clauses are 
embedded versions o f main-clause indicatives, interrogatives and imperatives. While 
a reasonable case against this view might be made for imperatives (their use being 
much more restricted than their embedded counterparts, which are probably best 
seen as infinitives rather than embedded imperatives), as far as indicatives are 
concerned there is little evidence that embedded and main clause occurrences are 
linguistically distinct. If this is the case, then parsimony will make preferable an 
account o f the meaning of the indicative which does not posit mood making a 
distinct semantic contribution in main-clause and embedded uses. Given that it has 
been shown that in some cases an embedded indicative can convey assertoric force, 
an acceptable account o f assertion will thus have to explain under what conditions 
this can happen and, when it does not happen, how the encoded meaning o f the 
indicative nevertheless contributes to the interpretation o f the sentence.
3.6 Conclusion to section 3
The relationship between the indicative mood and assertoric force is far from 
straightforward: an adequate account will have to explain the observations made in 
this section. In particular, an account o f stage-assertions and fiction will be needed, 
as well as o f why both embedded and main clause indicatives at times convey 
assertoric force, and at times do not. Before seeking to develop such an account, 
however, it is necessary to return to the issue o f why one might want a notion of 
assertion. In this section, it has been considered in terms o f its possible role as a 
‘meaning’ for the indicative. However, there are other uses the notion might be put 
to.
4  C o m m u n i c a t i o n
It was noted in section 2 that truth is employed as a means o f explicating linguistic 
meaning, so that the meaning of the proposition expressed by an utterance can be
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given in terms o f its truth conditions. This section notes that a number o f theorists 
(e.g. Grice 1989; Lewis 1975) have sought to explain the mechanics o f human 
communication by postulating norms or conventions o f  truthfulness. This may seem 
like an obvious step to take, the logic behind it being as follows: linguistic meaning 
is best understood in terms o f truth-conditions; people can therefore say true or false 
things; people use language to communicate; for this to succeed they need to assume 
that those they are communicating with are being honest; therefore there must exist a 
convention/norm o f truthfulness such that interlocutors generally assume that they 
are to be truthful and can expect to be taken as being truthful. If this line o f thought 
is followed, assertion, i.e. speaking with the intention o f saying something true, then 
becomes the paradigmatic case o f linguistic communication.
However, the claim that speakers try to be (and are expected to try to be) truthful can 
be taken a number of ways, as Wilson & Sperber (2002) point out (see also Wilson 
1995). First, if such a line is taken, it can apply to different levels o f meaning: either 
to the speaker's overall contribution to the conversation or to what she ‘literally 
says'. Second, it can be thought of as a moral obligation to avoid deception, or, more 
strongly, as the basis on which particular modes o f linguistic communication, such 
as metaphor and irony, depend. Each o f these distinctions is examined in turn below.
Given a sentence such as (50)a, most speakers o f English would assume that the 
speaker's intention was to communicate (50)b. However, as the valid inference (51) 
shows, this is not what is encoded by (50)a. It seems, then, that deriving (50)b from 
(50)a is matter o f pragmatic inference rather than decoding.
(50) a. Some o f the children have left
b. Not all o f the children have left
(51) If some o f the children have left, we can go home 
All o f the children have left
Therefore, we can go home
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For some authors, such as Grice, cases like (50) are grounds for distinguishing a 
level o f literal meaning, or what is said, which plays a role in the interpretation of 
utterances o f sentences such as (50)a. The idea is that on the basis of what the 
speaker ‘literally says’, the hearer can infer what she means on that occasion of 
utterance. This view and its more sophisticated variants have been seriously 
challenged by relevance theorists such as Sperber & Wilson and Carston (see 
Carston 2002b: chapter 2 for extensive analysis and references). What is o f concern 
here, though, is at which level the speaker might be said to be following the norm of 
truthfulness: at the level o f ‘what is said’ or at the level o f what is meant?
The point becomes crucial when the second of the two distinctions drawn above is 
considered: between positing a norm of truthfulness as a moral imperative or as the 
basis o f an explanation o f certain aspects o f linguistic communication. Metaphor and 
irony have often been thought to be parasitic on a norm of truthfulness, the idea 
being that the speaker says something which she clearly does not believe to be true 
and thus invites her audience to infer her intended meaning on the grounds that she 
has blatantly failed to observe the supposed convention o f truthfulness. If such an 
account is to work, however, it seems clear that a distinction must be drawn between 
being truthful in terms o f what one means and in terms o f what one says. This is 
because even in cases o f irony and metaphor, speakers are still expected not to 
deceive, though the point relates not to the propositions ‘literally’ expressed by their 
utterances but to the message inferred on the basis of their blatantly expressing a 
false proposition (W ilson & Sperber 2002).
G rice’s formulation o f  the supposed convention of truthfulness, his Maxim of 
Quality, seeks both to capture this distinction between what a speaker means and 
what she says and to provide a basis for the analysis of metaphor and irony:
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Grice's Maxim o f  Quality (Grice 1989: 27)
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one which is true.
(i) Do not say what you believe to be false.
(ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
The supermaxim requires speakers to try to make their contribution true, i.e. not 
merely the proposition their utterance expresses but all that they intend to 
communicate by that utterance: both its explicit and its implicit content. The 
submaxims, by contrast, relate only to what one says, i.e. the propositions explicitly 
expressed. On this view, the speaker of a metaphoric or ironic utterance flouts the 
first submaxim and invites the audience to infer a message on the assumption that 
she is still observing the supermaxim, i.e. that she wants to communicate something 
true even though she has said something which she patently believes to be false.
However, as Wilson & Sperber (2002) point out, this analysis runs into problems 
once the meaning o f ksay’ in the submaxims is scrutinised. ‘Say’ can be analysed 
either as merely expressing a proposition or as asserting it, the former differing from 
the latter in that there is no commitment to truth. On the first reading, the speaker o f 
an ironical or metaphoric utterance flouts the first submaxim by expressing a 
proposition she believes to be false. This then triggers the inference o f her intended 
meaning. The problem here, though, is that Grice has it that implicatures are derived 
in order to ensure that the maxims are being adhered to, but on this account the 
inferences do not result in the speaker saying something she believes to be true. A 
defender o f Grice could argue, though, that as long as the supermaxim is observed, 
then the spirit, if not the letter, o f the maxims is being observed, and indeed it is in 
these terms that Grice speaks o f the derivation of implicatures in his Retrospective 
Epilogue (1989: 370). All the same, responding to objections o f the sort raised by 
Wilson & Sperber by claiming that the maxims were being followed ‘in spirit’ does 
not exactly amount to a robust defence.
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On the second reading o f ‘say’, the role of the maxim o f truthfulness becomes 
unclear. As W ilson & Sperber point out, if assertion already entails intending to 
speak truthfully then the maxim of truthfulness is redundant. Indeed, one could 
provide the sort o f account o f irony and metaphor that Grice aims for simply by 
positing a moral imperative to be truthful and the notion of assertion. Then, when a 
speaker asserts a manifest falsehood, she triggers an inferential procedure aimed at 
reconciling this with the assumption that she is following the moral imperative to be 
truthful, and this results in the derivation o f the speaker’s implicit meaning. The 
problem with such an account is that it suggests no rationale for speaking 
figuratively: why not simply say explicitly what one means? This is in contrast to 
their own relevance-based account, which, as will be seen in chapter 2, justifies the 
extra effort involved in interpreting figurative utterances by showing that these result 
in a quality and range o f effects that literal paraphrases do not (Wilson & Sperber 
2002).
That speakers are expected to be truthful in terms o f their contributions to 
conversations is not a claim that many would want to deny. Nevertheless, accepting 
this does not entail accepting that communication fundamentally relies on a 
convention o f truthfulness. It may well be that there is a more fundamental 
consideration guiding human verbal communication. As will be seen in chapters 2 
and 3, a presumption o f relevance is a strong candidate for such a fundamental role. 
At present, though, it is simply necessary to note that an account o f linguistic 
communication that relies on the notion of a manifestly false assertion to solve the 
problems o f m etaphor and irony is not unproblematic.
5 K n o w l e d g e  t r a n s f e r
Given the role o f  communication in the transfer o f knowledge and the premium put 
on reliable information, it is to be expected that humans have a linguistic practice 
such that by engaging in that practice they thereby take responsibility for the quality 
o f the information they communicate. This is the view put forward by Williamson
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(1996), who argues that assertion is the means by which individuals take on 
responsibility for information they share with others.28
In an attempt to distinguish it from all other speech-acts, Williamson seeks a 
constitutive rule for assertion. A constitutive rule is, as the name suggests, a means 
o f isolating the essence o f an activity, and the rule that constitutes assertion, 
Williamson argues, can be expressed in the form given in (52):
(52) One must ((assert that P) only if certain conditions pertain)
Formulating the constitutive rule for assertion requires specifying what the ‘certain 
conditions’ are. Williamson argues that the condition cannot simply be that P be 
true, for this would fail to individuate assertion, there being other at least one other 
speech-act, i.e. conjecturing, which also requires that it only be performed if the 
proposition expressed is believed to be true. In addition to conjecturing that P, 
Williamson uses swearing that P as another example o f an act that would meet the 
condition o f truth. One might want to argue that swearing that P is a strong form of 
asserting that P, but this, Williamson argues, would not undermine his case: for him, 
the key point is that assertion lies on a cline between conjecturing and swearing, 
with each point on the cline having different standards o f warranting evidence. 
Someone wanting to maintain that truth individuated assertion would have to argue 
that the standard o f evidence required for assertion was “more intimately related to 
truth” (1996: 497) than is the case with other speech-acts aiming at truth.
For Williamson, what distinguishes assertion from other speech-acts aiming at truth 
is precisely that the standard o f evidence it requires is different from that required by 
the others. And the evidence required for assertion, Williamson argues, is
28 Another author who is concerned with the relationship between responsibility and assertion is 
Watson (2004).
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knowledge. Now, it may be felt that it is difficult to say with any certainty what one 
truly knows (as opposed to what one strongly believes), but a consideration of 
mental and perceptual states that entail knowledge reveals that people are generally 
happier to talk about what they know than might be indicated by the philosophical 
alarm-bells that this word sets off. For example, people are generally quite happy to 
say that they rem em ber that P, that they regret that P and that they saw that P, all of 
which entail that they know that P (Williamson 1995).
On this view, the rule constitutive o f assertion is:
(53) One must ((assert that P) only if one knows that P)
It is important to note that the claim is not that people only assert what they know, 
rather that they are open to rebuke if it turns out that they do not know what they 
assert. As Garcia-Carpintero puts it:
It is o f course no objection to such an account that there are assertions whose producers lack 
knowledge o f  the contents they assert. The claim is not that knowledge by the asserter [...] 
o f  the asserted proposition is essential; the claim is rather that being subject to blame if 
knowledge [ ...]  are missing is essential (2004: 145).
Attempting to show that knowledge is what warrants assertion, Williamson (1996) 
imagines a lottery in which the chances o f winning are very low, say 14 million to 1, 
and in which there can only be one winner. A friend of yours has only one ticket and 
you say to him, after the draw has taken place but without either o f you being aware 
o f the outcome (but both aware o f the odds):
(54) Your ticket d idn’t win
The crucial point about (54) is that one can be very sure that it is true (the odds on it 
not being true are 14 million to 1), but it is still faulty in the circumstances 
described. If assertion were warranted by truth, though, then (54) should be OK, for
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it is highly likely to be true. The fact that (54) is not acceptable leads Williamson to 
conclude that what warrants assertion is not the truth P, but that the speakers knows 
that P (as opposed to justifiably believing that P).
Moreover, as Williamson points out, there is a difference in effect between (54) and 
(55) which would not exist if assertion were warranted by truth. (54) would be 
warranted, according to a defender of the truth-theory o f assertion, by its almost 
certain truth. One should therefore expect, on this view, that (55) (which explicitly 
expresses the almost-certainty of the proposition expressed by (54)) would have the 
same effect and therefore be faulty in the same way. However, while (54) could be 
responded to, in the circumstances under consideration, by asking ‘How do you 
know?, (55) could be responded to by saying T know (1996: 499-500). Or, to make 
the point another way, while (54) would be felt deceitful in the situation described, 
(55) would merely be uninformative.
(55) Your ticket is almost certain not to have won
Indeed, the fact that one can respond ‘How do you know?’ to an assertion, he argues, 
indicates that assertion presupposes knowledge. Moreover, ‘Do you know that?’ is 
an aggressive response to assertion, and the aggressiveness can be explained by the 
fact that it calls into question the speaker’s warrant to assert (1996: 505-506).
The fact that speaker’s often assert when they do not have knowledge, Williamson 
goes on to argue, is not a problem for his account, as breaking a constitutive rule (a 
norm) does not mean that the activity it constitutes does not take place. There are 
different standards o f rules for different occasions (the offside rule is not generally 
observed in informal games o f football). Thus, in gossip, although one may speak 
without knowledge, it is not that the knowledge rule is not in force, but that breaking 
it is o f little consequence (1996: 511).
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As noted above, the reason there exists a speech-act that is warranted by knowledge 
rather than (highly probable, belief-warranting) truth, Williamson suggests, is that, 
when one asserts, one takes responsibility for the truth o f what one says, a 
responsibility one discharges by epistemically ensuring the truth o f the content. It is 
because humans have a use for relations of responsibility, then, that the act of 
assertion exists (1996: 521-522).
W illiamson’s claims here are supported by the variety o f means speakers have 
available to avoid taking epistemic responsibility for the propositions they utter, 
even when they are inclined to take them to be true. Evidential particles are the 
obvious example, but the epistemic use o f ‘must’ and ‘can’t’ are notable as means of 
presenting a proposition as certain without claiming knowledge.
While generally very sympathetic to Williamson’s knowledge-based view of 
assertion, Garcia-Carpintero (2004) argues that it doesn’t truly reflect the social 
function o f assertion as a means o f transferring knowledge. Someone performing 
soliloquies in the absence o f an audience could be complying with the knowledge 
rule, even though she would not be communicating anything to anybody. And 
surely, if one wants to explain assertion in terms o f responsibility for information 
garnered via communication, then it must be viewed as primarily a communicative 
act. Moreover, W illiamson’s knowledge rule can be argued not to individuate 
assertion, as someone who claims that knowledge is a prerequisite for assertion is 
also likely to view it as a prerequisite for presupposition: surely the grounds for 
one’s presuppositions must the same as those that warrant one’s assertions. Garcia- 
Carpintero (2004: 159) therefore proposes that the knowledge rule be replaced by 
the transfer o f knowledge rule (56):
(56) One must ((assert P) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a position 
to know P)
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For W illiamson and Garcia-Carpintero, one either asserts or does not: there can be 
no degrees o f  assertion or qualified assertion. Thus, for these authors, parenthetical 
utterances o f the type ‘P, I believe’ are not, as they are often described, qualified 
assertions o f P, for they explicitly deny knowledge o f P. Indeed, adopting this view 
o f assertion would mean excluding a great many cases o f what theorists have been 
happy to call assertions. Moreover, this view also implicitly denies that assertion is a 
genus o f acts, in contrast to Dummett (1981: 356) and others (see e.g. Vanderveken 
1990: 169 for a list o f what he considers to be assertive speech acts).
The relationship between responsibility and assertion that Williamson and Garcia- 
Carpintero see as central is also crucial to the study o f linguistic communication 
from a sociological point o f view (see Brandom 1983; 1994 for an approach to 
assertion from this perspective). This is especially so in the case of testimony, which 
relies on speakers both being committed to the truth o f what they say and taking 
responsibility for the veracity of the information they provide. Coady (1992) 
provides extensive philosophical discussion o f the nature of testimony. An 
explanation o f  the means by which children learn by testimony, as opposed to 
observation, will also have to make reference to linguistic practices aimed at truth 
and the recognition o f these by those children. There seems to be no work that 
explicitly relates testimony in this sense to assertion, though work by Harris 
(Clement et al. 2004; Harris 2002, 2004) provides interesting discussion o f the 
importance o f  testimony as a source of knowledge.
6  I n f e r e n c e
Current thinking on force can be traced back to Frege, but his concern was not 
exclusively with force as an element of natural language, but also -  and perhaps 
primarily -  with its use in logic. Frege argued, as did Russell and Whitehead in the 
Principia Mathematica, that a perspicuous logical notation requires a symbol 
denoting assertion: ‘ \-\ The effect of this is to mark the formula that follows it as 
having been judged true. Frege has been criticised, most notably by Wittgenstein 
(1958: 10-11), for this move, on the grounds that judging to be true is a
61
psychological process resulting in an attitude towards a proposition: it has no effect 
on the implications o f that proposition and therefore should have no place in a 
logical symbolism.
Given that Frege was so keen to keep psychology out o f logic (1918-19/1997: 342), 
it is perhaps puzzling that he should be so insistent on the need for an assertion sign. 
Geach (1976: 63) argues that the sign is a necessity in a logically perspicuous 
notation in order that suppositions be distinguished from assertions when making a 
supposition for the sake o f a reductio ad  absurdum  argument. Dummett (1981: 309), 
however, insists that this was not Frege’s reason for wanting an assertion sign and 
argues that supposition plays no role in Frege’s logic, its place being occupied by the 
assertion o f conditional sentences. Thus, rather than make a supposition such as 
(57), Dummett claims, Frege would assert a conditional such as (58),
(57) Suppose the killer is a vegetarian. It then follows that he can’t be a cannibal.
(58) If the killer is a vegetarian, he can’t be a cannibal.
Green (2002) and Smith (2000) argue that in order to understand Frege’s insistence 
that an adequate logical symbolism contain an assertion sign, it is necessary to 
consider the use to which Frege wished to put his logic. Green explains that Frege 
saw his project as related in part to Leibniz’s conception o f a lingua characteristica, 
an ideal o f a number o f seventeenth century writers who aimed to develop a system 
that would allow for the clear and precise expression o f all thoughts, provide a 
lingua franca for communication among all peoples, and “serve as an organon for 
the discovery of new truths or for the systematization o f what is known” (Green 
2002: 207). Green argues that most scholars, concentrating on Frege’s desire to 
construct a system suitable for the first o f these aims, ignore the fact that he also saw 
his logical enterprise as contributing to the third. Given this aim, it is necessary for 
him to formally distinguish what is (taken to be) true, so that any further knowledge 
derived from this by the laws o f logic would be also be true and could be shown to 
be so. Modern-day logicians, however, have different concerns, being interested in
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examining the properties o f formulas and what these imply given certain inference 
rules. The point they would make to Frege, as was noted above, is that one’s attitude 
towards a formula makes no difference to what it implies, and hence is o f no concern 
to those studying the behaviour of these forms (Green 2002; Smith 2000).
Green goes on to argue that that rather than viewing Frege’s assertion sign as marker 
o f assertoric fo rce , it should be viewed as a marker o f assertoric commitment, given 
that it will preface not only those propositions asserted but also those that follow 
logically from them and from others so prefaced.29 The notion of assertoric 
commitment, as was seen in section 3.3, is thus intended to account for the fact that 
what an individual asserts commits her to much more than the content o f her 
assertion, some o f which may actually be unknown to her and, indeed, come as a 
surprise.
While modern-day logicians may not have any use for the assertion sign, those who 
employ logic in an attempt to analyse human cognition are in many ways engaged in 
a project parallel to Frege’s. Just as Frege wanted to develop a logical system that 
would serve as an organon for the discovery and systemisation o f truths, so the 
cognitivist seeks a system to model the human ability to form an accurate-enough 
mental representation o f the world. Such a system must have a means of 
distinguishing thoughts held as true representations o f the world from those 
entertained in the process of, say, imagining, for whatever purpose, other possible 
states o f  the world. Indeed, Geach suggests that there might be a correlate to 
assertoric force in the realm of thoughts: “possibly a thought is assertoric in 
character unless it loses this character by occurring only as an element in a more 
complicated thought’’ (1965: 457). This point will be returned to in chapter 2, when 
the relevance-theoretic view o f mental representation is discussed.
29 To this one might add that most conceptions of assertoric force appear to have an informative 
element which Frege's assertion sign does not convey.
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There are further concerns, as was noted earlier, relating to the relationship between 
natural-language assertion and assertion in logic. Some authors, such as Dummett 
(1981; 1993; 1995), have suggested that the indicative mood in main clauses can be 
considered a natural-language equivalent o f Frege’s assertion sign. However, there is 
a duality to the linguistic sign which is not found in the logical symbol. The logical 
symbol signals that the propositional form following it has been judged true. It is 
unequivocal. However, the presence o f the indicative mood (if indeed it is a natural- 
language assertion sign), need not signal that an assertion is being made, as was seen 
in section 3.4. Hare (1970/1971: 89-93; 1989) therefore distinguishes between the 
mood-marker a linguistic expression carries and the force with which it is employed 
by terming the former the ‘tropic’ and the latter the ‘neustic’. (He calls the 
proposition expressed the ‘phrastic’.) He describes the roles o f the topic and neustic 
as follows: “although a neustic has to be present or understood before a sentence can 
be used to make an assertion or perform any other speech act, it is in virtue o f its 
tropic that it is used to make an assertion and not to perform some other speech act” 
(Hare 1970/1971: 92). Assertions, then, are not guaranteed by the presence of the 
appropriate tropic, on Hare’s view, but cannot be made without it.30
Hare uses the division o f labour between the topic and the neustic to explain what 
happens when indicative clauses are embedded in ‘iF-clauses and certain ‘that’- 
clauses:
(59) a. The boss is leaving the party early
b. If the boss leaves the party early, we can all let our hair down
c. It is true that the boss is leaving the party early
d. It is not true that the boss is leaving the party early
e. Leave the party early, boss!
30 See Dummett (1995: 115) for his views on Hare’s terminology.
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For Hare, what distinguishes (59)a. from the embedded instances o f this in (59)b, c 
& d is that in the latter cases the assertive neustic is missing, although they share the 
same tropic. For this reason, only (59)a can be read assertorically. (59)e, on the other 
hand, differs from (59)a in both tropic and neustic. This, according to Hare, explains 
why the inference (60) is valid while (61) is not (complications due to differences in 
aspect are ignored).
(60) Prem ise: If the boss leaves the party early, we can all let our hair down 
Prem ise: The boss is leaving the party early
Conclusion'. We can all let our hair down
(61) Premise: If the boss leaves the party early, we can all let our hair down 
Premise: Leave the party early, boss!
Conclusion: We can all let our hair down
That is to say, for modus ponens to go through, the minor premise must have both 
the same tropic and phrastic as the antecedent of the conditional. However, as far as 
logic is concerned, the distinction between tropic and neustic is only necessary if one 
is interested in inferences that lead to action (or, perhaps, the asking o f questions), 
for only in such cases will there be a need to distinguish between propositions put 
forward as true and those put forward as courses of action, as would be the case if 
one were attempting to develop a system of inference to direct action. In such a case, 
one would want the output o f such inferences to be expressed by imperatives rather 
than assertions. The neustic/tropic distinction is thus a concern for Hare, who is 
concerned with ethics, and Grice (2001) in his work on reasoning, because in such 
cases a distinction must be marked, on the one hand, between those propositional 
forms which are both assertoric and in fact asserted and those which are assertoric 
but not asserted; and, on the other hand, between those which have assertoric 
potential and those which do not (such as imperative syntax in natural language). 
However, in the absence o f a need for non-assertoric propositional forms, all that
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will be required is the two-way distinction between asserted and non-asserted 
propositional forms (cf. Recanati 1987: 263). This was the need felt by Frege and 
Russell.
Hare’s point about modus ponens, though, does touch upon the concerns o f Frege 
and Russell. As was seen briefly in section 3.5, in one sense something is needed to 
distinguish the P o f the minor premise from the embedded P o f the conditional and 
thus avoid the redundancy that would result if  they were indistinguishable. In 
another sense, however, both Ps need to be the same, so that the inference goes 
through. Similarly, Q in the first premise must be distinguished from Q in the 
conclusion if the argument is not to be circular. In both cases, the assertion sign 
provides just the right amount of difference and similarity, so that a perspicuous 
rendering of modus ponens would be as in (62), with assertions clearly marked 
(Dummett 1981; Geach 1965; Green 2000; Hare 1970/1971):
(62) |- ( P - Q )
k£— 
ho
This illustrates nicely Frege’s concern that the assertion sign not be understood as 
contributing to the content o f the assertion: P and Q represent the same content 
throughout (62) and the assertion sign does not add content but signals force. Recall 
that Frege (1918-19/1997) also made the claim that no content-bearing sign could 
function as a marker o f assertion: it could always be deprived o f this force by, say, 
embedding in a conditional or being used by an actor, he argued. As section 3.3 
showed, though, a weakened version of this claim has been challenged by Green’s 
(1997; 2000) identification o f robust weak-ifids.31
31 Another author who emphasises the centrality o f inference to a proper understanding o f  assertion is 
Brandom (1983; 1994), who argues that “[t]o put a sentence forward as information is thus to present 
it as fodder for inferences leading to further assertions” (1983: 640). As noted above, Brandom’s
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This discussion o f the role o f assertion in inference will be important in later 
sections, when the nature o f mental representation and its relationship to assertion is 
discussed. It will be shown that assertion can be characterised in terms o f attempting 
to have an effect on a context made up o f mental representations which are assertoric 
in character, and the indicative mood distinguished by its potential to make available 
propositional forms o f the correct format (of the correct ‘tropic’, in Hare’s terms) to 
have such an effect (see, in particular, chapter 3 section 2.3).
7 I n f o r m a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e
Assertion is also central to accounts of information structure. When one makes an 
assertion, one clearly commits oneself to far more than the proposition expressed by 
the utterance. For example, as speaker who utters (63) not only commits herself to 
the proposition that her sister is coming, but also to the proposition that she has a 
sister.
(63) My sister is coming to visit today
For some writers, this is evidence that what is asserted goes beyond the proposition 
expressed, while for others assertion is limited to the proposition expressed. Let’s 
call the former view the Russellian view, and the latter the Strawsonian view, 
reflecting the concerns o f two philosophers whose debate focussed attention on this 
issue (Russell 1905, 1957; Strawson 1950/1971). The debate will not be reviewed 
here, however, as it is well documented elsewhere (see Levinson 1983: 169-177).
The Russellian clearly does not want to have it that all that an utterance explicitly 
and implicitly communicates is asserted; rather, what is asserted, on this view, is the 
set o f propositions necessary for a sentence to be truth-evaluable. On this view, a
main concerns are with the social norms he sees as regulating assertion, though, and as such are not 
o f great relevance to a cognitively oriented approach such as is being developed here.
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sentence such as (64)a can only be given a positive truth-value if  the queen o f Sheba 
exists and hence (64)b must be part of the meaning of (64)a, and someone who 
asserts (64)a also taken to have asserted (64)b, among other things.32
(64) a. The queen o f Sheba is bald
b. The queen o f Sheba exists
For the Strawsonian, this confuses sentence types and utterances. O f course, they 
reply, the speaker o f (64)a is committed to (64)b, but it does not follow that (64)b is 
part o f what is asserted by an utterance o f (64)a. Rather, (64)b is taken for granted, 
or presupposed, by the speaker o f (64)a: it is presented as part o f the common 
ground to which (64)a is to be added.
The advantage o f the Strawsonian account, as Levinson (1983: 173) points out, is 
that it meshes nicely with intuitions about foregrounding and backgrounding of 
information: it is felt that the speaker’s main point in uttering (64)a would be the 
attribution o f baldness to the subject, and that (64)a would be a strange way o f 
communicating (64)b. It thus brings an informative element to the notion of 
assertion, such that to assert is not merely to claim truth but also to present 
information as new to one’s audience.
This is certainly the view which has held sway in linguistics, where there has been a 
great deal of work both on presupposition (for recent reviews o f the literature, see 
Beaver 2001; Kadmon 2000) and on the related issue o f information structure. Such 
a view is at the heart o f Stalnaker’s (1978) conception o f assertion, and of 
Lambrecht’s (1994). As was mentioned briefly in section 3.3, Stalnaker actually
32 Russell certainly seems to have thought that all the elements o f the logical form o f  a definite 
description are asserted  by the speaker who asserts a sentence containing that definite description: 
“Thus when we say “jc was the father o f Charles II.” we not only assert that x had a certain relation to 
Charles II., but also that nothing else had this relation.” (Russell 1905: 481-482)
68
characterises assertion as having the essential effect o f adding the proposition 
expressed to the com m on ground, though he is quick to point out that this alone does 
not define assertion, as other acts, such as supposition, have the same effect. 
Lambrecht equates what is asserted by a sentence with new information.
Abbott’s (2000) view is different in that she wants to avoid claiming any necessary 
link between presuppositions and old information or common ground. 
Presuppositions, she argues, are simply nonassertions. This, o f course, raises the 
question o f what an assertion is, and Abbott has no answer to this. Rather, she 
suggests that there is such a thing as an “ideal assertion”, which is “one atomic 
proposition, consisting o f one predicate with its unanalyzed arguments” and which 
typically corresponds to the main clause o f the utterance (2000: 1431). Thus, for 
Abbot there is an inherent limit to what can ideally be asserted by one sentence, and 
any other information must be expressed in another manner, i.e. by being 
presupposed. It does not follow, however, that presupposed information must be old 
information, she argues. It may well be, but since there are plenty o f cases where 
information marked as presupposed is new (she gives examples o f definite 
descriptions, ‘it’-clefts, reverse kwh’-clefts, embedded announcements and non- 
restrictive relative clauses used this way) one should, on her view, consider 
presupposition mechanisms not as markers o f old information, but as markers of 
nonassertion.
In the absence o f a clear picture of assertion, Abbott’s claim that there are such 
things as nonassertions is unsatisfying. Nevertheless, it is clear that for many people 
the notion o f assertion includes an element o f information structure, and bringing an 
element o f information structure into the notion of assertion would assist with some 
of the cases discussed in section 3.5, particularly those where there is a 
backgrounding effect, such as in the embedded clause in (44) (repeated below with 
(45)). However, where utterances open to a parenthetical reading are concerned, 
such as (45), it is likely to prove more difficult to avoid the claim that more than one 
assertion has taken place, though one may want to consider the usefulness of
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G reen’s notion o f assertoric commitment (discussed in section 3.3) here. On this 
view, the speaker could be said to be asserting the complex proposition expressed by 
(44) in its entirety, but merely expressing assertoric commitment to the proposition 
expressed by the embedded clause (i.e. that Peter’s wife has arranged a surprise 
party for him) (cf. Green 2000: 466-467).
(44) Peter is aware o f the fact that his wife has arranged as surprise party for him
(45) Peter pointed out that Chomsky is an American citizen
Before concluding this section, however, it needs to be pointed out that 
presuppositions are features o f questions and commands as well as o f assertions:
(65) a. 1 have to take my cat to the vet
b. Take my cat to the vet
c. Have you taken my cat to the vet?
All the utterances in (65) presuppose that the speaker has a cat, yet only (65)a is an 
assertion. It might therefore be argued that the opposing o f assertion and 
presupposition is misguided. What appears to be needed as a complement of 
presupposition is in fact something more general, such as utterance force. O f course, 
the implications o f this observation for accounts o f presupposition which rely on the 
notion of assertion will ultimately depend on how they relate assertion to the other 
forces.
8  C o n c l u s i o n
In this chapter a great deal o f ground has been covered. It will therefore be useful to 
identify some o f the key points to emerge from this discussion in order that they can 
be borne in mind and easily referred to in subsequent chapters.
I. Assertion and truth. A number of authors argue strongly (Barker, Garcia- 
Carpintero, Dummett) that the notions o f truth and assertion cannot be
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analysed independently. On this view, there is a notion o f truth just because 
there is a notion o f assertion: without assertion there would be no notion of 
truth. This is not the obvious way to think about matters: it may be more 
normal to think o f truth as prior to assertion, for assertion involves 
commitment to truth. However, attempting to separate truth from assertion 
and applying it to propositions results in the creation o f another predicate, 
that o f ‘obtaining’. Such a shift, though, would mean that our understanding 
o f linguistic meaning were no longer grounded in the natural-language 
concept o f truth.
This point has important implications for accounts o f linguistic meaning that 
rely on truth. The implication is this: such theories give the meaning not of 
sentences o f natural languages but o f the propositions they express, and the 
term ‘true’ in a T-sentence should be read as ‘obtains’, for judging truth 
depends on more than correspondence between the proposition expressed 
and how the world is: if this were not the case, one could happily call 
imperatives true or false, but one cannot. An account such as Davidson’s 
therefore needs, Dummett insists, a theory o f force before it can be said to be 
a theory o f linguistic meaning. Without this, it remains a theory of Fregean 
sense only.
The alternative is to explain the meaning of all the sentence types in terms of 
assertion. This is the route taken by Barker, but it involves the wholesale 
rejection o f the Fregean semantic programme. For Barker, recall, linguistic 
meaning is analysed in terms o f proto-acts, rather than divided into sense and 
force, and semantics becomes part o f the study o f intentional human 
behaviour, rather than o f an abstract notion o f meaning.
II. Assertion and indicative mood. If the view of the relationship between 
assertion and truth in I is right, then assertion must be conventionally 
associated with a linguistic form. This is not to say that all assertions must be
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performed by the use of that marker, or that that the use o f that marker 
always results in assertion. Rather, the point is that, as the notion o f truth 
cannot be analysed independently of assertion, and since a basis for ascribing 
a grasp o f truth to individuals is needed, this must taken to lie in their ability 
to use a form conventionally specified for performing assertions. Once a 
grasp o f truth can be ascribed on this basis, it is possible to go on to ascribe 
an intention to make assertions using other forms, or to use assertoric forms 
for other ends. Thus, as Dummett insists, the link between mood and force is 
essential to answering the question o f what force is, but not for identifying 
the force o f a particular utterance.
III. Assertion and inference. The lesson from Green’s and Smith’s readings o f 
Frege is that if inference is to be employed in the pursuit and systemisation 
o f truth then forms representing truths need to be marked as such. This point 
will be significant in subsequent chapters when the practice o f assertion is 
related to the cognitive process of developing an accurate representation of 
the world.
IV. Functional characterisations of assertion. There is a strong feeling among 
theorists that a functional characterisation o f assertion is needed. Thus, for 
Stalnaker, assertions have the function o f modifying the common ground, for 
Barker they open up areas for debate by advertising an intention to defend a 
representation, and for Williamson and Garcia-Carpintero they have the 
function o f communicating knowledge. A functional characterisation appears 
to be necessary in order to adequately distinguish assertion from other truth- 
aiming acts, and from the more general notion o f assertoric character that 
might be applied to other representations, such as beliefs.
These four points will be central in the next chapter, when the question o f how best 
to analyse assertion in the terms o f a cognitive theory of utterance interpretation will 
be addressed.
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C h a p t e r  2: A s s e r t io n , b e l ie f  and m e n t a l  r e pr e se n t a t io n
1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
The previous chapter ended by highlighting four key features o f assertion: its 
importance to an understanding o f truth and, therefore, to any truth-based theory of 
meaning; its close, though not unproblematic, relationship with the indicative mood; 
the importance o f an assertoric mode for inferences aimed at discovering truths and 
thereby extending knowledge; and the functional role o f assertion as a means of 
communicating information about the world.
The next two chapters will seek to develop a cognitive account o f the processing of 
indicative clauses, such that both their assertoric and non-assertoric effects can be 
explained. The present chapter will be concerned primarily with establishing a 
framework in which the contribution to utterance interpretation made by the 
indicative mood can be examined. As such, it will present a view o f mental 
representation which will serve as a basis for a subsequent characterisation of 
assertion. Chapter 3 will then be dedicated to establishing the conditions under 
which an utterance o f a clause in the indicative mood has assertoric effects.
The framework that will be adopted in this and the remaining chapters is Sperber & 
Wilson’s (1986/1995) Relevance Theory. The next section will therefore be 
dedicated to giving an outline o f the pertinent features o f this framework. As this 
theory relies strongly on the notion o f intention-attribution in its account o f human 
communication, and as intention attribution is often taken to involve the attribution 
of beliefs and desires, it is worth examining it in the light o f Dummett’s claims about 
the priority o f assertion over belief. This is because Dummett’s arguments to the 
effect that assertion is conceptually prior to belief might be taken to suggest that 
competence in assertion is a prerequisite for the development of the ability to 
attribute beliefs to others (though it needs to be stressed that a philosophical analysis 
such as Dummett’s need not have empirical consequences in this way).
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This chapter has the following structure: section 2 will give an outline o f Relevance 
Theory; section 3 discusses the role of intention and belief attribution in Relevance 
Theory and considers to what extent Dummett’s arguments do indeed pose a 
challenge for this theory; section 4 considers more closely different species o f 
mental representation, seeking in particular to distinguish their representational from 
their semantic properties; given this view o f mental representation, the role of 
language in communication is discussed in section 5, leading to an initial 
characterisation o f assertion.
2 R e l e v a n c e  T h e o r y
According to Sperber & Wilson, human linguistic communication belongs to a 
special class o f information transfer. Humans clearly transfer a wide range of 
information in a wide variety o f ways: skin colour and other physical features 
transfer information about ethnicity; complexion can transfer information about 
health, age and general well-being; clothes convey information about, among other 
things, an individual’s status and values; utterances transfer information about 
thoughts and the way the world is. While many more cases o f human information 
transfer could certainly be listed, Sperber & Wilson argue that there are good 
grounds to think that a sub-class of human communication can be identified by 
asking whether the behaviour that leads to the transfer of information is both 
intentional and reliant on the recognition of intention to succeed. This sub-class has 
been dubbed ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ by Sperber & Wilson, as it 
involves both a communicator performing an ostensive act -  i.e. one that cannot be 
explained by an audience except in terms of the communicator having the intention 
to inform her audience o f something -  and an audience inferring the intended 
message as a result o f the recognition of this behaviour as ostensive. Linguistic 
communication is seen as belonging to this class of information transfer.
Clearly, linguistic communication is not the only form of ostensive-inferential 
communication: gestures such as winking, nodding and waving are also clear cases,
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while some acts, such as wearing particular clothes, might be judged ostensive on 
some occasions but not on others. What distinguishes linguistic communication from 
other forms o f ostensive-inferential communication is that, through the use of 
language, the evidence concerning her intentions that a speaker can give is much 
richer. Human verbal communication is thus seen as a code-supported inferential 
process, relying on the recognition o f behaviour intended to invite inferences about 
the internal state o f the speaker.
The information an individual has available to him about the world can be thought of 
as his cognitive environment. This forms the basis o f his representation o f his 
physical and social environments, which is developed from sensory input (either 
actual or historical and recorded in memory), genetically endowed information and 
inference. Sperber & Wilson argue that in order to ostensively communicate with an 
individual, it is necessary to modify his cognitive environment in such a manner that 
the communicator’s intention to communicate with him becomes a feature of that 
environment that is attended to by that individual.
In order to see how this might be achieved, it is necessary to consider in more detail 
the structure o f the cognitive environment. A cognitive environment consists in both 
potential and realised representations that an individual is disposed to treat as true, 
though they need not in fact do so. Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 38-46) call these 
representations ‘assumptions’. Assumptions are representations o f the world that an 
individual is disposed to regard as adequately evidenced to justify adoption as true 
representations o f the world.1 This is not to say, though, that all the assumptions 
which constitute an individual’s cognitive environment are physically realised in the 
mind/brain of that individual. Some assumptions will be physically instantiated, but
1 This only applies to what Sperber & Wilson term ‘factual assumptions’. They also use the term 
‘assumptions’ for mentally represented propositional forms that are embedded in factual assumptions. 
These might not be representations o f the actual world. This issue will be discussed in detail in 
section 3.
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many more will remain only potentially so, as they will be either perceptible or 
inferable. Assumptions which are either concretely or potentially available to an 
individual are termed ‘manifest assumptions’. Any assumption an individual is 
capable o f entertaining and judging true or likely to be true is manifest to him. 
Manifestness is a matter o f degree: the more likely to be thus entertained and judged, 
given a particular physical environment and a particular set of cognitive abilities, the 
more manifest an assumption is.
Due to the fact that individuals differ both in terms of their histories and cognitive 
abilities, no two cognitive environments will ever be the same. However, where 
people’s physical and/or social environments coincide to some degree, then they will 
share some common assumptions: there will be a shared cognitive environment. 
When, in a shared environment, it is manifest which people share that environment, 
the result is a ‘mutual cognitive environment’ (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 41).
In order to achieve information transfer, it is only necessary to modify an 
individual’s cognitive environment to such a degree that this change is mentally 
represented: he need not be aware o f any intention for this to happen. However, 
there are advantages to making manifest to an individual the intention to modify his 
cognitive environment. First, doing so invites him to direct his cognitive abilities to 
the task o f inferring the assumptions that are intended to be made manifest to him, 
which makes the communicator’s task easier. Second, making manifest the intention 
to make a certain assumption manifest to an individual necessarily adjusts not only 
his cognitive environment but also the mutual cognitive environment shared by 
communicator and addressee. Mutual cognitive environments are the basis o f co­
ordinated behaviour, and by extending the former, the possibilities for the latter are 
also extended.
Thus, ostensive-inferential communication involves two tiers o f intentions: the 
intention to make manifest a set o f assumptions and the intention to make this
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intention mutually manifest. Sperber & Wilson term the first o f these ‘the 
informative intention’ and the second ‘the communicative intention’.
It was noted above that ostensive-inferential communication crucially involves an 
invitation by the communicator to the audience to infer her intended message. But, if 
it is to have any hope o f succeeding in the sort o f time available during verbal 
communication, inference o f this type must involve the selection o f a restricted set 
o f premises from a very large set of possibilities. This raises the question o f what 
guides the inferential process: how are contextual assumptions accessed and how 
does the interpreter know when to stop? Sperber & W ilson’s answer to this question 
is to point out that this problem is not restricted to the interpretation of utterances. 
Cognitive systems are constantly faced with the problem o f allocating resources to 
the processing o f sensory inputs. The problem is one o f optimisation: balancing the 
benefit o f attending to information with the cost o f processing it. It is therefore a fair 
assumption that cognitive systems have evolved to allocate resources so as to 
optimise the cost/benefit balance by directing resources towards those inputs which, 
for any given level of effort, will result in the greatest benefit. Thus, for many 
animals, input regarding predators or prey will be attended to over other inputs due 
to the associated likely benefits, while humans are cognitively disposed to divert 
attention to stimuli such as certain (loud) noises, sudden movements, and those 
which constitute signs o f physical health, social status, and so on.
What is needed, then, is a term which captures this tendency to balance cognitive 
cost and benefits, and this is just what the notion o f relevance to an individual, as 
defined by Sperber & Wilson, is designed to do. The relevance o f an input can be 
seen in terms of this balance between cognitive costs and cognitive benefits: for any 
given level o f cost, the greater the benefit, the greater the relevance; for any given 
level o f benefit, the less effort involved in deriving it, the greater the relevance. 
Attention is then directed towards sources o f information which promise most 
relevance. Now, to act ostensively is to claim attention; attention is paid to relevant 
stimuli; thus to act ostensively is to claim that one’s stimulus is relevant. To claim
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relevance is to claim that given a certain degree o f effort (a cost), an appropriate 
degree o f benefit will be achieved. The hearer is therefore justified in following a 
path o f least effort until he achieves a degree o f benefit that justifies the effort 
expended.2 O f course, what constitutes sufficient effect to justify effort expended 
will depend on a number o f factors, not least the hearer’s assumptions about the 
abilities and preferences o f the speaker. Nevertheless, this does offer a principled 
means o f arriving at intended interpretations, one which follows from reasonably 
non-controversial assumptions about how cognitive resources are allocated.
The picture drawn so far is but a sketch of the relevance-theoretic account of 
linguistic communication. Assumptions have been left largely unanalysed and 
nothing has been said about the role language plays, nor about the abilities that 
underlie the attribution o f communicative and informative intentions to 
communicators. This last issue is the focus of the next section, which considers the 
questions that are raised by applying empirically Dummett’s claim that assertion is 
conceptually prior to belief. As will be seen, the issues raised concern, among other 
things, the role o f the communicative and informative intentions in the relevance- 
theoretic account o f communication.
3  I n t e n t i o n  a t t r i b u t i o n , b e l i e f  a s c r i p t i o n s  a n d  m e t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
Dummett’s claim, recall, is that assertion is conceptually prior to belief. The reason 
why this claim (applied empirically) might raise questions for the relevance- 
theoretic account o f linguistic communication is that the communicative intention 
which, the theory has it, underlies ostensive behaviour and which, it is argued, must 
be attributed to the speaker by the hearer, is often presented as having belief as an 
element. An adequate conception o f belief is itself dependent on a conception o f 
truth, and truth, according to Dummett, cannot be analysed independently of
2 Cognitive benefit is measured in terms o f cognitive effects. These are discussed in detail in section 
4.1.
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assertion, an act which, for him, cannot be made sense o f without postulating a form 
conventionally associated with it.
Thus, the empirical prediction suggested by Dummett’s claim is that, 
developmentally, the competent use of assertoric forms in the performance of 
assertion should precede a conception of belief. It needs to be stressed, though, that 
this is not a claim Dummett himself makes: he is concerned with philosophical 
conceptual priority, or order o f explanation. However, if  applied empirically, his 
point does make clear predictions: if  an understanding o f belief rests on an 
understanding o f truth and falsity, and an understanding o f truth and falsity can only 
be derived from competence in the practice of assertion, then competence in 
assertion should precede, and be possible without, the ability to attribute belief to an 
individual. Indeed, that Dummett’s claim raises issues for intention-based accounts 
o f meaning, such as G rice’s ‘meaning™’, has been pointed out recently by Garcia- 
Carpintero:
Non-natural meaning constitutively involves communicative intentions; but the relevant 
communicative intentions are in part individuated relative to conventions operating in the 
semantic units o f  the expressions one has put together to produce one’s utterance. Dummett 
[(1981: 311, 354)] argues for this in the case o f assertion. His argument relies on the fact 
that, except for a very limited range o f cases, we cannot make sense o f  the attribution o f the 
inner state (belief, knowledge or judgement) that the act verbalizes independently o f its 
regulating function in the performances o f the relevant linguistic acts. This is certainly the 
case for complex higher-order mental states characteristic o f  Gricean accounts (2004: 161).
Applied empirically, the prediction suggested by Dummett’s claim can be taken 
either ontogenetically or phylogenetically: it may be applied to the development o f a 
concept o f belief, and hence to the ability to attribute belief, either in the developing 
child, or in the evolution o f the human species. On the ontogenetic reading, this 
prediction echoes an issue that has been tackled recently by Breheny (forthcoming), 
namely how to explain the fact that children who are unable to demonstrate an 
understanding o f the concept o f belief are nevertheless able to engage in what he
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terms ‘basic com m unication’, and which he characterises in terms o f the ability to 
produce meaningful assertions. On the phylogenetic reading, it relates to work by 
Sperber (2000), which argues that the relevance-theoretic account o f linguistic 
communication strongly supports the view that metarepresentational abilities 
(including the capacity to represent mental states including belief) predate linguistic 
communication in human evolution.
Both o f these issues will be discussed later in this section, as will the associated 
claim that utterance interpretation is handled by a pragmatics module. First, though, 
it is necessary to prepare the ground by detailing the role of, and the relationship 
between, metarepresentation, intention attribution and belief attribution in Relevance 
Theory.
3.1 The attribution o f  mental states in Relevance Theory
As was noted in section 2, Relevance Theory characterises linguistic communication 
as a type of ostensive-inferential communication. This type o f communication relies 
on the recognition by the hearer that (a) the communicator is acting with the 
intention o f informing him o f something, and (b) she intends the hearer to recognise 
that she has the intention in (a). It also depends on the ability o f the hearer to 
attribute an intended meaning or content to the speaker. As will be seen below, 
ascribing this intention, is generally characterised in Relevance Theory as entailing 
ascribing belief. Relevance Theory does therefore seem to be open to challenge from 
an empirical application o f Dummett’s claim. However, it will be argued below that 
it is possible to conceive o f a relevance-theoretic view of inferential communication 
which does not necessarily involve belief attribution in cases o f basic 
communication.
Sperber (1994b; see also Wilson 2000; 2003) suggests that humans have three 
interpretation strategies available when interpreting acts of linguistic
communication: ‘naive optimism’, ‘cautious optimism’ and ‘sophisticated 
understanding’. As will be seen below, they vary in terms of their
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metarepresentational sophistication (i.e. in the level or the order o f mental state 
attribution that they require) and the role played by belief attribution.
The most basic strategy is naive optimism. An individual following this strategy 
simply assumes that the first relevant interpretation o f the speaker’s utterance that 
occurs to him is the one that she intended. This strategy is successful in arriving at 
the speaker’s meaning only if the speaker is both benevolent and competent: she 
must be competent to such a degree that she is able to choose a linguistic form such 
that the first interpretation the speaker arrives at will be her intended one, and 
benevolent so that she does not choose a form which is likely to deceive the speaker.
As was seen in section 2, the relevance-theoretic view is that utterances are ostensive 
stimuli which presuppose their own relevance, and thus warrant the speaker 
following a path o f least effort until the goal of sufficient effect/benefit is reached in 
interpreting an utterance. This is based on the assumption that human cognition has 
evolved so as generally to minimise cost and maximise benefit, in other words, to 
maximise relevance. However, the presumption which utterances convey is not one 
o f maximal relevance, but optimal relevance. It is optimal because the speaker will 
not generally be expected to go against her own preferences, and will never be able 
to go beyond her abilities, in crafting her utterance. This means that the 
interpretation that would be most relevant to the hearer may be beyond the speaker’s 
abilities or incompatible with her desires. Consequently, a sophisticated hearer must 
take the speaker’s preferences and competence into account when interpreting her 
utterance and so seek not the interpretation that will give him the greatest effects (for 
any given level o f effort), but the interpretation that will give him the greatest effects 
given the speaker’s preferences and competence. This is summed up in the 
presumption of optimal relevance:
Presumption of optimal relevance (revised 1995):
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s 
effort to process it.
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(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
com m unicator’s abilities and preferences. (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 
270)
An individual employing a strategy o f naive optimism, however, does not consider 
the speaker’s competences and preferences, rather he implicitly assumes that she is 
competent and benevolent. He thus seeks to maximise relevance, rather than to 
optimise it. This can be seen by considering how (1) would be interpreted by an 
individual following this strategy:
(1) It’s late
In interpreting (1), a naive optimist will simply take the most accessible referent for 
‘it’ (or a non-referring interpretation if none is easily accessible) and the most 
accessible interpretation o f Tate’ (as meaning, say, that it is time for he and the 
speaker to leave) and, as long as he judges it to be relevant enough to have 
warranted paying attention to, assume this interpretation is the one intended by the 
speaker. M etarepresentation enters this story, as Sperber tells it, in two ways: first, in 
recognising the utterance as an ostensive stimulus and thereby taking it as a premise 
from which her message will be inferred; and, second, in attributing to her the 
intended message. Thus, if, as in Sperber’s example, Mary utters (1) in order to 
inform Peter that it is time to go home, the initial premise will be (2) and the 
interpretation (3) (with square brackets indicating levels of representation):
(2) Mary says: ‘It’s late’
(3) Mary intends [me to believe [that it is time to go home]]
Belief attribution therefore comes in at the level o f  attribution o f the intended 
interpretation. This is somewhat undesirable given that this strategy is just the sort 
that is postulated for children below the age o f four, who generally fail to 
demonstrate possession o f a conception of belief (Breheny forthcoming). Moreover,
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the strategy has the advantage of not requiring the child to represent the speaker’s 
competencies (which include what she can be assumed to believe). It is unfortunate, 
therefore, that belief enters the story when the interpretation is arrived at.
Origgi & Sperber are aware o f this problem and address it by arguing that the 
reasoning abilities required to demonstrate a conception o f belief by passing a false- 
belief task (in which the subject has to predict or explain the behaviour o f another 
person in terms o f that person’s possession of a false belief) are not required for 
language comprehension:
The attribution o f  a meaning to a speaker, and the prediction that a person with a false belief 
will act on this belief, though both involving mindreading, are two very different 
performances. The formal resources involved in the two cases are not the same. In the case 
o f speaker’s meaning, what is needed is the ability to represent an intention o f someone else 
about a representation o f  one’s own -  a second-order metarepresentation o f  a quite specific 
form. [ ...]  In the case o f false beliefs, a first-order metarepresentation o f a belief o f someone 
else is sufficient, but what is needed is the ability to evaluate the truth-value o f  the 
metarepresented belief and to predict behaviour on the basis o f false belief. We are not 
aware o f any argument to the effect that the ability needed to pass the false-belief task is a 
precondition for the ability needed to attribute speaker’s meaning. There is nothing 
inconsistent or paradoxical therefore in the idea o f an individual capable o f attributing 
speaker's meaning and incapable o f attributing false beliefs (and conversely). (Origgi & 
Sperber 2000: 163)
There are two points that need to be made here. First, it will soon be shown that 
some o f the interpretation strategies that Sperber (1994b) suggests do in fact require 
the sort o f reasoning involved in predicting or explaining behaviour in terms of false 
belief. This, however, is not incompatible with what Origgi & Sperber say: 
incompatibility would only follow if it could be shown that all attributions o f 
speaker meaning involved attributing false beliefs and explaining the speaker’s 
behaviour in these terms. Second, it is necessary to unpack just what is meant by 
‘believe’ in cases such as (3) in order to see whether the strategy is reliant on the
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interpreter being in possession o f a notion of truth, thus leaving it open to challenge 
from an empirical application o f Dummett’s claim.
Consider first what possible meanings ‘believe’ could have in theorising about an 
individual’s ability to attribute mental states to others. If one has what is sometimes 
referred to a ‘full-blown’ concept o f belief, then one knows at least the following: 
that beliefs are causes o f behaviour in oneself and others; that beliefs can be true or 
false; and that false beliefs can guide behaviour in the same way that true beliefs 
can. This is just the sort o f concept o f belief that is required to pass a false-belief 
task, and, importantly, it requires a conception of truth. Therefore, on Dummett’s 
claim as applied here, a strategy reliant on this notion o f belief could not be 
attempted by those without prior competence in making and responding to 
assertions.
There is, though, a less sophisticated notion o f belief that might be used in theorising 
about mind-reading abilities. On this view, what would be entailed by having a 
notion o f ‘basic b e lie f is simply that people can either have certain information 
available to them or not, and that they act according to the information they have. 
Notice that there is no mention here of truth and falsity. Indeed, the idea is that the 
individual who has this concept o f belief has no conception o f truth and falsity, 
merely o f the presence o f information or its absence. Crucially, an individual in 
possession o f only this rudimentary concept o f belief would not distinguish between 
states of the world perceived and representations o f states of the world. The theory 
of mind underlying his mind-reading abilities would thus be non-representational. 
For him, states o f affairs in the world would cause behaviour directly, due to their 
perception, rather than their representation.3 As Millikan puts it: “[A speaker does
3 It might be objected here that young children must have a conception o f truth and falsity because 
they can attribute desires to others, and the objects o f desires are not realised states o f affairs and so 
must be false. This, however, is to confuse, in the terms o f the last chapter, a proposition’s not 
obtaining from a representation’s being false. The fact that children do not treat the object o f a desire
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not] need to employ a representational theory o f mind to be sensitive, in many cases, 
to whether the speaker has the relevant information. Knowing that another has 
certain information can involve no more than knowing that the other person has been 
exposed to this information or anticipating that the other could exhibit this 
information through language” (forthcoming, p. 21 of the manuscript o f the chapter 
cited).
In what follows, the term ‘know ’ will be used to denote this non-representational 
ability to attribute mental states to others and ‘believe’ reserved only for the 
representational variety. That is, it will be assumed that children unable to 
demonstrate a full-blown theory of mind have a more simple ontology o f mental 
states, one which does not rest on a notion of truth and falsity, and this will be 
denoted here by the term ‘know’. Although this might seem a strange choice of 
terminology, as knowledge is often characterised as consisting o f justified belief plus 
truth, some thought shows that it is just the term that is needed: knowledge is either 
present or absent, not true or false. An individual with no conception o f truth or 
falsity could still therefore attribute knowledge to another (see Williamson 2002 for 
arguments against analysing knowledge in terms of belief).
Only where the representational meaning o f belief is employed is the relevance- 
theoretic view o f utterance interpretation open to a challenge from an empirical 
application o f Dummett’s claim concerning the priority o f assertion over belief, 
since the more basic ontology o f mental states suggested requires no conception of 
truth or falsity. Applying Dummett’s claim empirically, recall, means that 
competence in assertion cannot be said to require the prior attainment o f a full-
as true does not mean that they treat it as false, the crucial point being that the function o f a desire 
object is not to represent the world as being a particular way (it has a world-to-word direction o f fit), 
hence it cannot be described in terms o f truth or falsity. This point will discussed in some detail later 
in this chapter.
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blown notion o f belief, for this entails a concept o f truth and falsity which itself is 
dependent on, given Dummett’s claim, a notion o f assertion.
In what follows, then, the aim will be to look closely at just what sort o f mind- 
reading abilities are required by each of Sperber’s strategies. If it can be shown that 
relevance-theoretic ostensive-inferential communication can precede the acquisition 
o f a full-blown concept o f belief, then Relevance Theory is not threatened by 
Dummett’s claim.
‘Know’, in this non-representational sense o f ‘having information available’, could 
replace ‘believe’ in (3) to give (4):
(4) Mary intends [me to know [that it is time to go home]]
While this has the same number o f embeddings as (3), it does not require a grasp of 
the notion o f the representational nature of belief, and hence o f truth and falsity, and 
could therefore be available to a child unable to demonstrate that she grasps the 
concept o f belief.4
Alternatively, it might be denied that such a child has any notion o f intended 
interpretation and simply treats the effects o f the utterance as he would any o f those 
resulting from the processing o f any other relevant stimulus. Consider (5) spoken to 
a child in order to prevent him from eating a sweet he has picked up off the floor. 
This could have the desired effect without the child representing (7). Rather, he 
could simply follow a path o f least effort and derive (6), which, combined with his 
assumption that dirty objects should not be eaten, would direct him not to eat the 
sweet (and perhaps allow him to derive further cognitive effects).
4 One might not want to call (4) a ‘ metarepresentationthough, as it does not characterise the child as 
having a grasp o f the representational nature o f  the embedded content.
86
(5) It’s dirty
(6) The sweet is dirty
(7) She intends [me to believe/know [that this sweet is dirty]]
W hile this would certainly seem to indicate comprehension, the problem with this 
approach would be that it would suggest that the child does not characterise the 
speaker’s behaviour as goal-directed.5 This would in turn raise the question o f why 
the child bothered to attend to the speaker’s utterance. The non-representational 
attribution o f intention in (4), by contrast, has the advantage o f viewing the child as 
endowed with the ability to characterise the speaker’s behaviour as directed at 
making information available to him, without suggesting that he has the ability to 
grasp the representational nature o f the inner states that govern behaviour. That said, 
a goal-attribution such as (7) could, in the terms o f Relevance Theory, be manifest to 
the child without him representing it: what is at issue, though, is his capacity to do 
so.
Before looking at the next o f Sperber’s strategies, it is worthwhile considering 
whether an initial metarepresented premise such as (2) needs to be entertained by 
users o f this naive strategy. Part o f the reason for requiring an initial representation 
o f the type exemplified by (2) is that it justifies following the interpretation 
procedure warranted by ostensive stimuli, i.e. the search for optimal relevance by 
following a path o f least effort, taking into account the speaker’s preferences and 
competences. However, it has already been shown that the naiVe-optimism strategy 
involves not optimising but maximising relevance. This is the same strategy as is 
applied to the processing o f any stimulus which is attended to, for the tendency to 
maximise relevance is a generalisation about human cognition as a whole, not
5 For evidence that 9- to 12-month old children can characterise behaviour as goal-directed, see 
Tomasello et al (forthcoming: section 2.2).
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merely about utterance interpretation. What distinguishes ostensive stimuli is that 
they come with a presumption o f relevance that is in itself justification for attending 
to them. Now, one way a theorist might conceive o f this is in metarepresentational 
terms: in recognising a stimulus as ostensive, the system represents it in a certain 
fashion (under ‘says that’, for example) and this triggers the interpretation process. 
Alternatively, though, it might be conceived o f in non-metarepresentational terms: 
the recognition o f an ostensive stimulus could simply interrupt processing such that 
resources are directed at processing that stimulus above competing stimuli, without 
that stimulus being metarepresented. As will be seen later, Breheny’s proposal is for 
how basic communication works takes something like this approach.
Returning to Sperber’s strategies o f utterance interpretation, a hearer following the 
second strategy of cautious optimism assumes that the speaker is benevolent, though 
not necessarily competent. He will therefore realise that the stimulus the speaker 
employs may appear to be the most relevant to the speaker but may in fact not be. 
For example, the speaker o f (1) may merely mean that it is time to leave, while for 
the hearer the most relevant interpretation may be that a package he has been waiting 
for, but o f which the speaker is unaware, will arrive late. Following a strategy o f 
naive optimism would result in the hearer accepting the most relevant interpretation 
to him (i.e. that the package is late) as the one intended by the speaker. A cautious 
optimist, by contrast, would realise that such an interpretation was beyond the 
speaker’s competence, and hence ignore, or pass over, this possibility in interpreting 
her utterance (Sperber 1994b: 191-194).
In order to see whether belief (as opposed to knowledge) attribution necessarily 
plays a role in this strategy, it is crucial to be clear about what constitutes a speaker’s 
competences in this domain. If it does result that full-blown belief attribution plays a 
role, it will then be necessary to be clear about what this role is.
The belief-free basic ontology o f mental states proposed above as a possible 
alternative to, or precursor of, full-blown belief attribution would certainly allow a
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form of cautious optimism: a hearer would be justified in ignoring interpretations 
which relied on information unknown to the speaker. Thus, the interpretation o f (1) 
as referring to a package could be avoided by a hearer equipped only with this basic 
repertoire. What the lack o f a full-fledged concept o f belief would do is prevent the 
hearer from identifying the speaker’s intended meaning when this relies on him 
attributing a false belief to the speaker. For example, suppose Mary utters (1) 
intending to inform Peter that a train she wrongly assumes him to be waiting for is 
delayed. Unless Peter is able to attribute to her the false belief that he is waiting for 
the delayed train, he will be unable to identify her intended meaning. Cautious 
optimism can thus be divided into two sub-strategies according to whether it relies 
on the attribution o f an absence o f knowledge/information, or the attribution of a 
false belief.
This point is important because it illustrates the difference between a comprehension 
process that requires the attribution o f mental representations to the speaker and one 
that merely relies on the attribution o f information. Also, it illustrates how the 
process o f attributing an intended meaning can be essentially the same as explaining 
behaviour in terms o f false-belief. Mary might explain the fact that Peter is opening 
the fridge door by attributing to him the false belief that the fridge contains beer, 
when, unbeknownst to him, she has drunk the last one. Similarly, in the scenario 
described at the end o f the last paragraph, Peter would explain M ary’s utterance of 
‘It’s late’ by attributing to her the false belief that he is waiting for a delayed train. 
Were he not able to attribute this false belief, the intended interpretation would not 
occur to him, and he would be unable to identify the goal o f her behaviour.
However, even if it were granted that belief attribution has a role to play in a 
cautiously optimistic interpretation strategy, this would not entail that a belief 
attribution must always serve as a premise in this process. The naiVe-optimism 
strategy follows a path o f least effort, taking linguistic senses, assigning referents 
and considering hypotheses according to accessibility (Sperber 1994b: 190). A 
cautious optimist can do the same, the only difference being that accessibilities will
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be determined to some degree by information (or beliefs) the hearer assumes that the 
speaker has available to her.6 Thus, certain candidates for pronoun resolution, for 
example, would be suppressed if the hearer assumes the speaker has no knowledge 
o f those individuals. Assumptions about a speaker’s information/epistemic state 
must be used as actual premises in the derivation o f the speaker’s meaning only if  a 
false belief needs to be attributed. In such a case, it will also be necessary to 
metarepresent the speaker’s utterance (as in (2)), for working out what the speaker 
intended in such a case will require inferences concerning what effects her utterance 
would have had if the speaker’s false belief were true. The inference would be 
roughly along the lines o f (8):
a. The speaker has said: ‘It’s late’ Observed phenomenon
b. Something is late Initial interpretation arrived at by 
decoding linguistic form
c. A train is late An accessible premise warranted by 
the location o f  the utterance (a train 
station)
d. If a train is late, then people 
intending to catch it are often late 
for appointments etc.
A premise made accessible by the 
hypothesis that a train is late
e. The speaker falsely believes that 
1 am waiting for a train
A premise made accessible by the 
location o f  the utterance the 
propositional form  assigned to it
f. If I were waiting for a train, then 
the speaker’s utterance would be 
optimally relevant to me
A premise made accessible by 
considerations o f  relevance, i.e. o f  the 
effects (e.g. that the hearer might be 
late fo r  an appointment) the utterance 
would have fo r  the effort expended if  
the speaker's fa lse belief were true
g. The speaker intends me to know 
that a train she falsely believes me 
to be waiting for is late
Interpretaion warranted by 
considerations o f  relevance (i.e. o f  
expected effect and effort), given the 
initial premises and the false-belief 
attribution.
6 It should be pointed out that this is not how Sperber views cautious optimism. On his view, a hearer 
takes a cautiously optimistic approach when the interpretation arrived at by following a path o f least 
effort results in an interpretation that, while it would be relevant to the hearer, is incompatible with 
his assumptions about the speaker’s competences (Sperber 1994b: 192).
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An interpretation process such as that exemplified by (8) is clearly a case of 
explaining behaviour in terms o f false-belief. Indeed, it would be strange if the 
processes underlying the interpretation o f an utterance motivated by a false belief 
were distinct from explanations o f other behaviours motivated by false belief. In at 
least one type o f cautious optimism, then, false-belief attribution plays a role.
The use o f representations o f a speaker’s beliefs as premises is a defining feature 
only o f the third o f Sperber’s strategies: sophisticated understanding. Employing this 
strategy, the speaker does not assume that the speaker is either necessarily 
competent or benevolent, but only that she intends to appear so. Given this 
assumption, hearers may still identify the speaker’s intended meaning, even if  the 
informative intention is not fulfilled. That is to say, a hearer may realise what a 
speaker intended him to believe, even though he may not go on to believe it as a 
result. Like cautious optimism when it involves false belief attribution, the process 
that allows such interpretations is clearly both metarepresentational and reliant on 
full-blown belief attribution: given what the speaker has done (i.e. said that ‘P’), the 
hearer must work out what effects the speaker could have intended her utterance to 
have, and for this he must attribute to her certain beliefs about what effects her 
utterance could have had if he had accepted it. Such inferences cannot be the result 
o f processing a stimulus simply by following a path o f least effort without giving 
any consideration to the nature o f the stimulus or to the speaker’s intentions: both 
must be explicitly represented and must play a direct causal role (i.e. serve as 
premises) in the interpretation process.
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Table 1: Summary o f relationship between interpretation strategies and metarepresentational 
requirements
Metarepresentation 
of utterance 
necessary as initial 
premise?
Belief attribution 
necessary?
Metarepresentation 
of intended meaning 
necessary?
Naive optimism No No No
Cautious optimism 
(not involving false 
belief attribution)
No Not necessarily 
full-blown belief: 
knowledge 
attribution may be 
sufficient
No
Cautious optimism 
(involving false 
belief attribution)
Yes Yes Yes
Sophisticated
understanding
Yes Yes: Yes
Table 1 summarises the preceding discussion. It shows that as long as the 
recognition o f ostension is characterised in non-representational terms, then the 
metarepresentation o f the utterance is not required as an initial premise in the 
interpretation process for either naive optimism, or cautious optimism that is not 
reliant on the attribution o f false belief. Similarly, neither requires that the speaker’s 
intended meaning be metarepresented as such: a child, for example, could respond 
appropriately to an utterance by following either o f these strategies, without 
explicitly representing the effect of the utterance on him as the speaker’s intended 
meaning. (However, as was noted above, the disadvantage o f this position is that it 
does not characterise the child as recognising the speaker’s behaviour as goal- 
directed.) While belief attribution is not necessary for naive optimism, some form of 
either belief or knowledge attribution is required for both forms o f cautious 
optimism. The important point is that this does not have to serve as a premise in the 
interpretation process unless this process rests on a false belief. Sophisticated 
understanding does require a full-fledged concept o f belief, as well as the explicit 
representation o f the speaker’s utterance as an initial premise, and o f the speaker’s 
intended meaning as an output. An important upshot o f this is that a form of 
ostensive-inferential communication which does not rely on metarepresentational
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abilities can be conceived of. As noted above, an account along these lines will be 
considered in the next section.
Given these three strategies, an obvious question is who uses which, and when. 
Sperber suggests that these follow developmental stages, such that young children 
start out as naive optimists and gradually, as conceptual and metarepresentational 
abilities develop, grow to be sophisticated understanders. Importantly, though, he 
also suggests that given the appropriate circumstances, such as when “everyday 
communication takes place between people who are benevolent to one another and 
who know one another well enough”, then “cautious, and even naive optimism can 
serve as ‘default’ interpretation strategies, and the higher-level meta-representational 
strategies may play no role at all” (1994b: 197-198).7 However, it is important to 
emphasise that what distinguishes adults from young children is that the higher- 
order metarepresentations associated with acts of ostensive communication will be 
manifest (i.e. available for mental representation, though not necessarily mentally 
represented) even if the hearer is employing a strategy which does not require their 
explicit representation and deployment in inference. As such, if  an optimistic 
strategy fails, perhaps by yielding an interpretation which is incompatible with the 
hearer’s beliefs, he has recourse to more sophisticated strategies.
One interesting result o f the above discussion is that it converges to some extent 
with the view o f utterance interpretation propounded by Millikan (1984; 
forthcoming) and Recanati (2002; 2004). On this view, normal or basic utterance 
comprehension is as direct as perception (which is itself not all that direct, see 
Millikan 2004: chapter 9) and does not rely on reasoning about the speaker’s mental 
states. What has been said above suggests that contextual assumptions about a 
speaker’s knowledge or beliefs can influence utterance interpretation by suppressing
7 It should be emphasised that Sperber would be unlikely to agree with the characterisation o f the 
metarepresentational requirements o f his strategies given in Table 1.
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some and activating other candidates for, for example, reference assignment, 
disambiguation etc. without necessarily acting as premises in inferring speaker 
meaning. The crucial point to emerge from this discussion is that there is nothing in 
the claim that speakers make manifest their communicative intention that requires 
that a representation o f this intention must have a causal role (i.e. as a premise in the 
derivation o f speaker meaning) in the interpretation o f the utterance. Rather, all the 
claim entails is that this information should be available to the hearer should he need 
to employ it to derive the expected level o f effect.
3.2 Basic communication
As already noted, there are some similarities between the naive-optimism strategy of 
utterance interpretation, as characterised above, and Breheny’s idea o f basic 
communication in children under the age of four. Such children typically fail to 
demonstrate a full-blown conception of belief but are nevertheless in many ways 
competent linguistic communicators, able to assign pronominal reference across 
sentence boundaries, for example; and anyone who has had first-hand experience of 
children o f this age would certainly agree that they can use language in a way that, 
although lacking the sophistication o f adult language-use, is clearly meaningful and 
informative.8 Breheny terms this ‘basic communication’, as typified by “the 
assertive utterance o f a declarative sentence for informative purposes’’ 
(forthcoming).
As should be clear by now, the fact that children who lack the ability to attribute 
false belief to others are capable o f this type of communication poses a problem for 
theories o f communication that regard the ability to conceptualise behaviour in terms 
o f full-blown belief and desire as fundamental to the process o f linguistic 
communication. Breheny’s solution is to suggest a minimalist relevance-theoretic
8 Young children’s inability to attribute false beliefs is evidenced by their persistent failure to pass 
test requiring them to attribute false beliefs to a character in a scenario in order to predict that 
character’s behaviour, see, e.g. Baron-Cohen (1995).
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account o f basic communication which does not rely on participants being able to 
attribute either a belief-based communicative or informative intention in the 
recognition and interpretation o f ostension. Rather, what is needed is the ability to 
recognise and respond to attention-directing behaviour; this differs from recognising 
full-blown ostensive behaviour as characterised by Sperber and Wilson in that an 
appropriate response merely entails attending to the situation indicated. There is no 
need to attribute a sophisticated informative intention which has belief as a 
constituent.
In order to show how attention-directing behaviour can be recognised and 
appropriately responded to without the attribution of a complex communicative 
intention, Breheny employs the idea o f a shared situation. He argues that having the 
ability to conceptualise a shared situation does not necessitate attributing beliefs to 
others: a child much younger than four clearly has a concept o f feeding, which is a 
joint activity in a shared situation, but there is no need to argue that the child the 
ability to attribute beliefs in order to take place in a feeding activity.9 Within a 
shared situation there can be joint attention, which also does not rely on a concept of 
belief for it to be conceptualised, as long as ‘attending to ’ is understood in suitably 
goal-directed terms. Directing someone’s attention’ can then be conceived of as 
simply behaviour which has the goal of focussing one’s attention in a certain 
direction or towards a certain object or state or affairs. Children younger than four 
clearly engage in attention-directing behaviour, such as pointing. Indeed, studies 
have shown that informative pointing is practised by children as young as 12 months 
old (Liszkowski et al. in press).
Even given a concept o f shared situations in which joint activities take place, and the 
ability to engage in and respond to attention-directing behaviour (as a result o f an
9 Baron-Cohen (1995) postulates an ability to monitor shared attention (SAM) as a precursor o f belief 
attribution abilities.
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ability to conceive o f behaviour in goal-oriented terms), it still needs to be explained 
how addressees o f this form of communication could come to attend to the same 
features o f  the environment as those directing their attention. A person pointing in a 
certain direction, for example, could be attending to any one o f many possible 
features o f the environment: how does the child come to attend to the situation 
indicated without taking into consideration the intentions o f the person pointing? 
Breheny here makes use o f Relevance Theory: if  the human cognitive system has 
evolved towards maximising relevance, then directing perceptual organs at a certain 
area o f the environment will automatically result in attention focusing on whatever 
inputs are most relevant.
A little more can be said about this than Breheny does. A child with the limited 
conceptual abilities that Breheny posits may come into contact with at least two 
types o f attention-directing person: those with the ability to attribute belief states and 
those, like the child herself (it is assumed), without such abilities. The first scenario 
will be asymmetric, and the attention-director may have assumptions about what the 
child will find relevant and direct his attention accordingly. In such cases, although 
the child has no ability to attribute mental states, the communicator does, and this 
will play a role in the success o f the attention-directing endeavour. In the second 
(symmetric) scenario, the success of the attention-directing will depend on whether 
what is relevant to the pointer is relevant to the child: if it is, then joint attention will 
result; if  it is not, then they will attend to different situations. This account therefore 
has some clear empirical predictions: children without the ability to attribute 
ignorance o f information should only be able to engage in successful communication 
with each other in cases where what is relevant to the communicator is also relevant 
to the addressee. In asymmetric cases, however, communication will succeed as long 
as the party with the ability to attribute the possession or ignorance of information 
can successfully infer what would be relevant to the child (given the child’s
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information-state) so that he can either craft his utterance, or interpret the child’s 
utterance, accordingly.10
Breheny, then, shows how basic communication might be explained given an 
account of attention-directing coupled with the notion o f relevance. Crucially, this 
does not involve belief attribution. Applied to linguistic communication, Breheny’s 
basic communication functions very much along the lines o f a modified version of 
naive optimism described in section 3.1, on which neither the initial premise nor the 
interpretation are metarepresented. That is to say, the utterance o f assertoric 
sentences is recognised as an attention-directing act and thus directs the speaker’s 
cognitive effort towards representing the situation it describes, with implicit 
information such as pronominal reference simply being derived as part of the 
relevance-driven process o f identifying that situation.11
Breheny’s minimalist relevance-theoretic account o f linguistic communication 
makes the general prediction that interpreting any utterance which clearly involves 
the attribution o f an informative intention will be beyond children under four years 
old. Indeed, he points to evidence that what children o f this age are unable to do 
includes the interpretation o f scalar implicatures, such as interpreting ‘some’ as 
meaning ‘not all’. Such phenomena played a role in motivating the revision of the
10 For experimental evidence that young children are sensitive at least to what others have been 
attending to, and that this guides their interpretation o f  linguistic communication, see Tomasello & 
Haber1 (2003).
11 Breheny’s type o f inferential communication thus relies on maximal, not optimal relevance: the 
child’s attention is directed at the utterance’s linguistic form and he automatically treats it as the most 
likely source o f relevance available at that time and seeks to maximise its cognitive effects. Breheny 
appears not to appreciate this point when he says that his basic communication strategy involves 
following “a path o f  least effort in fixing on a source o f  optimal relevance” (Breheny forthcoming: 41 
ms, emphasis added). As was shown in section 3.1, individuals unable to attribute at least knowledge 
cannot have expectations o f optimal relevance. This assumes, o f course, that he is using ‘optimal’ in 
the technical, relevance-theoretic sense.
97
communicative principle of relevance in Sperber & Wilson to include reference to 
the speakers abilities and preferences. The idea is that when there are two 
compatible forms that are alike in terms of processing effort, a speaker choosing the 
informationally weaker o f the two thereby implicates that it would be incompatible 
with her abilities or preferences to use the stronger one. This explains why ‘some’ in 
B ’s response in (9) may be taken to imply that he does not know whether all o f his 
neighbours have pets: he has used the strongest form compatible with his abilities 
(here his knowledge), thereby implying that he is unable to use the stronger ‘all’ and 
prompting A to interpret ‘some’ as implicating ‘not all’ (1986/1995: 276-278).
(9) A: Do all, or at least some, of your neighbours have pets?
B: Some o f them do
Thus, what Breheny’s account o f basic communication and the discussion of the 
optimistic strategies in section 3.1 show is that it is possible to give a relevance- 
theoretic account o f linguistic communication which is not reliant on a conception of 
belief preceding competence in assertion. Consequently, the theory is not challenged 
by Dummett’s claim that assertion is conceptually prior to belief, though this claim 
has led to a useful re-evaluation of the necessity of metarepresentational abilities in 
basic ostensive-inferential communication.
3.3 A pragmatics module?
As Breheny notes, the minimalist relevance-theoretic account argues against the 
need for a specific module devoted to utterance interpretation, which would have as 
its domain utterances and other ostensive stimuli. The arguments for such a module 
have been presented in a number of places (Sperber 2000; Sperber & Wilson 2002), 
and are summarised by Wilson (2003). They can be termed ‘the underdeterminacy 
argument’, ‘the overtness argument’, and ‘the effect argument’.
The underdeterminacy argument rests on the observation that, where non-ostensive 
intentional behaviour is concerned, the effects that a speaker can hope to achieve in
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a certain situation are quite limited, and that this greatly facilitates the task of 
inferring the speaker’s intention. Someone jumping up and down under an apple 
tree, the argument goes, can rationally only expect to have a limited number of 
effects, making it easy to form reliable hypotheses about his intentions (i.e. that he 
intends to grasp an apple or shake one from the tree). Sentence meaning, on the 
other hand, greatly underdetermines the speaker’s intended meaning, making the 
inferring o f the speaker’s intention a far more challenging task, one which requires a 
dedicated procedure.
This argument fails to acknowledge, however, that although linguistic meaning is 
indeed under-determinate as regards speaker meaning, language does allow much 
more fine-grained evidence to be presented than do other forms o f behaviour. 
Moreover, as the discussion in the previous sections has shown, even given its 
underdeterminacy, a speaker’s meaning can be identified by following the same 
procedure as is used when interpreting other non-ostensive stimuli. Thus, the 
underdeterminacy o f linguistic meaning is not a strong argument for a pragmatics 
sub-module.
The overtness argument points out that Grice’s conception o f ‘meaning™* (1989: 
213-223), which distinguishes linguistically communicated meaning from natural 
forms o f meaning, requires that the speaker must not only have an informative 
intention but intend that this intention be recognised by the audience. Interpreting 
such behaviour thus requires the attribution o f a multi-level intention of the form 
‘the speaker intends me to know that she intends me to believe that P’. Given that 
two-year olds, on the one hand, engage in basic communication but, on the other, 
fail to demonstrate any ability to form such higher-order representations in false- 
belief tasks, a possible solution to this problem is to posit a comprehension module 
which is available to such children and is able to process such higher-order 
representations, but whose representations are unavailable to other modules o f the 
mind, such as the general mind-reading module. Consequently, although able to 
represent the content o f beliefs attributed to others as representations, the child is
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unable to use these representations in inferences aimed at explaining or predicting 
behaviour, the argument would go.
As Wilson acknowledges (2003: 313, fn. 8), one response to this argument is to ask 
whether the sort o f communication that children are engaging in is indeed full-blown 
ostensive communication. Clearly, this is the route taken by Breheny, who would 
probably want to say that such children are not responding to verbal behaviour (or 
characterising it) as ostensive behaviour in the relevance-theoretic sense, but to 
attention-directing behaviour. The reason that they may seem to be engaged in 
ostensive communication is that adults assume that children are characterising adult 
ostensive behaviour as ostensive, when in fact they treat it as merely attention- 
directing. At the same time, adults may also mistakenly characterise a child’s 
attention-directing behaviour as being driven by a full-blown communicative 
intention (i.e. one reliant on the notion of belief). Indeed, one question raised by the 
claim that two-year olds have the ability to attribute a communicative intention is 
what use this would be to them if they were also unable to attribute belief more 
generally. The crucial effect o f the recognition o f the communicative intention is to 
make it mutually manifest that the speaker has a certain informative intention and 
thereby encourage the hearer to infer what the content of this might be on the basis 
o f assumptions about what the speaker might believe to be relevant to the hearer. 
Without the ability to represent such beliefs, though, it must be asked what use the 
attribution o f a higher-order intention might be. In a shared cognitive environment, 
the same stimulus will be relevant in the same way to all those who share it. This is 
just the type o f communication predicted above to be successful in symmetrical 
communication between non-belief-attributors. Mutuality is needed when a stimulus 
is employed that requires that the audience adjust their representation o f the shared 
environment in a manner indicated by the speaker. By making her informative 
intention overt, the speaker invites the addressee to attune his cognitive environment 
to hers on the basis o f her stimulus, what is manifest to him about her beliefs and
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desires, what is manifest to them about her assumptions about their assumptions and 
so on.1'  If children under four are unable to mentally represent assumptions as 
attributed to their speaker, it is not clear what would be the use o f attributing a 
communicative intention.13
The effect argument goes as follows: general intention attribution works by first 
identifying an effect that the agent could have both predicted and desired and then 
assuming that this was the intended effect; this procedure is not capable of 
accounting for utterance interpretation because the desired effect just is the 
recognition o f the speaker’s intention. However, basic communication o f the type 
posited by Breheny is effect-driven: the communicator produces a stimulus which 
the addressee processes by seeking to maximise relevance. If the effect achieved is 
the one intended, then communication succeeds; if it is not, then it fails. The effect is 
not calculated on the basis of a recognition of the speaker’s intentions; rather, the 
effect achieved is the only one considered, any interpretations more compatible with 
the speaker’s abilities and preferences being beyond the capacity o f the hearer to 
arrive at. Again, this is essentially Sperber’s strategy o f naive optimism, on which 
the hearer accepts the first interpretation relevant to him.
It seems, then, that the case for a pragmatics module is not clear-cut and requires 
further consideration. It is worthwhile, though, considering why one might feel the 
need to postulate one (cf. Carston 2002a: 132). When Relevance Theory was first 
developed, part o f the aim was to respond to Fodor’s (1983) claim that there could
12 This goes on ad  infinitum, but becoming more weakly manifest at each stage such that after a few 
embeddings these manifest assumptions are not mentally represented.
13 Basically the same point is made by Breheny (forthcoming: ms 39), who argues that the main 
function o f the reflexive element to Grice’s account o f meaningnn and Sperber & Wilson’s 
communicative intention is to cope with cases where ‘shared knowledge’ or a shared cognitive 
environment is not enough to ensure successful communication, but rather a dimension o f mutuality 
is needed such that what is shared is also assumed to be shared by the sharers.
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be no theory o f central cognitive systems because o f what has become known as the 
frame problem (the problem of limiting the premises that can be employed in a 
process o f non-demonstrative inference such that the problems it sets out to solve 
become tractable). By arguing that human cognition tends towards maximising 
relevance, Sperber & Wilson put forward a robust challenge to Fodor’s pessimism. 
Since Fodor (1983), however, the original distinction he drew between central and 
modular systems has been questioned by many, with a number of theorists now 
arguing that the mind is modular through and through (Carruthers 2005; Pinker 
1998; Sperber 1994a). In such a revised picture, the question o f which module is 
responsible for utterance interpretation naturally arises. Given that linguistically 
communicated meaning, on the Gricean conception, is intentional, it is natural to 
assume that the putative theory-of-mind module is a likely candidate. However, as 
this appears to come on-line (in the crucial respects) after communicative abilities 
develop, the idea that there is a sub-module responsible for utterance interpretation 
becomes attractive. Indeed, the arguments presented for a pragmatics module are 
essentially arguments against the view that utterance interpretation falls within the 
domain o f a theory-of-mind module, rather than being motivated by any explanatory 
need that the non-modular central-systems story was unable to fulfil (cf. Bloom 
2002, who also argues against a pragmatics module). The picture developed here, by 
contrast, is neutral concerning the modularity of central systems. It simply follows 
the original relevance-theoretic line that central systems, be they modular or not, 
seek to maximise relevance. Mind-reading abilities have a role to play, but this is not 
to say that utterance interpretation is part o f the domain of a mind-reading module.
Furthermore, it is not clear what sort o f evolutionary account one could give for a 
pragmatics module. If this has ostensive acts as its domain, then these must have 
existed prior to the evolution o f the pragmatics module, otherwise there would be 
nothing for it to evolve to track. However, if a pragmatics module is necessary for 
the interpretation o f ostensive acts, then it is not clear why such acts would exist 
prior to the development o f a the module: they are only useful if they can be 
recognised as such, and if they can be recognised as such without domain-specific
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cognitive abilities, then why should these develop? Sperber’s answer to this question 
is that early, simple ostensive-inferential communication was interpreted by 
employing general mind-reading abilities, but that once this was underway “a more 
specialised adaptation aimed at comprehension evolved” (2000: 130). However, this 
position concedes that a pragmatics module is not a prerequisite for successful 
ostensive-inferential communication, but merely facilitates it.
3.4  B e lie f  a ttribu tion  in the evolution o f  linguistic com m unication
The evolutionary argument raised at the end of the last subsection provides a 
convenient link to a discussion of the phylogenetic issues that would be raised if 
Dummett’s claim concerning the conceptual primacy o f assertion over belief were 
applied empirically. In order to consider the extent to which this is indeed a 
challenge for accounts of the evolution of linguistic communication, such as 
Sperber’s (2000), which propose that mind-reading abilities predate linguistic 
communication, it is necessary to return to the issues both o f the relationship 
between inferential communication and metarepresentation, and o f that between 
metarepresentation and belief.
In presenting a case for the evolution of inferential communication as prior to (and 
as a prerequisite for) the evolution o f language and linguistic communication, 
Sperber suggests that if ancestral linguistic communication was anything like 
modem linguistic communication, then the ancestors of modem humans must have 
had metarepresentational abilities. This is because, as has been shown, what is 
linguistically encoded by an utterance greatly underdetermines what a speaker 
means, and, for Sperber, inferring what a speaker means on the basis o f her 
linguistically encoded evidence requires inferring her informative intention, which in 
turn, for Sperber, involves metarepresenting the content o f her beliefs and desires.14
14 That Sperber’s notion o f belief here is representational can be seen from the fact that, in the sort o f  
ancestral scenarios he postulates, it is possible for a pre-linguistic early human to attribute to another 
the intention to deceive him. In other words, the addressee must be able to represent the state of
103
The underdeterminacy argument is also employed to argue against a code-model 
account o f linguistic communication, on which hearers do not infer the intentions of 
their speakers but simply decode the message. However, Breheny’s arguments -  and 
indeed the revised version o f Sperber’s own naive optimism strategy outlined above 
-  suggest that a code can be employed in inferential communication without 
metarepresentational (in particular full-blown belief-attributing) abilities, especially 
if  the information is relevant to the addressee in the same way as it is relevant to the 
communicator. In ancestral scenarios in which early or proto-humans are engaged in 
hunting, avoiding predation, and such, this is likely to have (often, at least) been the 
case. Furthermore, inferential linguistic communication o f a basic kind does not 
require that the addressee be able to represent the content o f the message as a 
message: he may simply treat it as he would any perceptible proximal stimulus (as in 
visual and auditory perception). That is to say, the message may be completely 
transparent to the receiver: he may not process it as a representation (i.e. opaquely) 
but purely as information, even though he has had to infer some o f the ‘intended’ 
meaning (see Sperber 2000: 123 on the question of whether coded communication is 
transparent).
The notion of transparency also touches on the second point to be considered, that of 
the link between metarepresentation and belief. The ability to represent another’s 
beliefs and make use of their representational nature in predicting the behaviour of 
an individual requires that one be able to ‘decouple’ (Leslie 1987) a representation R 
such that it does not necessarily retain the implications it would have in a context of 
the individual’s beliefs about the world. Thus, while one person might accept that 
the belief that Peter is in France follows from the belief that Peter is in Paris, they 
might attribute to another person the belief that Peter is in Paris without also 
attributing to that person the belief that Peter is in France, on the grounds that they
affairs the communicator intends him to represent as reality and assign this representation a negative 
truth-value. See, in particular, Sperber (2000: 124-125).
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do not feel justified in attributing to that person the belief that Paris is in France. In 
effect, this means that an individual cannot allow all the entries in his personal 
database o f beliefs to interact with those beliefs he attributes to another person. 
Rather, he must only allow those beliefs of his that he can safely assume that the 
other person also holds to interact with those he attributes to her on the basis o f her 
behaviour, as well as perhaps attributing to her beliefs that the attributer himself 
does not hold. It is therefore necessary to establish a sub-database o f beliefs for that 
other person, entry to and exit from which must be carefully monitored.15 The ability 
to do this essentially involves grasping that ‘Peter believes that P ’ does not entail P, 
and nor does P entail ‘Peter believes that P \
As was shown above, though, not all attribution of mental states is so cognitively 
challenging. The attribution of knowledge may entail simply tracking what 
information another individual has access to. Given that an individual knows that P, 
then that individual knows all that follows from P, as long as this does not rest on a 
premise unknown to that individual. Knowledge may thus be attributed simply by 
tagging what is known to the attributer with a marker signifying that it is known to 
the attributee (or, perhaps more economically, by tagging that which is not known to 
the attributee). Crucially, decoupling is not necessary. All that is necessary is 
keeping track o f what information is available, or not, to that individual. There is no 
need to grasp o f the representational nature of that information.
Desires are also simpler to represent than beliefs, but for different reasons. 
Representations of desirable states of affairs only have implications when they occur 
as the objects o f complex representations, not in their own right. Thus, while all 
representations embedded under ‘A believes that’ can serve as premises in the 
deduction of further beliefs for that person, representations embedded under ‘A
15 See Cosmides & Tooby (2000) for a discussion o f the various roles played by the ability to 
metarepresent decoupled representational forms.
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wants that’ do not, in themselves, imply anything. Put another way, the implications 
propositional forms have when unembedded are mirrored when embedded under 
‘believe’ but not under ‘want’. This is illustrated by (10), (11) and (12): while (10)b 
follows from (10)a, and ( l l ) b  from (11 )a, (12)b does not follow from (12)a (Heim 
1992; Stalnaker 1984):
(10) a. Peter’s mother will get better
b. Peter’s mother is ill
(11) a. Peter believes his mother will get better
b. Peter believes his mother is ill
(12) a. Peter wants his mother to get better
b. Peter wants his mother to be ill
Thus, on the one hand, inferential linguistic communication does not necessarily 
require metarepresentational abilities, and, on the other hand, inferring intentions 
does not necessarily involve attributing belief: the cognitively simpler attribution of 
knowledge may also lead to accurate predictions o f intentions. The way is therefore 
open to tell a plausible language-first, relevance-theoretic story about the evolution 
o f the sophisticated linguistic communication humans have today. It begins with 
inferentially-supplemented coded communication, completely transparent to the 
hearer and made possible by a basic linguistic code (compositional like human 
language but perhaps not yet recursive) and a relevance-seeking cognitive system 
that homes in on the relevant interpretation. This is the one intended by the 
communicator because what is relevant to her is relevant to her audience by virtue of 
the fact that they are in the same physical environment and have similar cognitive 
needs. However, no intentions are attributed by the interpreter and the communicator 
does not have a representation o f the audience’s mental state but acts benevolently in 
making information accessible. Such behaviour has been selected for because it 
resulted in the reproductive success o f their ancestors.
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At a later stage o f evolution, members of the species have acquired the ability to 
track knowledge in each other and thus act informatively only when their audience is 
ignorant. This requires no metarepresentational skill other than the ability to infer 
the possession o f knowledge from perception o f the other’s access to an information 
source. Attention-directing behaviour directs perceptual organs to sources of 
relevant information. Coupled with the cognitively simpler ability o f attributing 
desires, then one has all the elements o f a basic knowledge-desire action-predictor 
which enables the organism to predict the behaviour of another based on what 
information it has access to and what it wants.
The breakthrough that leads to the sophisticated use o f language enjoyed by modem 
humans would be a mutation that allowed an individual to recognise an utterance as 
a representation and therefore to metarepresent its content. This would enable that 
individual to compare the representation with what it represents. He will find then 
that the representation is not always reliable and that individuals can be mistaken (so 
far there are no liars, for only the mutant has this potential). This is essentially the 
recognition that an expression with propositional form P does not entail that P is the 
case, which, again, is the basis of a grasp of the notion of belief (along with the fact 
that P ’s truth does not entail awareness o f P, which is evolutionarily prior on the 
present story). Suddenly, consideration o f the communicator’s competence 
(specifically, her representation of the world) becomes important in her interpreting 
acts o f basic linguistic communication, and there is a great deal to be gained from 
attributing to her beliefs (true and false) as opposed to knowledge. Such an 
advantageous adaptation is likely to spread rapidly and the potential for deception 
arises. The communicator’s preferences (including her inclination towards 
benevolence or malevolence) thus become an important consideration. A 
metarepresentational arms race takes off, the more sophisticated having an 
evolutionary advantage over the less well-endowed. Before long, linguistic 
communication looks very different to the basic communication of the species’ 
ancestors, and merely letting another know of your intention to communicate can be 
enough to get your message across.
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The main advantage such a tale has over the metarepresentation-first story is that it 
allows there to be perceptible, public representations (i.e. basic assertions) in the 
environment, thus providing a basis for the subsequent natural selection of the 
ability to metarepresent the content o f representations. Sperber him self concedes the 
attraction o f such a scenario (2000: 121-122), but argues that it is implausible on the 
grounds that linguistic communication relies on inferring a speaker’s intention, 
which necessarily involves metarepresentation. However, Breheny’s account of 
basic communication suggests that the inference required for linguistic 
communication can be co-ordinated without metarepresentational abilities, thus 
weakening the case for the metarepresentation-first scenario. Strengthening the case 
for the language-first scenario is the presence o f public representations as the objects 
o f the newly-evolved metarepresentational capability. This seems far more plausible 
than a mutation that results in an individual suddenly postulating the existence of 
private representations and metarepresenting the content o f these.
3.5 Summary> o f  section  3
This section has shown that the challenge that could posed to Relevance Theory by 
applying empirically Dummett’s claim concerning the conceptual primacy of 
assertion over belief is not insurmountable, despite the central role played by 
complex intention-attribution in the theory. Relevance-driven interpretation 
processes with no recourse to metarepresentational abilities are both conceivable and 
plausible, thus allowing assertion to predate belief attribution in the development of 
both the individual and the species.
One important point that this discussion has highlighted is that the code model of 
communication is not to be distinguished from inferential communication by the 
need for metarepresentational abilities. An ostension-/inference-based account of 
basic communication which has no recourse to metarepresentational abilities is 
possible.
108
4 M ea n in g  an d  m e n t a l  re pr e se n t a t io n
4.1 M ental represen ta tion  an d  relevance
The last section considered how one of the issues highlighted at the end o f chapter 1 
(the relationship between assertion, truth and belief) made interesting predictions 
about the development o f communicative abilities. This section considers the 
inferential processes involved in utterance interpretation and focuses on the medium 
in which, according to Relevance Theory, these take place. This relates to the third 
o f the issues identified at the end o f chapter 1, namely the relationship between 
assertion and inference. The material covered here will, it is hoped, be of interest in 
its own right, but will certainly be important in chapter 3 when an account of the 
relationship between assertion and the indicative mood will be developed.
Relevance Theory assumes a representational/computational view o f the mind, as 
outlined in Fodor (1981; 1998). This approach accounts for the content o f thoughts 
by viewing them as structured symbolic objects, instantiated in the mind, which co- 
vary with features o f the environment. Thus, the thought that ‘the cat is on the mat’ 
is assumed to have as a constituent a symbolic form which is tokened by the 
presence o f a cat in the individual’s perceptible environment. Thoughts are true, on 
this view, if the entities, properties and relations they represent are as they are 
represented.
As well as having semantic properties, these symbolic representations are thought to 
be structured in such a manner that they have a syntax comparable with that of 
natural language, and hence this representational medium is often referred to as ‘the 
language of thought’. It is this formal property of mental representations that gives 
them their productivity and systematicity: the fact that they have a syntax means 
they can be used in inferential computations. Thus, one can derive the thought that 
‘the cat is not at the vet’s’ from the observation that it is on the mat.
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If the representational nature of assumptions explains how they can be true or false, 
their formal properties and the computations these permit explain how they can be 
assessed as such by the individual. On being presented with a new assumption -  
either through perceptual channels or through communication -  an individual will 
seek to integrate it with accessible prior assumptions. The inferences which 
constitute this attempt at integration will contain the new assumption as a premise 
and will ideally go through without uncovering a contradiction. Should a 
contradiction be found, though, the system will be faced with two options: reject the 
new assumption or reject the prior assumptions with which it is incompatible. Which 
it chooses will depend on the relative confidence it has in each set o f assumptions. If 
the new assumption is from perception, for example, and the prior assumptions from 
communication, it will most likely reject the prior set on the grounds that its source 
was unreliable.
Adding a new assumption to a set o f assumptions will either have an effect on that 
set or it will not, and whatever effect it does have can be compared with the effect of 
other assumptions. As noted in section 2, Sperber & Wilson term an assumption that 
has an effect on a prior set o f thoughts ‘relevant’, and assess the degree o f relevance 
o f new assumptions in terms o f the scale o f their effect (as against the amount of 
effort involved in deriving them). Effects which improve the individual’s 
representation of the world they term ‘positive cognitive effects’. What the human 
cognitive system aims at, they argue, is maximising positive cognitive effect while 
minimising effort.
The notion o f a cognitive effect is derived from the formal notion o f a contextual 
effect. If a context is taken to be a set o f propositions, the addition o f a further 
proposition to that context has an effect on that context if  it leads to either the
110
derivation o f non-trivial implications16 or the cancellation of one or more of the 
contextual propositions. If  the facility to grade propositions according to strength or 
certainty is added to this formal context, then a third type of effect is possible: the 
strengthening or weakening o f contextual propositions.
This conception o f a context can be applied to the propositional forms that serve as 
an individual’s representation o f the world: his assumptions. An effect on a such a 
system is not merely a contextual effect but also a cognitive effect. Changes to the 
cognitive system can be either positive or negative according to whether or not they 
improve the individual’s representation o f the world. Those which do result in such 
an improvement are positive cognitive effects, and this notion can be used as the 
basis o f a further notion o f relevance to an individual. A proposition is relevant in a 
context if  it has effects in that context. An assumption is relevant to an individual if 
it results in positive cognitive effects (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 263-266).
The notion o f a positive cognitive effect (and hence of relevance to an individual) 
clearly relies on the notion o f truth, for an individual’s representation of the world 
will only be improved by the addition o f a true assumption. However, the mere 
addition o f true assumptions to a context formed o f factual assumptions will only 
have a negligible effect on the quality o f the individual’s overall representation of 
the world: for a significant improvement in that representation, that true assumption 
must also have sufficient cognitive effects in the context to which it is added to 
justify the processing it. In other words, it must be relevant in that context, and 
hence to that individual.
16 “A set o f  assumptions P logically and non-trivially implies an assumption Q if and only i f , when P 
is the set o f initial theses in a derivation involving only elimination rules, Q belongs to the set o f final 
theses” (Sperber & W ilson 1995: 97)
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4.2 Propositional forms, assumptions and truth
It was noted in Chapter 1 that a number of authors have pointed out that ‘true’ as 
applied to propositions does not equate to ‘true’ as applied to assertions. Above, 
however, the propositional forms termed ‘assumptions’ have been freely spoken of 
in terms of truth and falsity. It is now necessary to consider, therefore, whether it is 
acceptable to use ‘true’ in an unqualified sense in a discussion o f assumptions. In 
order to do this, it is first necessary to ask what features assertions have besides 
expressing propositions such that they can be judged true or false. This will make it 
possible to decide by analogy whether it is appropriate to describe assumptions in 
these terms.
In addition to expressing propositions, a crucial feature which makes assertions 
truth-apt is their direction of fit: the term ‘true’ can only be applied when the 
proposition expressed by the form being judged obtains independently o f that form. 
When it obtains as a result o f that form, such as when a proposition obtains because 
an utterance of an imperative expressing it has been complied with, it is not correct 
to describe the form expressing that proposition as true. Another important feature, 
and this comes from Barker (2004), is that ‘true’ is a term applied to representations. 
Propositions per se are not representations, though forms expressing them may well 
be. Assertions, given that they are generally thought of as having the functional 
characteristic of providing information about the world, are certainly 
representations. There are, then, three necessary conditions for being truth apt: 
expressing a proposition, having a word-to-world direction o f fit and being a 
representation. It now needs to be asked whether assumptions have these features.
By definition, assumptions express propositions (they are propositional forms). They 
also have a word-to-world fit: an assumption is correct if the proposition it expresses 
obtains in the actual world independently of that assumption. All that remains for 
assumptions to be shown to be truth-apt is to establish that they are representations. 
This might appear to follow automatically from the fact that thoughts are often 
referred to as ‘mental representations’, but the view that a symbolic mental system
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that co-varies with states of affairs is thereby a representational system is not 
universally accepted. Barker (2004), for example, argues that for an object to count 
as a representation it must be intended as one. According to his argument, as the 
medium of thought is where intentions are formed, that medium cannot itself be 
representational if  circularity is to be avoided. However, there is a way round this. 
What intentions give an object such that it serves as a representation is the function 
o f representing. Functions are not solely the result o f intentions, however, but also of 
evolution. Millikan (1984; 1993) provides a notion o f function on which an object’s 
proper function is the effect it has which ensures its reproduction. This conception 
thus allows for functions to be explained in evolutionary terms, so that the function 
o f a component o f an organism is that effect it has which contributes to the 
organism’s evolutionary success. Hearts are reproduced because they contribute to 
the evolutionary success o f the organism by pumping blood around the body. In a 
parallel fashion, it is the fact that a cognitive system represents the world for an 
organism which contributes to the reproductive success of that organism and hence 
the reproduction o f that system. On this view, the proper function of the cognitive 
system is to represent the world, and assumptions therefore meet all the conditions 
for truth-aptness.
Not all propositional forms which play a role in cognition, however, aim at truth. 
Factual assumptions -  i.e. propositional forms which consitute the basis o f the 
individual’s representation o f the world (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 74) -  can have as 
constituents further propositional forms. While the former aim at truth, the latter do 
not necessarily do so. Factual assumptions about another person’s beliefs have a 
constituent propositional form, as in (13):
(13) George believes that P
While the assumption (13) aims at truth, the embedded proposition P does not. This 
is because P serves not as a direct representation of the world, but as a representation 
of the content o f another representation o f the world, i.e. George’s belief. If P is a
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faithful representation of a belief of George’s, then (13) is true, but this does not 
entail that P itself is true.
(14) I conjecture that Q
(14) also has a proposition as a constituent. In this case, however, Q serves (by 
virtue o f its embedding form) as a representation o f the world and thus does aim at 
truth.
What factual assumptions and the propositional forms embedded in (13) and (14) 
have in common is that they aim at consistency with a particular set o f propositions: 
a factual assumption should be consistent with all other factual assumptions in a 
particular cognitive system at a given time; P in (13) should be consistent with all 
other propositions embedded under ‘George believes that’; and Q in (14) should be 
consistent with all other propositions embedded under ‘I conjecture that’. These 
assumptions ‘aim ’ at consistency because they are treated as consistent even when, 
due to processing limitations, there may in fact be inconsistencies in the set which 
are unidentified as such by the cognitive system.
What distinguishes the set of factual assumptions from sets o f embedded 
propositional forms is that the former track the actual world. Assumptions in this set 
are derived from perceptual stimuli and communication, and inferences drawn from 
these. Consistency here aims at maintaining and improving an accurate 
representation o f the world. Where sets of embedded propositional forms are 
concerned, consistency is employed to develop reflective representations o f the 
actual world, representations o f other worlds and representations o f other world­
views. Humans have access to representations of fictional worlds, for example, and 
representations o f the world-views o f other individuals. Like an individual’s 
representation o f the actual world, these sets of representations aim at consistency, 
even if  they generally don’t serve as representations o f the actual world Thus, 
consistency is a means of ensuring truth where factual assumptions are concerned,
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but this is not necessarily so in respect o f embedded propositional forms. Some 
cases, such as conjecture, will aim at truth, but others, such as fiction and belief 
attributions, will not.
This point will be important in the next chapter when an account o f what is encoded 
by the indicative mood is developed and how this is related to assertoric force is 
examined. For the same reason, it is also necessary to look at sets of propositional 
forms that do not aim at consistency.
(15) George desires that R
As well as representing the beliefs o f others, humans also represent other people’s 
desires, as in (15). These differ from representations of beliefs in that they do not 
aim at consistency and do not have implications in their own right. Indeed, it is 
important that the objects o f desire attributions do not have implications in their own 
right, as this would warrant the inference that someone who desired a particular state 
o f affairs also desired all the implications that the object of that desire would have if 
it were entertained as a belief. However, as examples (11) and (12) showed 
(repeated below) this is not the case: while (1 l)b is generally true if ( l l ) a  is true, 
(12)a would not normally imply (12)b.17
(11) a. Peter believes his mother will get better
b. Peter believes his mother is ill
(12) a. Peter wants his mother to get better
b. Peter wants his mother to be ill
17 Reasoning about behaviour in terms o f beliefs and desires, is done not by using the contents o f  
those beliefs and desires as premises, but by using metarepresentations o f those contents (in other 
words, using as premises forms o f  the types exemplified by (13) and (15), not the embedded P and 
R).
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When discussing metarepresentation, then, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
objects o f metarepresentations are of two types: those which aim at consistency and 
therefore enter into inferential relations with other forms embedded under the same 
representation-type, and those that do not aim at consistency and thus do not interact 
in this way. The former mimic the behaviour of factual assumptions, while the latter 
do not. As will be shown later, the distinction between these two types o f 
representations is reflected in natural language to a significant extent in terms of 
forms which can present a proposition as relevant in its own right and hence 
consistency-aiming, and those which cannot.
Mental representations
Factual Non-factual
Aim at Don’t aim at
consistency consistency
Aim at Don’t aim
truth at truth
Figure 1: Types of mental representation
Figure 1 draws together the above discussion into a taxonomy of mental 
representations, where ‘mental representation’ means any propositional form that 
plays a role in cognition. Factual mental representations are those treated as facts by 
the system by virtue o f their format: they are ‘factual assumptions’ in relevance- 
theoretic terminology and they necessarily aim at truth via consistency. Non-factual 
mental representations are propositional forms embedded in factual assumptions.
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World-representing or world-view-representing non-factual representations (such as 
fictions and belief ascriptions respectively) aim at consistency, while desire 
representations do not. Finally, those non-factual mental representations which aim 
at consistency can be divided according to whether they aim at truth or not. 
Conjectures are an example o f truth-aiming, non-factual mental representations.
As discussed in chapter 1, Frege’s insistence on an assertion sign in his logical 
symbolism can be explained, following Green (2002) and Smith (2000), by 
considering the fact that one o f the uses to which he intended this symbolism to be 
put was the acquisition and systemisation o f knowledge. It was also noted how the 
aims of a cognitive system are essentially the same as this: its purpose is to maintain 
and improve the individual’s representation o f the world. It should therefore be no 
surprise to find that a model o f this system will have in it a means o f marking 
thoughts as having assertoric character. Thus, the basic, factual level of 
representation postulated by Relevance Theory echoes Geach’s (1965) suggestion, 
also mentioned in chapter 1, that thoughts are necessarily assertoric in character 
unless embedded in a complex thought.
4.3 Mental representation and possible-world semantics
Chapter 1 ’s distinction between an assertion, or an assertion-like mental 
representation, being true and a proposition obtaining is also important to an 
understanding o f the two roles played by possible worlds in discussions of mental 
representation. On the one hand, those mental representations aiming at consistency 
have the function of representing particular worlds (and consistency is the means by 
which they fulfil this function). Factual representations are representations of the 
actual world. Non-factual, consistency-aiming representations are also world- 
representations: they might be representations o f other possible worlds, as in the 
case o f fiction, or they may be indirect representations of the actual world attributed 
to others. They may even be cautious or reflective representations o f the actual 
world by the individual herself, as in conjecture.
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On the other hand, possible worlds are employed in order to explicate the content of 
mental representations regardless of their representational function. Here, it is the 
propositional nature o f mental representations, rather than their representational 
purpose, that is in play: possible-world semantics allows one to say how it is that 
mental representations have semantic content. Propositions can be thought o f as 
identifying sets o f possible worlds, and a proposition obtains in any given world if 
that world is a member o f that set.18 Thus, the proposition ‘Paris is in France’ 
obtains in this world because this world is a member o f the set o f worlds comprising 
that proposition.
While the set o f factual assumptions held by an individual constitutes a 
representation o f the actual world, it does not determine which possible world is the 
actual world. Rather, because that set of propositions will obtain in more than one 
possible world, it identifies a set o f possible worlds which are candidates for the 
actual world. By adding to one’s stock o f factual assumptions, one reduces this set of 
possible candidates and becomes thereby more certain about the nature of the actual 
world. The same principle applies to representations o f other worlds or world-views: 
the addition of further propositions reduces uncertainty as to the nature o f the world 
represented by eliminating candidate possible worlds.
This view o f certainty being increased by the reduction of the candidate possible 
worlds comes, of course, from Stalnaker’s influential work on assertion and 
presupposition. This work is notable in that it suggests how the formal view of 
sentence meaning developed in model-theoretic semantics might be applied to 
pragmatics to solve what had hitherto appeared semantic problems, one example 
being the problem o f presupposition projection (Stalnaker 1970/1999, 1973, 
1974/1999, 1978, 1988/1999, 2002). This approach has proved very influential in
18 As was seen in chapter 1, propositions can also be thought o f as functions from possible worlds to 
truth-values. Following Barker, this characterisation is avoided from now on so that the term ‘true’ is 
not applied to non-representational entities such as propositions.
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what has come to be known as ‘formal pragmatics’ (See Kadmon 2000 for an 
overview), having played an important role in the development both o f Kamp’s 
(1981) Discourse Representation Theory and Heim’s (1988) File-Change Semantics.
For Stalnaker (1978), an essential effect o f an assertion is to extend, through the 
addition o f the proposition expressed, the common ground shared by the participants 
o f a conversation. On his view, the common ground is made up o f the 
presuppositions o f the participants o f a conversation, these presuppositions being 
those propositions that an individual is disposed to behave as if  she believes are true, 
and towards which she believes her audience to be similarly disposed. If 
propositions are viewed as sets of possible worlds, the propositions presupposed by 
the participants in a conversation will pick out the set o f possible worlds in which 
those propositions obtain. Stalnaker terms this the ‘context set’. As all the possible 
worlds in the context set are candidates for the actual world, assertion, on 
Stalnaker’s view, functions by reducing this uncertainty through the elimination 
from the context set of those possible worlds incompatible with the proposition 
asserted. This is achieved when the participants o f a conversation accept the 
proposition expressed by the assertion and add it to what they presuppose.19
The relevance-theoretic approach to communication can be analysed along parallel 
lines. It was noted above how communication on this view involves the modification
of a mutual cognitive environment. As it consists in a set o f manifest assumptions, a
20 •cognitive environment also picks out a set o f worlds. Acting ostensively modifies a 
cognitive environment, and the assumptions thereby communicated extend the 
cognitive environment by reducing the set of possible worlds which are candidates
19 This will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.
20 It is important, however, not to equate a cognitive environment with a representation o f a world. A 
representation is a concrete thing, but, while many o f the assumptions manifest to an individual will 
be entertained by him and hence be physically instantiated in the form o f mental representations, it is 
central to the notion o f manifestness that not all o f them will be, as was seen earlier.
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for the actual world. The same principle applies to any set of propositions which 
aims at consistency: increasing that set decreases the number o f possible worlds 
picked out by that set. Thus, the Stalnakerian picture of a context can be applied not 
just to the common ground or to mutual cognitive environments, but also to any 
representation o f any particular world that functions by seeking consistency in a set 
o f propositional forms.
In sum, mental representations have content because they express propositions. A set 
o f mental representations aiming at consistency can represent a particular world, but 
the propositions it expresses will obtain in more than one world, each o f which will 
be a candidate for the represented world. So far, however, mental representations 
that do not aim at consistency have been ignored, so these must be considered now.
It has been argued that for a set o f propositional forms to count as a world 
representation, it must aim at consistency, because consistency is the feature which 
allows assumptions to pick out a particular world. As noted above, representations of 
desire do not aim at consistency. They therefore cannot function as representations 
o f a world. What, then, are they representations of? Consistent sets o f propositions 
function as representations o f particular possible worlds because, in possible world 
semantics, consistency entails a set of propositions obtaining in at least one possible 
world. By adding consistent propositions to that set, the number of possible worlds 
that the set obtains in is reduced. While a set o f propositions that does not aim at 
consistency will pick out a set of worlds in which that proposition obtains, adding to 
it will not reduce (and is likely to increase) the set o f worlds picked out. In other 
words, the problem is as follows: a consistent set o f propositions can function as 
world representations by virtue o f the fact that it will obtain in at least one possible 
world. But an inconsistent set need not obtain in any possible world. How then, do 
propositional forms for which consistency is not an aim come to have a 
representational function?
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There are a number of ways this problem could be addressed. Firstly, it could be 
denied that representations such as (15) are metarepresentations. This could be done 
by arguing that for a representation to count as a metarepresentation its object must 
have implications in its own right. As has been shown above, the objects o f desire 
representations do not have implications in their own right. On this account, (15) 
(i.e. ‘George desires that R ’) would count as a representation, but R would not. 
Propositionality would not constitute representationhood. This need not be as 
outlandish as it might seem. Factual assumptions are representations by virtue of 
their causal relation to the environment and their evolutionary function. 
Consistency-aiming, non-factual mental representations are, to some degree, 
representations because they mimic the behaviour of factual assumptions. 
Propositional mental objects that are neither causally related to the environment nor 
mimic the behaviour of factual assumptions might well be denied the status of 
representations.
A second approach might be to suggest that the objects of desire reports are not 
representations o f worlds but representations o f thoughts. R in (15) would not, on 
this account, function as a representation o f a world but as a representation of a 
thought o f the person to whom the desire is attributed. This would be an interpretive 
use of language, in Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/1995: 224-231) terminology, as 
discussed in relation to irony in chapter 1. The problem with this account is that it 
would lead to a parallel view of belief reports, as these also contain a representation 
o f a thought attributed to another. The result would be that the objects o f belief 
reports we no longer seen as world representations. Flowever, the thought 
represented in belief ascription is itself a representation o f the world, and so it seems 
far to say that the object o f belief reports are world representations, albeit indirect 
ones. Moreover, individuals often adopt the objects o f belief ascriptions as factual 
assumptions of their own, which further strengthens the case for considering them
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(indirect) world representations.21 Thus treating the objects of desire representations 
as representations o f thoughts only postpones the issue of explaining what they 
ultimately represent: one still has to explain what the thoughts they represent in turn 
represent such that they are different from beliefs.
The third option is to treat mental representations that don’t aim at consistency as 
representations not o f particular worlds, but of world-parts. A number of possible 
worlds can contain the same part or feature, so a world-part representation will pick 
out a set o f worlds, just as a representation of a particular world will. This would 
mean that the objects o f belief reports and desire reports both pick out sets o f worlds, 
but because the object o f a desire report does not aim at consistency, it cannot 
represent any particular world. Rather, it identifies a set of worlds that possess a 
feature that the person to whom the desire is attributed finds desirable (if the desire 
attribution is true). This is a very different form of representation to that achieved by 
consistency-aiming propositional forms, a difference perhaps best captured in terms 
o f direction o f fit: consistency-aiming propositional forms have a word-to-world 
direction o f fit; non-consistency-aiming propositional forms have a world-to-word 
direction o f fit and hence are not truth-apt.
This last approach correctly predicts the conditions under which desires will be 
incompatible: if  the world-part represented by one desire object is not part of at least 
one world which also has, as a part, the world-part represented by another desire 
object, then the desires are incompatible. As there is no world which has as a part 
that I give up smoking and simultaneously that I have a cigarette, these desires are 
incompatible. This approach avoids having to deny that the objects of desire reports 
are representations, but identifies them as a distinct type of representation from that
21 See Sperber (1997) for a discussion o f the condition under which we adopt the objects o f belief 
ascriptions as beliefs o f our own.
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found in belief reports. Moreover, this distinction in representation type is 
explainable in terms o f whether or not the propositional form is consistency-aiming.
This approach also has the advantage o f fleshing out the intuition that when 
expressing a desire, individuals don’t make a claim about the world but specify a 
feature they would like it to contain. To this it might be objected that expressing a 
belief specifies a feature the world contains, and that therefore beliefs should also be 
analysed as representing world-parts, and not worlds. The crucial point, though, is 
that one does more than claim that the world has that feature, as one commits oneself 
to all the features this implies, even if one is ignorant o f these, this being what 
underlies Green’s (1997; 2000) notion of assertoric commitment and Portner’s 
(1997) notion of an expandable context (discussed in chapter 4). For this reason, 
even simple belief expressions or reports can be viewed as representations o f whole 
worlds. Given these advantages, the third solution seems the best o f the three.
So distinguishing the set of worlds that a mental representation picks out by virtue of 
its propositional nature from the world it represents by virtue o f its representational 
function is important if the different semantic properties o f the objects o f belief 
reports and the objects o f desire reports are to be explained. Because both are 
propositional, both will pick out sets o f possible worlds in which they obtain. 
However, their distinct inferential properties allow them to fulfil different 
representational functions. Crucially, because those that aim at consistency are able 
to eliminate candidate worlds, they are able to function as representations of 
particular worlds.
The above analysis o f belief vs. desire ascriptions owes a great deal to analyses of 
the indicative/non-indicative distinction by Farkas (1985; 1992), Huntley (1984) and 
Portner (1997). What these analyses (which will be discussed in detail later) have in 
common is that they seek to explain the indicative/non-indicative contrast by 
relating the indicative, on the one hand, to particular worlds, and various varieties of 
non-indicative, on the other, to sets o f worlds (or worlds vs. world parts, in Portner’s
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case). The current account, though, takes this approach further by explaining how 
the logical properties o f mental representations determine their representational 
function. In other words, it doesn’t simply stipulate that a form is specified for 
representing particular worlds but shows how this follows from its logical properties 
and the nature o f the representational system in which it operates.
4.4 Summary
A lot o f ground has been covered in this section, and it is therefore worth outlining 
the picture o f mental representation and meaning developed here. The view that 
propositions are the bearers of truth has been rejected, following Dummett, Barker 
and Garcia-Carpintero. Rather, propositions are sets o f possible worlds, and a 
proposition obtains in a particular world if that world is a member of the set. A truth- 
apt object must have three features: it must express a proposition; it must have word- 
to-world direction o f fit; and it must be a representation. This explains why 
assertions and beliefs can be true, while commands and intentions cannot, even 
though all four express propositions.
One advantage o f this position is that the role played by propositions in language 
comprehension becomes clear in relation to both truth-apt and non-truth-apt uses of 
language. Understanding an assertion and understanding a command can both be 
characterised in terms o f picking out the set o f possible worlds in which that 
proposition obtains. Understanding the difference between the two requires, in part, 
grasping the different representational function to which the form expressing the 
proposition in each case is put: in the first case it is a representation of a particular 
world; in the second it is a representation o f a world-part.
This is not to not deny, as Carston (2002b: 133) has argued, that the propositional 
form of a non-declarative utterance is, in terms o f its effect on processing, 
functionally inert in its own right (indeed, this point will be important in the analysis 
o f the indicative/non-indicative contrast developed in subsequent chapters). The 
point, rather, relates to the semantic properties of interpretations of these forms
124
rather than to the process o f their interpretation.22 It is to deny, however, that 
conceptual representations are representations of propositions (Carston 2002b: 125 
expresses the relationship between the two in these terms). Conceptual 
representations are representations o f particular worlds or o f world parts, depending 
on whether or not they aim at consistency. That they express propositions enables 
them to have these functions.
Moreover, that a form cannot be evaluated as true or false does not make it 
unamenable to analysis in truth-conditional terms (as Carston 2002b: 133 suggests). 
It is possible to give T-sentences for imperatives, say, just as for declaratives. 
However, the ‘true’ employed in such a T-sentence is that o f a proposition expressed 
by that form obtaining, not of an assertion o f that proposition being in fact true (or, 
indeed, o f an order expressing that proposition being complied with). But it is ‘true’ 
as applied to assertions in which a complete theory o f linguistic meaning based on 
truth must be grounded: the other ‘true’ gives no more that an account o f the 
contribution to meaning made by propositions, which are themselves no more than 
abstract entities employed to explicate linguistic meaning. But ‘obtaining- 
conditional semantics’ is an ugly term which is unlikely to catch on, and so, with the 
above provisos, the term ‘truth-conditional’ and its variants will be used in what 
follows to refer to a non-mentalist approach to the study o f linguistic meaning, an 
approach that will be contrasted with a view of linguistic semantics as the input to 
the cognitive process o f utterance interpretation.
5 L a n g u a g e  i n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n
The previous section considered the relevance-theoretic view o f mental 
representation and, briefly, how ostensive-inferential communication functions by 
modifying the mutual cognitive environment of the speaker and hearer. This section 
will look at the role played by language in communication o f this sort.
22 I.e. it is a ‘truth-conditional semantic’ rather than a ‘linguistic semantic’ point, in terms to be 
discussed in section 5.1
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5.1 What do sentences encode?
In responding to the question which heads this subsection, it is necessary to 
distinguish clearly between input and interpretation. A distinction has often been 
drawn by those working in Relevance Theory between semantics understood as what 
is encoded by linguistic forms, and semantics understood as the relationship between 
such forms and the world. For some (e.g. Lewis 1970), the term ‘semantics’ should 
by definition be applied only to the latter relationship. However, following Sperber 
& Wilson (1986/1995), relevance theorists such as Carston (2002b) and Clark 
(1991), argue that a full appreciation o f the word-world relationship requires an 
understanding o f how that link is mediated by the cognitive process o f utterance 
interpretation.
On the relevance-theoretic view, developing an accurate picture of utterance 
interpretation involves reference to two distinct types o f semantic interpretation, one 
a psychological process, the other not. The psychological process involves 
translating natural-language input into the medium of thought, itself, as noted earlier, 
taken to be language-like enough to be termed ‘the language of thought’. For reasons 
that will be discussed briefly below, ‘sentences’ o f the language o f thought are 
considered to have an essential characteristic which natural-language sentences lack: 
determinate truth-conditions. In other words, these mental representations of states 
of affairs are fully propositional, while their natural language counterparts are not. 
They can thus be interpreted in the second sense: by being compared with the world 
and judged either true or false.23 This is patently not a psychological process, for 
humans are not able to have knowledge o f the world except via mental 
representations.24 The ascription o f truth-conditions to mental representations is,
23 Although this position is widely held, it is not immune to possible challenges. See Carston (2002b: 
74-83) for discussion.
24 This is not to deny, o f course, humans are capable o f judging thoughts to be true or false. 
According to the Fodorian representational/computational view o f the mind assumed by Relevance
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rather, a theoretical tool which enables the cognitivist to explain how it is that 
thoughts have content, i.e. via a mapping between the conceptual constituents o f 
mental representations and the world.
On this view, then, what is encoded by linguistic forms are not rules for mapping 
such forms to states o f affairs in the world, but schemata for the construction o f 
mental representations o f states of affairs and hints as to the sort o f contextual 
assumptions that should be brought to bear on the interpretation of these. While 
there will be a degree o f correspondence between the conceptual information 
encoded by the linguistic form and the mental representation, it should not be 
thought that the information encoded by natural-language sentences is in itself 
sufficient for the construction of fully-propositional mental representations. Indeed, 
if  this were the case, then it would be possible to abstract away from the 
psychological process o f deriving a language-of-thought sentence from a natural- 
language sentence, for the latter would, albeit indirectly, determine a uniquely 
identifiable state o f affairs (i.e. the truth-conditions o f the mental representation), 
and the mind could be bypassed in an account o f how natural language is 
meaningful. That such an abstraction would obscure, rather than clarify, the picture 
is primarily due to the now widely accepted observation that natural language 
sentences radically underdetermine the truth-conditions of the propositions they are 
used to convey. This topic has been much discussed (see Carston 2002b: chapter 1, 
and references therein), so here it is enough to point out that not only must reference 
assignment, disambiguation and the addition o f other necessary material take place 
before determinate truth-conditions can be identified, but that in many cases 
linguistically encoded concepts must be broadened or narrowed in accordance with 
speaker intention so that they pick out more or less than their linguistically encoded 
denotation would indicate. Thus, there is a great deal o f inferential work to be done
Theory, however, this is done by evaluating a thought’s compatibility with other thoughts held to be 
true, as was seen in section 4.2.
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in order to discern the proposition intended by the speaker in using a particular 
linguistic form. Another important reason for not abstracting away from the mental 
in the analysis o f linguistic meaning is that, as will be seen below, some of what is 
encoded by natural language sentences does not contribute directly to propositional 
content but, rather, affects the way the context is accessed and manipulated.
In order to examine the relationship between what is linguistically encoded and the 
truth-conditional content o f the speaker’s intended meaning, it is useful to first 
examine in more detail the various different kinds o f encoded meaning.
encoding
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the contribute to
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expressed expressed
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Figure 2: Varieties o f linguistically encoded meaning
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Figure 2 analyses linguistically encoded meaning first according to whether it is 
procedural or conceptual, then according to whether it contributes to the proposition 
expressed, and finally to whether it influences which propositions are communicated 
-  and hence processed -  or how these are processed.
The idea o f conceptually encoded meaning that does not affect the proposition 
expressed may seem odd, but consider (16)a:
(16) a. Peter’s left, I suppose
b. The speaker supposes that Peter has left
(16)a is true if  Peter has left, false if he has not. The effect o f the parenthetical T 
suppose’ is to communicate that the speaker is less than certain o f the truth of the 
statement in the remainder of her utterance. In Relevance Theory, this has generally 
been explained by arguing that the parenthetical results in a higher-order 
representation along the lines of (16)b being added to the context in which (16)a is 
interpreted, resulting in the conclusion that this has been uttered with less than 100% 
certainty (Blakemore 1990/91; lfantidou 2001; Wilson & Sperber 1993). The 
parenthetical information thus contributes to the truth-conditions o f (16)b, though 
not to the truth-conditions of the utterance. This is not the case with all 
parentheticals, however. (17)a would appear to be true only if (17)b is:
(17) a. Peter, it is alleged, is innocent
b. It is alleged that Peter is innocent
When conceptually encoded meaning does contribute to the proposition expressed 
by an utterance, this is not necessarily by contributing the meaning linguistically 
encoded by that form to the mental representation the utterance gives rise to. Rather, 
what generally happens is that only some o f the encyclopaedic and logical 
information associated with a lexically encoded concept also appears in the 
corresponding mental concept, the degree of similarity between the two
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corresponding broadly to intuitions about whether the use o f a word or phrase is 
literal or figurative (though in Relevance Theory these are pre-theoretical terms 
without direct equivalents within the framework).
This can be illustrated by looking at the contribution of the word ‘flat’ to an 
utterance such as (18), uttered as part o f a discussion concerning suitable 
destinations for a cycling holiday.25 There are competing intuitions about what ‘flat’ 
means in this utterance: on the one hand, there is the intuition that it means 
something like ‘level and smooth’, while on the other it is clear that applying this 
definition to (18) would make it literally false.
(18) Holland is flat
Although Holland is not, strictly speaking, flat, it is less ‘unflaf than, say, Norway, 
and is thus a less challenging destination for a cycling holiday. In such a case, what 
is communicated by the lexical item ‘flat’ is the concept FLAT*, i.e. something like 
‘level to such a degree as to make cycling reasonably easy’. Faced with this 
observation, the theorist has a number of options. She may decide that ‘flat’ is 
polysemous, and that an utterance o f (18) requires a process o f disambiguation on 
the part o f the addressee. Or she may decide that (18) is literally false and that the 
speaker is not speaking literally but figuratively, and that ‘flat’ here receives a 
metaphoric interpretation. The problem with the first o f these strategies is that it 
would require a distinct lexical entry for each degree o f flatness (or at least the 
listing o f an indefinite number o f related meanings under a single lexical entry), 
while the second would mean that so much communication was figurative that the 
term would lose its appeal.
25 This example comes from Wilson & Sperber (2002). For discussion o f the relationship between 
linguistically encoded conceptual meaning and communicated meaning, see Sperber & Wilson (1998) 
and Carston (2002b: chapter 5).
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The alternative, and this is the route taken by relevance theorists, is to decide that the 
lexical item ‘flat’ encodes something like ‘level and smooth’, but that this is merely 
a clue to, not a failsafe indicator of, the speaker’s intended meaning, which can be 
characterised by (19) and which is inferred on the basis of the linguistically encoded 
meaning and contextual assumptions, the inference being guided by considerations 
o f relevance.
(19) Holland is FLAT*
Thus, what is encoded by the linguistic item ‘flat’ makes only an indirect 
contribution to the truth-conditions o f the utterance, this being an example of the 
notion o f concept broadening mentioned earlier in this section.
Procedurally encoded information is information which does not contribute a 
concept to the utterance interpretation process but rather constrains or guides that 
process in some way. The term comes originally from work on discourse 
connectives such as ‘but’ and ‘after all’ by Blakemore (1987; 2000; 2004), though it 
is now generally agreed by those working in Relevance Theory that pronouns and 
mood markers can also be fruitfully analysed as cases of procedural encoding, the 
difference between them being what aspect of the interpretation process they 
constrain. The procedures encoded by discourse connectives do not contribute 
directly to the propositional content o f what is communicated, having an effect, 
rather, on the context in which utterances are interpreted. The procedures encoded 
by pronouns are such that they constrain the explicit propositional content of an 
utterance; for instance, in the case o f ‘he’, the constraint requires that a concept 
denoting a particular individual male must be entered in the corresponding slot in the 
mental representation. As such, pronouns contribute, by virtue o f the procedures
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they encode but without encoding a concept, conceptual information to the 
propositional content o f an utterance.26
Those elements of linguistic encoding that contribute to the propositional content of 
an utterance, whether conceptually or procedurally encoded, will make the same 
contribution regardless o f the force of the utterance. But not all procedurally 
encoded information contributes to the proposition expressed. As shown in figure 2, 
procedural information encoded by an utterance can also play a role in determining 
which propositions are communicated and how these are processed. This distinction 
is analysed by Wilson & Sperber (1993) according to whether the encoded 
information constrains explicatures or implicatures, terms which will be discussed in 
some detail in section 5.2. For now, it is necessary only to note both that the 
proposition expressed will not necessarily play a direct role in the interpretation of 
the utterance; and that assumptions concerning the speaker’s actions and attitudes 
will contribute towards interpretation.
(20) a. The train left five minutes ago
b. The speaker is saying that the train left five minutes ago
c. The speaker believes that the train left five minutes ago
d. We have missed the train
(21) a. Leave the book on my desk
b. The speaker is telling me to leave the book on his desk
c. The speaker wants me to leave the book on his desk
An assertion of (20)a might communicate all o f the propositions expressed by (20)a 
to d, while the request performed using (21) can communicate those propositions 
expressed by (21 )b and c, but not that expressed by (21)a itself. Mood markers thus
26 Wilson & Sperber (1993: 20) point to similarities between this view o f pronouns and Kaplan’s 
(1978) distinction between character and content.
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constrain which higher-order representations an utterance can communicate (so that 
imperative syntax cannot communicate that the speaker believes the proposition 
expressed by the utterance, for example), and also whether the proposition expressed 
by the utterance itself is communicated. Notice how the derivation of (20)d relies on 
the speaker employing the proposition expressed by (20)a in inference. The speaker 
who intends to communicate the latter must therefore also communicate the former. 
When an imperative is uttered, however, it is not possible to employ the proposition 
expressed by the utterance in the derivation o f cognitive effect (except as a 
constituent o f a more complex proposition). Mood markers thus both determine 
whether the proposition expressed is a possible communicated assumption and 
constrain the type o f attitude the speaker could have towards that proposition.
But mood markers will be the topic of the next two chapters. The focus here is the 
distinction between the semantic content of interpretations and the linguistically 
encoded input to the interpretation process. These two kinds of ‘semantics’, as noted 
at the outset of this sub-section, have been termed truth-conditional and natural- 
language semantics respectively. The former plays a dual role in Relevance Theory 
as both an observational and an explanatory tool.
It was noted above how the fact that utterances have propositional content is 
ultimately explained by postulating a language o f thought. This is assumed to have a 
compositional semantics by virtue o f a direct mapping between the conceptual 
representations that serve as constituents in fully-propositional mental 
representations and entities and properties in the world. Thus, truth-conditional 
semantics here plays an explanatory role: it explains how utterances have, via their 
relationship with mental representations, content.
However, truth-conditional semantics also plays an observational role, one which 
can be highlighted by looking again at the discussion of ‘flat’ above, where it was 
noted that (18) is literally false and that the intended meaning o f an utterance o f (18) 
is something like (19), which is truth-conditionally distinct fromo (18). A theory of
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utterance interpretation is then employed to explain how (18) could be used to 
communicate (19). Thus, truth-conditional semantics is used both in observation of 
the phenomenon to be explained and in its explanation. There is nothing wrong with 
this, o f course, but a theorist must be aware of the use to which he is putting truth- 
conditional semantics at any point in his theorising.
The case can be stated more generally as follows: in seeking to explain the process 
o f utterance interpretation the theorist sets himself the task o f explaining how an 
addressee arrives, as a result of processing a speech act, at an understanding of the 
intended explicit content o f the linguistic form. He has then, a target for explanation: 
viz. the interpretation o f the sentence uttered. Although this linguistic form has the 
intended truth-conditional meaning only as a result o f being translated into a fully- 
propositional mental representation, the theoretical machinery that underpins this 
claim has been set up to explain how this form is meaningful for an addressee. A 
theory of utterance interpretation cannot be asked to explain what the sentence 
(uttered in context) means, for the existence of this meaning is the very phenomenon 
it has been set up to cast light on.
If it is assumed that utterances have truth-conditional meaning, then theories both of 
how they mean and o f what they mean are needed, the latter being the explicandum  
o f the former. How utterances mean is a question for cognitive science; what they 
mean is a question that can be answered largely mind independently (‘largely’, 
because, as mentioned above, there are some elements o f linguistic meaning which 
seem not to affect the truth-conditions of an utterance but only the manner of its 
processing, and these cannot easily be analysed mind-independently). Nevertheless, 
the truth-conditional content of utterances can be analysed in such a manner, and, 
indeed, it must be if  a cognitive theory of utterance interpretation is to have anything 
to explain.
If, then, a truth-conditional theory is needed in order to explain what utterances 
mean, how is this related to the task o f explaining how they mean? Utterances mean
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because they represent, for humans, states of affairs. In order to explain how 
something represents a state o f affairs, it is necessary to posit a representational 
system, for representation is a three-way relationship between an object, what it 
represents and an information-processing system (Sperber 1996: 61). Given such a 
system, an attempt can be made to explain how changes in the representations it 
forms are related to changes in the input to this system. For those concerned with 
linguistic communication, the interesting input is linguistic, though it is, o f course, 
necessary to consider how this combines with other sorts of input, both from 
perception and memory. Given an utterance such as (22), then:
(22) Peter kicked the ball
it is necessary to explain how this will modify the human cognitive/representational 
system such that for that system it means that Peter kicked the ball. The crucial 
point, though, is that without a theory of what (22) means there is no way of 
predicting what effect it should have on the system to which it is inputted. It is 
precisely this role o f providing predictions against which to measure the success of 
models o f utterance interpretation which is the theory-building, as opposed to 
explanatory, role o f truth-conditional semantics.
If all sentences were as simple as (22), it would perhaps be possible to stick with 
pre-theoretical notions o f meaning as the measure o f the success of models of 
interpretation. But the existence o f forms whose precise meaning is very hard to 
articulate -  such as belief reports, counterfactuals and sentences containing modal 
verbs -  requires employing theoretical tools, such as possible worlds-semantics, in 
an attempt to explicate just what a processing model needs to be able to account for.
The reason it is important to be clear about this theory-building role of a mind- 
independent semantics is that it helps to clarify just what is being claimed about 
what is encoded by linguistic forms. As chapters 3 and 4 will show, this is especially 
pertinent to current concerns, for the proposal to be developed will argue that what is
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encoded by the indicative mood will sometimes have truth-conditional effects on 
interpretation, and sometimes will not. For now, though, it is enough to recognise 
that the theory-building role o f truth-conditional semantics helps to distinguish 
between different claims about the semantics of linguistic forms. Expressed in truth- 
conditional terms, such claims are observations concerning what a natural-language 
semantics, in combination with a theory of utterance interpretation, needs to explain. 
In natural-language terms, as understood here, claims about what is encoded amount 
to claims about the effect that such forms have on the representational system, 
effects which can either affect the propositional content o f the utterance or not.
5.2 Explicit and implicit communication
Examples (20) and (21) (repeated below for convenience) show that speakers 
communicate many more propositions than the one expressed by the linguistic form 
o f the utterance. How these are derived will be considered here, with particular focus 
on the contrast between explicit and implicit communication. It will be noted in 
particular that assertions have the unique potential o f communicating the proposition 
expressed by the sentence uttered, a potential that other speech acts do not have.27
(20) a. The train left five minutes ago
b. The speaker is saying that the train left five minutes ago
c. The speaker believes that the train left five minutes ago
d. We have missed the train
(21) a. Leave the book on my desk
b. The speaker is telling me to leave the book on his desk
c. The speaker wants me to leave the book on his desk
In Relevance Theory, if the proposition expressed by the linguistic form of an 
utterance is communicated (i.e. made manifest or more manifest), then that it is an
27 Indeed, the fact that assertions explicitly express the proposition to which the speaker is committed 
is seen by Alston as central to an analysis o f this act (2000: 116-120).
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‘explicature’ o f that utterance. Thus, (20)a represents the utterance’s linguistic form, 
the proposition it expresses and its explicature (modulo earlier points about 
underdeterminacy), while (21)a represents only linguistic form and the proposition 
expressed. Non-declaratives, as Carston (2002b: 120) rightly emphasises, never 
communicate the proposition expressed. Both declaratives and non-declaratives, 
however, communicate higher-order representations about the speaker’s behaviour 
and her attitude to the proposition expressed. As these propositions are derived by 
developing the schematic linguistically encoded input an utterance provides (i.e. its 
logical form), they are also explicatures o f a kind, termed higher-order explicatures 
due to the fact that they take the proposition expressed as objects. Communicated 
propositions not derived by developing the logical form of an utterance, such as
(20)d, are termed implicatures.
Carston notes that, in many cases, utterances that express more than one proposition 
also communicate more than one o f those propositions. The examples below 
illustrate the sort o f cases she considers:
(23) I’m certain that Peter has passed the exam
(24) Jane didn’t pass the exam because she never sat it
(25) Chomsky says that the language faculty is innate
(23) could communicate both that Peter has passed the exam and that the speaker is 
certain o f this, and (24) that Jane didn’t pass the exam, that she never sat it and that 
the former is a consequence o f the latter. Citing an authority, as in (25) may give the 
hearer reason to believe the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause (recall 
the way Darwin’s ideas are presented as fact in example (42) o f chapter 1). In all of 
these cases, the communicated embedded proposition would be derived by 
developing a logical form o f an utterance. For this reason, Carston offers the 
following definition o f explicature, which differs from the original proposed by 
Sperber & Wilson (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 182) in that it emphasises that an
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explicature need not be the propositional form of an utterance but any communicated 
proposition expressed by the utterance:
An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an ‘explicature’ o f the utterance 
if  and only if  it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form o f the utterance, 
or o f (b) a sentential subpart o f a logical form (Carston 2002b: 124).
It is important to note that the fact that a proposition expressed by a sentential 
subpart o f an utterance is entailed by the proposition expressed by the whole
utterance does not necessarily mean that it is an explicature of that utterance. (26)a
below entails (26)b, but this fact is clearly highly manifest to the hearer and hence it 
is not communicated by the utterance and is therefore not an explicature. Contrast 
this with the dialogue in (27), where the entailed embedded proposition in B ’s reply 
could indeed be an explicature of the utterance if the hearer is unaware of the fact 
that David has been deceiving Victoria.
(26) a. I’m glad you’re here 
b. The hearer is present
(27) A: Why’s Victoria crying?
B: She’s just found out that David’s been deceiving her
Where assertions such as (20) are concerned, higher-order explicatures show 
similarities with what Stalnaker terms non-essential effects o f assertion. It has been 
noted on a number o f occasions in this thesis that Stalnaker views modification of 
the common ground by the proposition expressed as an essential effect o f assertion. 
Other changes to the common ground result from the fact that a ‘conspicuous’ or 
‘manifest’ event (Stalnaker 2002: 708 is where the latter term is used) has occurred, 
such as someone leaving or entering the room in which the conversation is taking 
place. Stalnaker points out that an assertion (or, indeed, the performance of any 
speech act) is such an event and will thus in itself change the context. This type of 
context change differs from the essential effect o f assertions in that it is not 
dependent on acceptance by the audience.
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The parallel here between the notion o f a higher-order explicature and Stalnaker’s 
non-essential effect o f assertion is clear. Just as the context may not be changed by 
the content o f an assertion if  it is rejected by the audience, so ‘base-level’ 
explicatures (such as (20)a) can be rejected and not modify the mutual cognitive 
environment. However, the descriptions (20)b and (20)c will not necessarily be 
rejected along with it and may still result in a change to the mutual cognitive 
environment in just the way that Stalnaker’s non-essential effect will affect the 
common ground. Some higher-order explicatures, though, will only follow if the 
assertion is accepted. Consider, for example, factives such as ‘know’: ‘The speaker 
knows the train left five minutes ago’ can be a higher-order explicature of an 
utterance o f (20) only if  the assertion is judged true.
5.3 Assertion and common ground
Having mentioned on a number o f occasions that Stalnaker sees modification of the 
common ground by the proposition expressed as an essential effect o f assertion, it is 
necessary now to consider how this fits into the relevance-theoretic picture being 
developed here. Sperber & Wilson define an ordinary assertion as one which 
communicates its propositional form. They use the term ‘ordinary assertions’ to 
distinguish what might be termed ‘informative assertions’ from utterances of 
assertoric forms on occasions when the speaker’s intention does not include 
communicating the proposition expressed (1986/1995: 181). Examples of such 
occasion are ironic utterances, utterances such as (28)a, where the speaker’s 
intention is not to inform the hearer o f the proposition expressed but to communicate 
the higher-order explicature (28)b, and cases where the speaker expresses the 
content of a belief in full knowledge that her hearer will not accept it. Such a case 
would be the defiant expression of a religious belief under persecution.
(28) a. You’ve had your hair cut
b. I notice you’ve had your hair cut
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In order to see whether communicating the propositional form, as in ordinary 
assertion, amounts to an attempt to modify the common ground by the addition o f 
that proposition, it is necessary to consider again what is meant here by 
‘communicate’. Sperber & Wilson define communication as a modification of the 
mutual cognitive environment of the speaker and the hearer such that the speaker’s 
intention to make manifest or more manifest a set of assumptions is mutually 
manifest. An assertion o f (20)a will thus have the aim o f making mutually manifest 
the speaker’s intention to make (more) manifest a set o f assumptions with the 
propositional forms that are expressed by (20). Communication is thus successful if 
this intention (the communicative intention) is fulfilled. Note that this does not entail 
that any o f the propositions expressed by (20) actually becomes manifest to the 
hearer, merely that the speaker’s intention that they should does. Thus, an ordinary 
assertion, one for which the intention is to communicate the proposition expressed, 
is successful on these terms as long as the fact that the speaker has this intention is 
mutually manifest. The hearer does not have to accept (i.e. judge as true) the content 
o f the explicature.
For the content o f the explicature to be judged true, the speaker must fulfil his 
informative intention. In the case o f (20)a, this is the intention to make manifest the 
set o f assumptions in (20). When the informative intention is embedded in a 
communicative intention, fulfilling the former will thereby make that set o f 
assumptions not only manifest but also mutually so. As such, the content of the 
explicature, if there is one, will certainly be added to the common ground. 
Modifying the common ground in this way (i.e. though the overt fulfilment of 
informative intentions) is certainly seen by Sperber & Wilson as an aim of most 
verbal communication (1986/1995: 64), though not constitutive of it. Thus, for an 
assertion to be a successful act o f communication in Sperber & Wilson’s sense, all 
that matters is that the speaker’s intention that the speaker come to believe the 
content o f his explicature be mutually manifest. For an assertion to be successful in 
Stalnaker’s terms, though, the speaker must also fulfil her informative intention, not 
merely make it mutually manifest that she has this intention.
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This difference, though, is essentially terminological. A successful assertion in 
Stalnaker’s terms is one in which, in relevance-theoretic terminology, the speaker 
fulfils both his communicative and informative intentions, thereby modifying the 
common ground/mutual cognitive environment. The fact that Sperber & Wilson 
term assertions made with this intention ‘ordinary’ does indicate that they see these 
as in some sense prototypical, with the existence o f ‘non-ordinary’ assertions being 
parasitic on these. In the end, the debate would come down to what one wants to call 
a successful assertion: one in which the proposition expressed is judged as true by 
the audience, or one in which the speaker’s intention that they should do this 
becomes manifest. But nothing much appears to hinge on this. Indeed, the most 
likely source o f the difference is the fact that these authors are engaged in distinct 
projects, Sperber & Wilson aiming to provide an account o f human communication, 
Stalnaker an analysis of the different ways the common ground can be modified by 
an assertion, with a view to explaining certain phenomena generally described as 
presuppositional.
6 S ummary
It was noted at the end o f chapter 1 that many authors see assertion as having a 
functional characteristic, in addition to its truth committing feature. This is 
expressed in a variety o f ways: as the function of communicating knowledge 
(Garcia-Carpintero 2004; Williamson 1996), o f communicating information 
(Dummett 1981), o f opening up an area for debate and advertising commitment 
(Barker 2003), or o f putting forward a proposition for inclusion in the common 
ground (Stalnaker 1978), all o f which can be glossed as informing the audience of 
the proposition expressed. What is now clear is that Sperber & Wilson also see this 
functional element as distinguishing (ordinary) assertion when they say that the 
proposition expressed should be among the propositions falling under the speaker’s 
informative intention. The picture of assertion that is emerging is thus of a speech- 
act with the following features:
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I. It commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. In this it 
is similar to both presupposition and expressions o f assertoric commitment, 
such as the use o f ‘as’-parentheticals a la Green.
II. It has the function of informing the listener of this proposition. This 
distinguishes assertion from both presupposition and expressions of 
assertoric commitment.
III. It explicitly expresses a member of the set of assumptions covered by the 
speaker’s informative intention. This distinguishes assertion from the other 
major speech acts, such as commanding/requesting and asking, as well as 
from implicature.
What is notable is that features I and II are potentially explainable in terms of 
relevance: for an assumption to be relevant to an individual it must be both true and 
informative. This opens up the possibility of accounting for both features with one 
concept. The next chapter will consider how this might be done by linking the 
indicative mood and relevance, thus covering point 11 raised at the end of the last 
chapter, i.e. the issue o f the relationship between this mood and assertion.
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C h a pt e r  3: A sser tio n  and th e  in d ic a t iv e  m o o d
1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although the last chapter ended with a discussion o f assertion in Relevance Theory 
-  in particular the notion o f an ‘ordinary’ assertion -  nothing has yet been said about 
how the indicative mood and assertion are related. This chapter, therefore, will relate 
the discussion of mental representation in the previous chapter to matters of 
linguistic form and practice, so that an account o f the contribution made by the 
indicative mood to the utterance-interpretation process can be developed. In other 
words, the aim will be to specify a linguistic semantics for the indicative mood such 
that it explains both the truth-conditional and the non-truth-conditional effects that it 
has been observed to have.
In doing so, it will be important to note (following, in particular, Pendelbury 1986)
that mood has a role to play regardless o f whether it is found in a main or embedded
clause, as the minimal pair in (1) show:
(1) a. I insist that Peter is here
b. I insist that Peter be here
Whereas in (1 )a the speaker is committing himself to the view that Peter is present, 
in (1 )b he is expressing his desire that this be the case, a distinction marked only by 
the mood of the subordinate clause. But while (l)a  might be called an embedded 
assertion, it is clear that the presence o f the indicative mood in a subordinate clause 
does not necessarily result in assertoric commitment, as (2) shows:
(2) I hope that Peter is here
The fact that mood has an effect even when embedded presents a choice between 
opting to distinguish between main-clause mood and embedded mood, as Dummett 
(1981) and Hamish (1994) do, or aiming for a unitary account o f mood that will
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explain its effects both when embedded and when not. The second option will be 
taken here as it is the more parsimonious of the two, and because there are many 
cases where the expression of a proposition by an embedded indicative does indeed 
lead to assertoric commitment, main-clause parentheticals being the clearest case. 
The simplest way to explain this is to have the contribution to interpretation made by 
the indicative the same in embedded and unembedded cases o f its occurrence. 
Clearly, however, this move would shut down any possibility o f a direct link 
between form and force if the presence of the indicative in the subordinate clause of
(2) is to be explained.
The aim, therefore, is to find an encoded contribution to interpretation that can 
explain how, under the right circumstances, the utterance o f an indicative clause, 
embedded or otherwise, can result in assertoric force, but without its presence 
necessarily having this effect. At the same time, it will be necessary to explain the 
role of the indicative in those cases where assertoric force does not follow.
In order to give an adequate account o f the indicative, there will be a need to throw it 
into relief at times though comparison with another mood. In this chapter, this will 
be done mainly by reference to the imperative, though a thorough analysis of this 
form will not be given. However, a detailed analysis of a non-indicative form will 
follow in chapter 4, which takes a close look at the indicative/subjunctive contrast in 
Spanish, which has often been discussed in terms o f assertion and non-assertion
2 M o o d  in  R e l e v a n c e  T h e o r y
2.1 The standard relevance-theoretic approach
In an number of works, Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber seek to address the 
problem o f how mood can make a contribution to interpretation both at the utterance 
level and at subordinate-clause level. They do this by proposing a semantics for the
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major moods which constrains the types of world they can represent.1 For the 
moment, the question o f whether ‘semantics’ relates, in the terms o f the last chapter, 
to natural-language semantics or truth-conditional semantics will largely be ignored, 
though it will be discussed in some detail later. The semantics they propose is as 
follows:
Declarative/indicative sentences (or clauses) may represent a state of 
affairs as actual;
Imperative sentences represent a state of affairs as desirable and achievable; 
Interrogative sentences represent a thought as desirable.2
Before these claims are questioned (noting in particular the use of ‘may’ in the 
semantics o f the declarative/indicative), the way in which they are intended to solve 
the problems that the moods present will be examined.
As was noted above, the aim is for a theory of mood that explains the relationship 
between a linguistic form and the forces standardly associated with it without 
specifying that it be used only for the performance o f acts carrying that force. Such a 
theory will provide an explanation for both main-clause occurrences of a particular 
form without its ‘standard force’ and the contribution made to interpretation when 
the form is embedded. In the case o f the indicative, the same semantics needs to 
explain why the speaker is committed to the truth o f both (3) and the proposition
1 As Wilson (1998-9a) points out, the relevance-theoretic literature on mood (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995: 243-254; Wilson & Sperber 1988a, b, 1993) is somewhat confusing, as it focuses at times 
on the effects at utterance level and at times on what these forms are thought to encode without 
explicitly uniting the two. Wilson (1998-9a; 1998-9b) seeks to remedy this, and, unless otherwise 
indicated, most o f this section is drawn from that work.
2 The semantics for declaratives and imperatives are quoted directly from Wilson (1998-9a: 8). That 
given for interrogatives is taken from (Wilson 1998-9b) and expressed here in a manner parallel to the 
other moods. It is clear from these texts that the moods have their representational potential because 
o f what they encode. Thus, these are claims about the linguistic semantics o f mood.
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expressed by the subordinate clause in A ’s contribution to (5), while she is not 
committed to truth in (4) (spoken as a contribution to a discussion of CS Lewis’s 
Namia books), in B ’s response in (5) or in the subordinate clause in (6).
(3) The train leaves at 5:30
(4) The children didn’t go through a broom-cupboard, they went through a 
wardrobe
(5) A: I insist that Peter is innocent
B: (ironically) Oh yeah. He’s innocent
(6) Peter thinks Jane is innocent
In order to see how the standard RT approach seeks to deal with this problem, it is 
necessary to focus on what is deliberately not specified by these semantics: in the 
case o f indicatives, it is who represents the state o f affairs as actual that is left 
unspecified; in the case o f imperatives, it is to whom the state o f affairs is presented 
as desirable; while in the case o f interrogatives, what is unspecified is to whom the 
thought represented is presented as desirable. The idea is that a sufficiently powerful 
pragmatic theory, such as Relevance Theory, will be able to fill in the gaps, allowing 
a relatively weak semantics to explain a wide range of cases.
So, in the case o f (3), the state of affairs picked out by the proposition expressed is 
entertained as actual by the speaker. This alone, though, is not enough for assertoric 
force to follow. To count as an ordinary assertion, the speaker must also intend that 
the proposition expressed be an explicature of the utterance. In other words, it must 
make a direct contribution to the relevance of the utterance in its own right.
In (5), fact that the indicative is used in the embedded clause of A’s utterance 
indicates that the actual world is being represented and thereby disambiguates 
between the two possible readings of ‘insist’ illustrated by (1) (repeated here):
(1) a. I insist that Peter is here
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b. I insist that Peter be here
B ’s response in (5) and the subordinate clause in (6) are cases where the person 
entertaining the description is not the speaker. In (6), the description is attributed to 
Peter, while in (5), B indicates that the proposition that his utterance expresses 
would only be entertained as a description of the actual world by a fool.3 (4) is more 
problematic, for it could not be argued that anyone is entertaining a fiction as a 
description o f the actual world. The best one could do is argue that the speaker is 
pretending that she is entertaining the proposition expressed as a description o f the 
actual world, but as many genres o f fiction, such as much science fiction, make no 
such pretence, this would be a difficult line to maintain. Rather, it is necessary to 
make use o f the hedge in the semantics (i.e. the ‘may’) and argue that the indicative 
can also be used to express propositions entertained as descriptions o f states o f 
affairs in non-actual possible worlds. Other authors (Clark 1991; Rouchota 1994b, c) 
have taken this route (though not necessarily in relation to fiction), but, as will be 
seen, it is not without its problems.
In each o f these cases, considerations of relevance lead the hearer to determine who 
the speaker intends the entertainer of the description to be. While linguistic 
information guides this process, the hearer may be justified in going further than this 
would indicate. For example, chapter 2 showed how the proposition expressed by 
the subordinate clause in (7) might be an explicature of the utterance. In such a case, 
the speaker would be indicating that this proposition was entertained as a description 
of the actual world not only by Chomsky, but also by the speaker herself.
(7) Chomsky says that the language faculty is innate
3 Irony has been analysed in Relevance Theory as being a case of the echoic use o f language (Sperber 
1984; Sperber & Wilson 1981; 1986/1995: 237-243).
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And in the case o f the imperative, the fact that to whom the state o f affairs described 
is desirable is not specified allows Wilson & Sperber to explain how this form can 
be used not only to represent the speaker’s desire, as in commands and requests, but 
also to represent a desire attributed to the hearer, as in advice or permission. An 
example o f this is B ’s response in (8) (from Wilson & Sperber 1988a: 80):
(8) A: Excuse me, I want to get to the station 
B: Take a number 3 bus
It is no desire/intention o f B ’s that A take a number 3 bus, but A has indicated that a 
course o f action resulting in her arrival at the station is desirable to her. B thus uses a 
form specified for describing potential and desirable states of affairs in his response, 
with the issue o f to whom the state o f affairs described is desirable being resolved by 
considerations o f relevance. Hamish (1994: 448) questions whether B ’s response in 
(8) is in fact an imperative, asking whether it might be a case o f discourse ellipsis, so 
that it is an infinitival continuation o f an implicit ‘to get to the station I advise you 
to .. .’. That this is not the case can be seen by considering what form would be used 
if negative advice were given. If this were a case o f ellipsis, one would expect the 
negation to be indicated by ‘not’, rather than ‘don’t ’, but as (8)' shows, this is not the
4case:
(8)’ B: Don’t take a number 3 bus; that goes all round the houses. Take a 73 
instead.
The indeterminacy in interrogatives determines not to whom a state of affairs is 
desirable, but to whom a thought is desirable. The challenge for any account of the 
semantics o f interrogative mood is to explain the range o f cases where this mood is 
employed for means other than the soliciting of information. Examples of such cases
4 The negation test for imperatives is discussed by Clark (1991: chapter 2).
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include rhetorical questions such as (9), exam questions and guess questions such as 
(10) (Wilson & Sperber 1988a: 92):
(9) What was your New Year’s resolution?
(10) Which hand is it in?
If (9) were uttered to someone who had just lit up a cigarette despite having resolved 
to give up smoking, then the speaker would most likely know the answer to the 
question and it could not, therefore, be analysed as a request for information. Exam 
questions are not normally requests for information either, as those asking the 
questions usually know more than those being asked. And in guess questions such as
(10), uttered when the speaker has a sweet in one of her hands and asks the hearer to 
guess which one, the speaker already knows the answer but the hearer can only 
guess. Thus, on the one hand, the speaker cannot be said to be asking for 
information, and, on the other, the hearer cannot be expected to give it!
Wilson & Sperber argue that analysing interrogatives as encoding that the 
proposition expressed is an interpretation of a desirable thought can account for 
these and their ‘standard’ information-requesting uses. A representation can be a 
representation o f either a state of affairs or another representation. When a 
representation represents a state of affairs, Sperber & Wilson term this a descriptive 
relationship; when it represents another representation, the relationship is 
interpretive.5 Interpretive representation depends not on truth but on resemblance 
between the two representations, with the degree of resemblance being determined 
by the number o f implications they share. Answers interpretively resemble 
questions. Uttering an interrogative indicates that a thought which interpretively 
resembles the proposition expressed by the utterance is desirable because it would be 
relevant. As with imperatives, to whom the desirability pertains is determined
5 This term has already been explained in chapter 1 in relation to irony in section 3.4.3.
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pragmatically: if  the speaker’s aim is to get information, the thought is desirable 
(hence relevant) to him; but in guess questions such as (10), for example, the thought 
is desirable to the hearer. As the topic of this thesis is assertion, however, from now 
on the emphasis will mainly be on descriptive uses o f language, and the interrogative 
form will generally be ignored.
To entertain a proposition as a description of a state o f affairs in a particular type of 
world is to have an attitude towards that proposition. Wilson & Sperber argue that 
the basic attitude o f belief and the varieties o f desire can be analysed according to 
whether the type o f world the propositional form is entertained as a description of is 
actual, potential or merely possible (i.e. with no commitment to whether it is actual). 
Analysed this way, belief is the holding of a thought as a description of the actual 
world. Desirable worlds can be either potential (in the sense that they are compatible 
with all the individual’s assumptions about the actual world) or not. This distinction 
is reflected in the distinction between hoping and wishing: someone can hope for 
potentialities but not impossibilities, while wishes are not constrained by what is 
believed to be possible.
Wilson & Sperber make use o f this connection between possible-world semantics 
and propositional attitude to relate mood and speech-act. Utterances of main-clause 
indicatives are analysed as a cases o f ‘saying that’, and imperatives as cases as of 
‘telling to’. However, these are technical terms which are not to be equated with 
either the Gricean notion o f saying or the common-sense notion, the former entailing 
speaker meaning and the latter often relating to implicitly communicated meaning 
(Carston 2002b: 209-210, fn. 16). ‘Saying that’ here means communicating that the 
proposition expressed is entertained as a description o f an actual state o f affairs 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 247) and uttering a main-clause indicative therefore 
communicates the higher-order explicature (11):
(11) The speaker is saying that P
(12) The speaker is telling the hearer to P
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Because the semantics o f the indicative, on this story, does not specify who is 
entertaining the proposition expressed as a description of the actual world, ‘saying 
that P ’ does not necessarily commit the speaker to P. This only follows if 
considerations o f relevance lead the hearer to attribute the attitude expressed to the 
speaker (rather than taking the speaker to be attributing the belief to someone else, 
for instance). Similarly, an imperative results in the higher-order explicature (12), 
but only in imperatival force if the indeterminacy inherent in the semantics is 
resolved by attributing to the speaker the desire that the hearer perform the action 
described by the utterance (as opposed to taking the speaker to be attributing the 
desire to the hearer, for instance). Thus, ‘saying that’ and ‘telling to’ are generic 
speech-acts and are not synonymous with ‘asserting’ and ‘commanding’. Under 
appropriate conditions, a hearer may go on to derive a more specific speech-act 
description, so that a case o f ‘saying that’ could be described by the hearer as a case 
o f ‘warning that’, for instance, or a case of ‘telling to’ as a case of ‘commanding the 
hearer to’, for example. However, the generic speech acts differ from the more fine- 
tuned variety in that they are necessarily communicated by the utterance of the 
forms associated with them.
Sperber & Wilson (1983: chapter 7) argue that not all speech-acts given in the 
traditional taxonomies are communicated. For these authors, a communicated speech 
act is one whose interpretation necessarily involves the hearer deriving a higher- 
order explicature which describes the speaker’s behaviour in speech-act terms. 
These are o f two types: institutional and non-institutional. Institutional
communicated speech-acts include bidding at bridge and promising. They are 
describable only by reference to an institution, such as the game of bridge or certain 
moral and religious beliefs,6 and thus, argue Sperber & Wilson, best studied as part
6 Promising, despite the large amount of attention paid to it by speech-act theorists, is convincingly 
argued by Sperber & Wilson not to be a universal practice but one which only exists given certain 
moral and legal frameworks (Sperber & Wilson 1983: chapter 7).
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of those institutions rather than as part of a study o f linguistic communication 
(though, o f course, any adequate study of the institutions will need to make use of a 
theory of communication). Non-institutional communicated speech acts form a 
highly restricted set consisting in ‘saying that’, ‘telling to ’ and ‘asking’.
While other non-institutional acts, such as ‘warning’ or ‘requesting’ may be 
communicated, it is not necessary that they are, and hence they are not classified as 
communicated speech acts. To see that they need not be communicated, note that 
what is necessary for a warning to be successful is that the hearer realise that the 
speaker’s utterance communicates a set o f propositions describing states of affairs 
detrimental to the hearer. Thus, (13)a would necessarily communicate (13)b, and, 
given appropriate contextual considerations, could also communicate (13)c and d 
without communicating (13)e. Indeed, non-communicated, non-institutional speech 
acts such as ‘warning’ are better seen as post-interpretation descriptions of 
behaviour rather than essential features o f the interpretation process. This is not to 
deny, though, that these descriptions can play a role in communication when the 
speaker’s intentions as to how she intends her utterance to achieve relevance are 
unclear. It is in such cases that (14) would be an appropriate response to (13)a.
(13) a. This knife’s sharp
b. The speaker has said that the knife is sharp
c. The speaker believes that the knife is sharp
d. The knife may cut me if  1 don’t take care
e. The speaker is warning me that the knife is sharp
(14) Is that a warning or a threat?
In sum, then, while mood is argued by Wilson & Sperber to encode information 
relating to speech-act potential, this is at a generic level o f description. They explain 
the role played by the indicative mood in utterance interpretation as follows: the 
indicative encodes the information that the proposition expressed by an utterance of 
the indicative clause is/‘may be’ entertained as a description o f the actual world,
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with the issue o f who holds this attitude towards the proposition being resolved 
pragmatically in accordance with considerations of relevance. The mood of the main 
clause results in a speech-act description of that utterance, the meaning of this 
description being as under-specified as the information encoded by the clause. As 
regards the indicative, this results in the utterance communicating that it is an 
instance of ‘saying that’, and the hearer’s task is to infer to whom is to be attributed 
the view that the proposition expressed is a description o f the actual world. If  it is to 
the speaker, and it is manifest that the speaker intends this proposition expressed to 
be an explicature o f the utterance, then the utterance is an ordinary assertion.
A critical examination of this account will follow soon, paying particular attention to 
the hedging over the semantics of the indicative (the troublesome ‘may’), but also 
considering these claims in the light of the last chapter’s distinction between natural- 
language and truth-conditional semantics, and the two theoretical roles played by the 
latter. First, however, it is instructive to consider briefly the strategy, employed by 
Sperber & Wilson, of seeking a core semantics for all instances of a given mood. 
This has certain similarities with the speech-act approach taken by Hamish (1994), 
and comparing the two will be a useful way both of highlighting the differences 
between Wilson & Sperber’s account and a speech-act approach, and of showing the 
limitations o f the latter.
Hamish argues that the semantics of any given mood is exhausted by characterising 
three elements o f information: the illocutionary force potential of the utterance 
(IFP), direction o f fit, and the conditions of satisfaction (1994: 431). The IFP of an 
utterance consists in the range of acts a form can be used to perform literally and 
directly, where literalness is defined in terms of a match between speaker meaning 
and sentence meaning: an individual speaks literally if she means at least what she 
says. (Clearly this presupposes a notion o f ‘what is said’ as distinct from speaker 
meaning, an issue to be discussed shortly.) An illocutionary act is performed directly 
if  done without relying on the performance of another act. ‘Direction of fit’ is a term 
familiar from chapter 2 (word-to-world in the case of assertions, world-to-word in
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the case of directives), while ‘conditions of satisfaction’ relates to the conditions 
under which an utterance is satisfied: being true and the state o f affairs described 
being brought about by the hearer as a result o f the utterance, are the respective 
conditions o f satisfaction for assertoric and imperatival utterances.
What is notable about Hamish’s speech-act account is that it does not postulate a 
direct force-form correspondence. Rather, the link between form and force is 
mediated by an expressed attitude associated with each o f the moods. Thus, 
declarative word order is associated with the expressed attitude ‘the speaker believes 
that P ’, and imperative syntax with ‘the speaker desires/intends that the hearer make 
it the case that P’. This then allows, on Hamish’s account, the hearer to employ other 
contextual information to infer precisely which act the speaker is performing, this 
process being constrained by the need to identify an act which has the expressed 
attitude as a necessary condition in its analysis. So the IFP o f a mood is best seen, on 
Hamish’s account, as a constraint on which acts can be performed directly by that 
act, rather than as a case o f one to one form-force correspondence.
It is in the role played by propositional attitude that Ham ish’s account most 
resembles Sperber & Wilson’s. Both see mood as primarily relating to the 
expression o f attitude, which then becomes the basis o f inferring communicative 
intentions. However, Hamish’s account differs from Sperber & Wilson’s in a 
number of ways. Firstly, the attitude expressed by the form is always expressed by 
the speaker, whereas Sperber & Wilson point out that in many cases, free-indirect 
reported speech being an example, speakers do not express their own attitudes but 
those of others. Secondly, the analysis limits itself to accounting for the relationship 
between mood and force and has nothing to say about the contribution made by 
mood at the level o f the embedded clause. Sperber & Wilson, recall, have it that 
mood makes the same contribution at both main clause and embedded clause level, 
but that the effect is distinct at each: only at sentence level does it contribute towards 
force. Thirdly, Hamish does not seek to account for all instances o f the use o f a 
particular mood, only those which are ‘literal and direct’, where this is defined in
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terms of a match between sentence meaning and the speaker’s intended meaning. 
This in itself is problematic as it is doubtful whether a propositional level of 
meaning independent o f speaker intention can be identified, making the notion of 
literal meaning a highly dubious one (see Carston 2002b, especially chapter 2, for 
extensive discussion o f this issue).
Thus, while both Hamish and Wilson & Sperber employ propositional attitude as a 
mediator between form and force in an attempt to account for the contribution of 
mood, Wilson & Sperber’s approach is more successful in that it does not rely on 
notions o f literality, aims to explain effects at the embedded-clause level as well as 
at utterance level and is able to account for cases where the attitude expressed is not 
the speaker’s. However, this is not so say that their account is completely 
unproblematic, as will be seen below.
2.2 Problems with the standard approach
The first issue relates to just what semantics is being postulated for the 
declarative/indicative and how this differs from that postulated for the infinitive. 
Here are some quotes that give an indication of the problem:
Let us define saying that P , where P  is the propositional form o f the utterance, as 
communicating that the thought interpreted by P  is entertained as a description of an actual 
state o f affairs...When you say that P, you communicate that you are saying that P. You 
may communicate this by means o f linguistic indicators such as indicative mood, declarative 
word order and so on (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 247-248)
A declarative with propositional content P  communicates that P  represents a thought 
entertained as a description o f an actual or possible state o f affairs
An infinitive clause with propositional content P  communicates that the thought represented 
by P  describes a possible state o f affairs (i.e. without encoding anything about whether that 
state o f affairs is potential or desirable) (Clark 1991: 47 &141)
...na-clauses [i.e. Modem Greek subjunctive (-like) clauses] encode the information that the 
proposition is entertained as a description of a state of affairs in a possible world, whereas
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indicative clauses encode the information that the proposition expressed is entertained as a 
description o f a state o f affairs in the base world (Rouchota 1994b: 6 9 )7
Declarative sentences (or clauses) may represent a state of affairs as actual.
Infinitival sentences (or clauses) represent a state o f affairs as possible (Wilson 1998-9a: 8)
Declarative indicators, such as the indicative mood [...], encode the information that their 
clause represents an actual or possible state o f affairs, or, equivalently, that their clause 
comes with a belief attitude attached; this applies to all clauses, main or embedded (Carston 
2002b: 209-210, fn. 216)
These statements demonstrate that there is a lack of unanimity, and perhaps not a 
little uncertainty, about what the indicative encodes and how it is distinguished from 
non-indicatives. Does the indicative encode that the proposition expressed is 
entertained as a description o f the actual world, or as a description o f the actual or 
some other possible world? If the former, how are its non-assertoric uses to be 
explained? If the latter, how is it to be distinguished from infinitives and 
subjunctives?
That the indicative can be used to describe states of affairs which no-one entertains 
as actual is clear. As was noted above, much fiction doesn’t even pretend to be a 
description of the actual world. Moreover, indicatives are found in the antecedents of 
conditionals.
It is also clear that infinitives can be used to represent actual states o f affairs, as 
(15)a, shows:
(15) a. I believe you to be the best person for the job
b. 1 believe that you are the best person for the job
7 The base world is the world the speaker is in, and is by default the actual world (Rouchota 1994b: 
69).
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But if  this is the case then the standard account has no means of distinguishing the 
indicative from the infinitive: both can be used to represent the actual world, and 
both can be used to represent non-actual possible worlds. Moreover, (15)a appears to 
result in no extra effect. This is in contrast to what would be predicted by 
Rouchota’s claim that the indicative is linked by default to the base (actual) world. 
On this claim, an utterance such as (15)b would be easier to process than (15)a and 
the latter should therefore warrant an expectation o f greater effects. That it does not 
suggests that recourse to the notion o f a base world does little to distinguish 
indicatives from subjunctives and infinitives. Moreover, as will be seen in chapter 4, 
the subjunctive in Spanish can be used to indicate that a representation of the actual 
world is of low information value, whereas Rouchota’s account would predict that 
such usage should indicate high information value in order to justify, though the 
derivation of greater effects, the use of a non-default form for representing the base 
world.
One possible remedy to the problems raised by the use o f non-indicatives to 
represent the actual world would be to argue that while embedded infinitives can 
represent the actual world, a non-embedded infinitival utterance can only describe 
non-actual worlds, as (16) and (17) illustrate. In other words, one might argue that 
what is unique about main-clause indicatives is that these are the only main-clause 
forms that are able to be used to represent the actual world.
(16) To spend all one’s life in a room. Imagine.
(17) To meet the president o f the United States. Hmm.8
The problem with this solution, though, would be, the loss o f one o f the advantages 
of the relevance-theoretic account: that the same semantics is postulated for both the
8 These examples are from Wilson & Sperber (1988a: 84).
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embedded and unembedded use of a form. Nevertheless, there is certainly something 
to the observation that, at main clause level, only indicatives can be used to represent 
the actual world, and the proposals developed in section 2.3 will aim to account for 
this.
Another issue relating to the standard relevance-theoretic account is whether 
attempts to characterise the moods in terms of the types of worlds the thoughts that 
they express represent is, in the terms discussed in the previous chapter, a natural- 
language-semantic characterisation or a truth-conditional-semantic characterisation. 
Recall that the former o f these relates to the information encoded by the linguistic 
form in terms o f the effect it has on human information-processing mechanisms, 
while the latter relates to the truth-conditions of the utterance’s interpretation. 
Characterising moods in terms of the types o f worlds that the propositions they 
express can represent is a generalisation about the interpretations that utterances of 
these forms receive. It does not follow, though, that this information is what is 
linguistically encoded by the mood. What may be encoded, rather, is a cognitive 
constraint on the role the proposition expressed is to play in the processing of the 
utterance. Indeed, Wilson & Sperber (1993) argue that mood is a case o f procedural, 
rather than conceptual, encoding, in that it contributes to meaning by constraining 
some aspect of the interpretation process rather than feeding it with conceptual 
representations. However, they express the nature of the constraints imposed by 
mood in terms of the semantic features of their interpretations (i.e. as a 
representation o f a particular type o f world), rather than in the effects that it has on 
the processing system which lead to the distinct interpretations. The new account 
offered in the next section differs from the standard relevance-theoretic account in 
that it seeks to explain the representational effects o f mood in terms of the effect it 
has on how the proposition expressed by a clause with a given mood is processed by 
that system. As such, it is able to handle both those cases where mood has truth- 
conditional effects and those cases where it does not.
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2.3 A new relevance-theoretic account o f  the indicative
Before developing the new account, it is useful to draw together and re-cap on the 
data it needs to account for:
a) Assertoric force: the account developed must explain the role of the 
indicative in the interpretation of what Sperber & Wilson term ‘ordinary 
assertions’, i.e. utterances which both commit the speaker to the truth of the 
proposition expressed and seek to inform the hearer of that proposition.
b) Non-ordinary assertions: in the same way, it must be able to explain what 
happens in non-ordinary assertions, when there is speaker commitment but 
no intention to inform the hearer of the proposition expressed, such as when 
a religious belief is defiantly asserted under persecution.
c) Non-assertoric main-clause uses: as well as cases where there is no 
informative intention, there are also cases o f main-clause indicative use 
where there is no commitment to truth, fiction being one type o f example.
d) Embedded clauses and assertion: there are cases, as has been seen, when 
an embedded clause conveys a key point o f the speaker’s message, 
parentheticals being one type o f example.
e) Unasserted embedded indicatives without assertoric force: the account 
developed must be able to specify the conditions under which embedded 
indicatives do not convey assertoric force, such as when they occur as the 
constituent o f a negative first-person belief report (‘I don’t believe that P’).
The account that will be developed in this section to explain these data can be 
expressed quite succinctly:
Claim: indicative clauses are unique in that they present the proposition 
expressed as potentially relevant in its own right in an accessible context. 
Consequence: because they have this feature, indicatives are also unique in 
having the capacity to present the proposition expressed by an indicative
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clause as relevant in its own right to an individual. This is what marks them 
for assertoric use.
What will take time is explaining and justifying the claim, showing how the 
consequence follows, and demonstrating how this analysis explains the range of uses 
identified in a) to e). This will be done as follows: first the distinction between a 
proposition being relevant in a context and being relevant in its own right in that 
context will be discussed. Then, drawing on the distinction between factual and non- 
factual consistency-aiming mental representations introduced in the last chapter, two 
types o f contexts will be distinguished: factual and non-factual. Because relevance in 
a factual context is related to relevance to an individual, it will then be possible to 
explain the link between the indicative mood and assertoric force in terms o f the 
relevance o f a proposition in its own right to an individual.
2.3.1 Relevance vs. a proposition’s relevance in its own right
The claim being made is that the indicative is unique in presenting the proposition 
expressed as potentially relevant in its own right in an accessible context. It is 
therefore necessary to be clear about the distinction between a proposition which is 
relevant and one which is relevant in its own right. Consider the argument in (18):
(18) If Peter tells Mary that her dress looks nice, she’ll dance with him 
Peter is telling Mary that her dress looks nice 
Mary will dance with him
Given an initial context consisting of only the first premise in (18), the addition o f 
the second premise results in the conclusion that Mary will dance with Peter. The 
proposition ‘Peter is telling Mary her dress looks nice’ is thus relevant in this (very 
simple) context. This second premise, however, contains two propositions: ‘Peter is 
telling Mary that her dress looks nice’ and ‘Mary’s dress looks nice’. Only the first 
o f these is relevant in its own right, for only this proposition warrants the derivation 
of effects. However, it would be wrong to say that the embedded proposition was
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/rrelevant, as without it the embedding proposition would have no effect. It makes a 
contribution to relevance, therefore, but not in its own right.
The distinction between a proposition contributing directly to relevance in its own 
right and making an indirect contribution is central to an understanding of the 
different roles propositions can play in linguistic communication. Utterances 
communicate a range of propositions, some o f which may play a direct role in the 
derivation o f contextual effects, and others of which may not. Consider (19) and (20) 
(capitals mark focal stress):
(19) a. JOHN gave Peter a lift
b. Someone gave Peter a lift
(20) a. Stand up
b. The speaker wants the hearer to sand up
(19)b is implied by (19)a, but in a context where (19)b is mutually manifest prior to 
the utterance (i.e. one which would justify this stress pattern), it is unlikely to lead to 
significant cognitive gains simply by being made more manifest. However, it would 
contribute to the relevance of the utterance as a whole if it made more accessible a 
context in which the proposition expressed by (19)a could lead to positive cognitive 
effects. For example, assume it was mutually manifest that the person who gave 
Peter a lift probably murdered him. Making accessible the assumption that someone 
gave Peter a lift would also make this assumption more manifest and facilitate the 
derivation o f the implication that John probably killed Peter. Thus, in the utterance 
o f (19)a, two propositions play very different roles: (19)b activates a context in 
which the proposition expressed by (19)a is relevant. Both propositions contribute to 
the overall relevance o f the utterance, but only (19)a has contextual effects of its 
own. It can therefore be said that the proposition expressed by (19)a is relevant in its
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own right, while (19)b is not, even though it contributes to the overall relevance of 
the utterance.9
But (19)b is not a proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance. Perhaps, 
therefore, it could be argued that all explicitly expressed propositions are relevant in 
their own right, not merely those expressed by indicatives.10 That this is not the case 
can be seen by considering (20)a. As Carston (2002b: 120) points out, the 
proposition expressed by (20)a (that the hearer stand up) makes no direct 
contribution to the relevance of the utterance. Rather, relevance is achieved by the 
communication o f a higher-order explicature such as (20)b. Like the implicit 
proposition (19)b, then, the proposition explicitly expressed by an utterance of (20)a 
makes an indirect contribution to the relevance of the utterance. It is not relevant in 
its own right and it is therefore not the case that explicitly expressed propositions are 
necessarily relevant in their own right.
2.3.2 Factual vs. non-factual contexts
The above discussion of relevance in its own right jumped rather quickly from 
relevance in a simple, formal context to the relevance of an utterance in the more 
complex case of utterance interpretation. Looking more closely at the types of 
context involved in utterance interpretation will make it possible to see how the two 
are related.
Chapter 2, section 4.2, showed that consistency-aiming mentally representations can 
be categorised by considering whether they aim at truth or not, and whether they are 
embedded or not. Firstly there are factual assumptions, which are assumptions that
9 For a relevance-theoretic account o f contrastive stress, in which the notion o f relevance in its own 
right is employed, see Wilson & Sperber (1979) and Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 202-217).
10 Recall that being explicitly expressed is not the same as being an explicature: to be an explicature a 
proposition must be both explicitly expressed and communicated (Carston 2002b: 117; Sperber & 
Wilson 1986/1995: 182-183).
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the system treats as true by virtue of their unembedded format. These constitute the 
individual’s unreflective representation of the world and rely on consistency as a 
means o f achieving and maintaining accuracy. Other propositional forms embedded 
in factual assumptions either aim at consistency or do not, and those that do either 
aim at truth or do not. Those which aim at consistency include representations o f the 
actual world attributed to others (i.e. attributed beliefs), representations o f the 
content of fictions, and reflective representations o f the actual world, such as 
conjecture. But while all three of these aim at consistency, only conjecture aims at 
truth.
A context formed o f non-consistency aiming propositions would offer no means of 
acquiring information about a world, due to the fact that adding further assumptions 
to such a context does not reduce the set o f worlds compatible with that set. Thus, 
contexts accessible to the hearer must be formed o f either factual assumptions, 
embedded assumptions aiming at both consistency and truth, or embedded 
assumptions aiming only at consistency. (And, o f course, a context must be made up 
exclusively o f one of these types, not a mixture o f them.) A context made up of a 
subset of the factual assumptions manifest to an individual can be termed ‘a factual 
context’ and one made up of embedded propositional forms an ‘embedded context’. 
If necessary, it is then also possible to distinguish between truth-aiming and non­
truth aiming embedded contexts, though this distinction will not be made as a matter 
of course.
2.3.3 Context types and contributions to utterance-relevance
In determining the role played in the interpretation o f an utterance by a 
communicated proposition, it is necessary to consider both the type of effect that 
proposition has on a context and the type o f context it has an effect on. Indeed, both 
considerations are crucial to explaining the conditions under which an utterance will 
carry assertoric force. Recall from chapter 2 that an utterance communicates many 
more propositions than the proposition expressed, and that many utterances do not in
163
fact communicate the proposition expressed. The examples given in chapter 2 to 
illustrate this point were the following:
(21) a. The train left five minutes ago
b. The speaker is saying that the train left five minutes ago
c. The speaker believes that the train left five minutes ago
d. We have missed the train
(22) a. Leave the book on my desk
b. The speaker is telling me to leave the book on his desk
c. The speaker wants me to put his book on my desk
An assertion such as (21) might communicate all of (21) a to d, but an imperative 
cannot communicate the proposition it expresses, only its higher-order explicatures 
(and, o f course, any implicatures which follow from these).
Any act o f ostensive communication will have some effect on a factual context. This 
is because ostensive stimuli are changes in the audience’s perceptible environment, 
and, if  noticed, they will thereby modify the individual’s representation of the world. 
Thus, even if the utterance (21 )a is not intended as an ordinary assertion, it will still 
result in the hearer forming a factual representation expressing the content of the 
higher-order explicature (21)b. Similarly, if a speaker intends her utterance not as a 
representation o f the actual world, but of, say, a fictional world, the fact that she has 
made the utterance will be a feature of the actual world and, consequently, as a 
relevant stimulus, have an effect on a factual context.11
What distinguishes ordinary assertions from non-ordinary assertions and non- 
assertoric utterances is that not only is a description of the ostensive stimulus (i.e.
11 Note again here the parallels with Stalnaker’s distinction between essential and non-essential 
effects, as discussed in chapter 2 section 4.3.
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that the speaker is engaged in a form of ostensive behaviour, such as saying that or 
telling to) intended as relevant in a factual context, but so is the proposition 
expressed. That is to say, in making an assertion, a speaker puts forward the 
proposition expressed by the utterance as a candidate for adoption by the hearer as a 
factual assumption: she presents it as relevant in its own right in a factual context. 
As will be seen below, other uses o f the indicative either present the proposition 
expressed as indirectly relevant in a factual context, as relevant in its own right in an 
embedded context, or as indirectly relevant in an embedded context. Non­
indicatives, on the other hand, can only present the proposition expressed as 
indirectly relevant in either a factual or an embedded context. Thus, it is the potential 
o f the proposition expressed by an indicative clause to be relevant in its own right 
that determines that form’s assertoric potential, and it is the nature o f the context in 
which relevance in its own right is to be achieved which determines whether that 
potential is realised.
Non-ordinary assertions result when the proposition expressed is clearly held as a 
factual assumption by the speaker, but she manifestly does not utter it with the 
intention that the hearer adopt it as a factual assumption o f his own. This may be 
either because the hearer already holds this assumption factually, or because it is 
clear that he would not accept it as a factual assumption. (23)a is an example o f the 
first type of case. This utterance communicates the propositions expressed by (23)b 
to d, but not, crucially, that expressed by (23)a itself.
(23) a. You’ve had you hair cut
b. The speaker has noticed that the hearer has had his hair cut
c. The speaker believes that the hearer has had his hair cut
d. The speaker wants the hearer to know that the speaker has noticed
that the hearer has had his hair cut
The second type o f non-ordinary assertion is discussed by Sperber & Wilson 
(1986/1995: 180-181). These are cases when the speaker intends her utterance to
165
achieve relevance as an expression of her belief even though it is mutually manifest 
that the proposition expressed by her utterance will not be accepted by the audience. 
The speaker expresses that proposition regardless, in order to demonstrate her 
commitment to it. As mentioned earlier, an example of such a case (though not the 
one given by Sperber & Wilson) would be a defiant assertion under religious 
persecution.
Fiction, reported speech, belief attribution and suppositions are all cases in which the 
indicative is used to present the proposition expressed as relevant in its own right in 
an embedded context. In such cases, as noted above, although the proposition is 
relevant in an embedded context, the utterance itself is relevant in a factual context. 
A belief ascription may, o f course, be made either directly or indirectly, as in (24), 
where under the right contextual conditions, either a or b could be used to attribute 
to Peter the belief that the tooth fairy took his tooth. The difference between the two 
is that (24)a, assuming it is an ordinary assertion, explicitly expresses both the 
proposition that is relevant in a factual context and the one which is relevant in an 
embedded context; (24)b, by contrast, explicitly expresses only the proposition 
relevant in an embedded context.
(24) a. Peter believes the tooth fairy took his tooth
b. The tooth fairy took Peter’s tooth
This is not to say, though, that embedded indicatives always express propositions 
relevant in one context or another.
(25) Peter doesn’t believe that Santa Claus exists anymore
(26) I’m glad that you’re here
In (25) the subordinate clause, though indicative, is clearly not presented as relevant 
in a context made up o f assumptions representing Peter’s view of the world (rather, 
its negation is), while factives such as (26) are generally only acceptable if the
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proposition expressed by the indicative subordinate clause is already part of the 
common ground, and hence cannot contribute directly to the relevance of the 
utterance. Propositions such as these contribute to the relevance o f an utterance 
indirectly, not in their own right.
The present analysis can cope with examples such as (25) and (26) because it says 
that the indicative marks a proposition as potentially relevant in its own right. These 
are cases where the potentiality is not fulfilled. This may not seem to be the most 
satisfactory response, since it appears to somewhat weaken the claim made. In fact, 
however, data such as (25) and (26) actually strengthen the claim, as where the 
semantics of the embeddmg clause precludes the proposition expressed by the 
embedded clause from being relevant in its own right, languages with a subjunctive 
mood often use this. Consider the Spanish translations (25)' and (26)':
(25)' Pedro ya no cree que Papa Noel exista
pedro already not believe+3SG that Papa Noel exist+3SG+SUBJ 
‘Peter doesn’t believe that Santa Claus exists anymore’
(26)' Me alegro de que estes aqui
myself please+3SG of that you be+3SG+SUBJ here 
‘I’m glad that you’re here’
The analysis of the Spanish subjunctive in chapter 4 will show that, on the whole, 
this form cannot be used to present propositions as relevant in their own right. In the 
few cases where they can be used in this way, there is an effect which is explainable 
in terms of the speaker indicating that there is at least one accessible context in 
which the proposition expressed by the subjunctive is not relevant in its own right. 
Thus, the fact that propositions expressed by non-indicatives are generally precluded 
from being relevant in their own right means that the potentiality caveat in the 
(natural-language) semantics proposed for the indicative does not weaken the claim 
made.
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Another possible objection to the claim made here for the indicative is that it fails to 
explain the presence o f a non-indicative in certain first-person belief reports (which 
are cases o f explicit speaker commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by 
the object clause). In such cases, the speaker is certainly presenting the proposition 
expressed by the non-indicative clause as potentially relevant in its own right, it 
could be argued, because she is presenting it as a representation o f the actual world. 
Consider (15) (repeated below), which was presented above as an example of an 
embedded infinitive being used to represent the actual world.
(15) I believe you to be the best person for the job
It might be thought that this poses a serious problem for the account being developed 
here, as a non-indicative is being used to present a proposition that could at least be 
relevant in its own right in an embedded context (i.e. the hearer’s representation of 
the speaker’s world-view), and even in a factual context. However, because the 
present account makes claims about how mood affects processing, as opposed to 
what it reveals about propositional attitude, it is possible to deal with this in a 
straightforward manner. (15) is truth-conditionally equivalent to (27), both 
expressing the complex proposition (28):
(27) I believe you are the best person for the job
(28) <believe, speaker <best person for the job, hearer> >
A belief report can achieve relevance in a number ways, none o f which is exclusive. 
First, it can provide a reason for the hearer to adopt the object of the belief report as 
a belief o f his own. If the speaker is someone to be trusted on the issue, then that fact 
that she believes that P is a good reason for the hearer to believe that P. If this is the 
reason that the speaker expresses her belief, then she is presenting it as relevant in its 
own right in a factual context and should choose an indicative clause to express that 
proposition. Second, the relevance o f the utterance may rely heavily on the fact that 
the object of the belief report updates the hearer’s representation of the speaker’s
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world view. A debate can be imagined in which the speaker says, ‘I don’t believe P;
I believe Q \  with no intention that the hearer adopt Q as a belief o f his own: she 
simply wants him to have her views clear. Again, an indicative complement would 
be expected, as the proposition is presented as relevant in its own right in an 
embedded context (i.e. the hearer’s representation o f the speaker’s representation of 
the world). Third, the speaker might be reporting belief in order to explain 
behaviour. In such a case, the most relevant proposition would be not the embedded 
one but the complex proposition expressed by the whole belief report. This is how 
belief ascriptions are used when premises concerning an individual’s beliefs and 
wants are employed to predict or explain her actions: the standard folk- 
psychological schema for working out intentions is ‘If someone wants Q and 
believes P will lead to Q, then, all things being equal, that person will try to bring 
about P’. In such a schema, it is not P and Q that are doing the work, but the forms 
in which they are embedded.
If the primary relevance o f a belief report is as an explanation o f behaviour, 
processing effort will be reduced if the object is marked as not relevant in its own 
right, as the system will not attempt to process the proposition expressed by the 
embedded indicative but only that expressed by the whole sentence. Thus, the 
current account makes an interesting prediction about the circumstances under which 
the form exemplified by (15) will be preferred over that exemplified by (27): when 
the main relevance o f the utterance is as an explanation o f behaviour or intentions.
One author who has compared corpus instances of ‘believe that X is’ and ‘believe X 
to be’ is Noel (1997). He notes that any clear difference in meaning is difficult to 
find, and suggests that discourse features such as the given-ness and newness o f 
information are the crucial element. However, it is interesting to note that his data 
does suggest that a re-analysis along the lines suggested here might be fruitful. One 
prediction would be that there would be a strong tendency for infinitive 
complements to be used to explain behaviour, the third o f the uses o f belief reports 
highlighted above. The two examples from Noel listed below (his (10) and (17)
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respectively) are cases where this does seem to hold. In (29) M15’s beliefs are given 
as the reason for its misguided, according to the author, actions, while in (30) the 
beliefs o f each village are given as a reason for their symbolic markings. O f course, 
though, a thorough analysis of the data is needed before firm conclusions can be 
drawn. Moreover, the two views may be complementary rather than incompatible.
(29) The reason for M I5’s inefficiency is that it wastes far too much time and 
resources chasing after the wrong sort of people who it believes to be 
subversive, while real enemies o f the state are able to go on spying 
undetected for decades.
(30) Each village believes itself to be totally different from any other and often 
marks itself in a variety o f symbolic ways from those which surround it.
Another prediction would be that indicative complements should be preferred when 
the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is relevant in its own right in 
either a factual or an embedded context. O f course, though, a thorough analysis of 
the data is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. Moreover, this view and 
Noel’s given- vs. new-information account may be complementary rather than 
incompatible, especially when it is considered that the distinction between relevance 
and relevance in its own right can be employed to explain information-structure 
effects, as will be shown in the next chapter,
As noted above, explicit belief and speech attributions might be used because the 
speaker is presenting the proposition expressed as relevant in its own right in a 
factual context, even though the indicative clause is embedded. This raises two 
issues: are such cases assertions and how does the hearer decide in which context to 
process an embedded proposition? Consider (31) and (32):
(31) Mary says a pixie stole her doll
(32) The guard says the train leaves from platform 3
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The problem is how to explain why an utterance of (31) would lead to the 
proposition expressed by the subordinate clause having an effect on an embedded 
context representing M ary’s belief world, while (32) would result in the proposition 
expressed by the subordinate clause being processed in a factual context. The 
problem can be solved in the following way. First, a dumb processing system is 
posited, one which, on coming across a proposition expressed by an indicative 
clause, automatically processes that proposition in the most accessible context. 
Given such a system, the task is then to explain how it is that, on some occasions, 
embedded indicatives have many o f the properties associated with main-clause 
assertoric uses, while on others they do not.
An adult hearer of (31) is unlikely to start a search for a mischievous pixie on the
basis o f this utterance, but the same hearer may, as a result o f hearing (32),. head 
towards platform 3 to catch a train. The different effects the subordinate clauses
have on behaviour clearly result from a combination of the content o f the
subordinate clause and the relationship to that content o f the person to whom it is 
attributed. The proposition expressed by the subordinate clause in (31) will be 
relevant in an embedded context representing Mary’s world view, but not in a 
factual context. The words ‘Mary’ and ‘pixie’ will make a factual context less 
accessible, as they will activate encyclopaedic information about Mary (that she is a 
highly imaginative five-year old) and about the mythical nature o f pixies. By 
contrast, in a situation in which the hearer of (32) is about to embark on a train 
journey, the word ‘guard’ will activate encyclopaedic information to the effect that 
guards tend to be reliable sources o f information about train departures. Given the 
hearer’s aim o f catching the correct train, a factual context in which the proposition 
expressed by the subordinate clause is relevant will be highly accessible and this 
proposition will therefore achieve relevance in its own right in that context. It is 
potentially also relevant in an embedded context representing the guard’s world 
view, but as it is o f little benefit to the hearer to develop a representation of this, 
there is no need for it to be processed in this way. Note that the speaker takes some 
responsibility for the effect o f the subordinate clause in (32) even though he has not
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baldly asserted its content: she can foresee the effect it will have on the hearer, and if 
she knows o f any reason why the belief resulting from the utterance (that the train 
leaves from platform 3) is an unreasonable one given its source, she should make 
this clear. While one might baulk at saying that the speaker of (32) has asserted that 
the train leaves from platform 3, it does have features in common with assertion in 
that the speaker is both committed to the (probable) truth o f that proposition and 
seeks to inform the hearer o f it. It differs from a clear-cut case o f assertion in that the 
speaker does not take ultimate responsibility for the content o f the subordinate 
clause in the way that she does for the content o f the main clause (recall 
Williamson's 1996 discussion o f the centrality o f responsibility to assertion, as 
discussed in chapter 1, section 5).
2.3.4 Assertion and relevance to an individual
It was noted at the start o f section 2.3.3 that while all utterances will have an effect 
on a factual context, an ordinary assertion is distinguished by the fact that the 
proposition expressed by the utterance also has an effect on a factual context in its 
own right. Recall that a factual context is a context formed o f assumptions that the 
individual holds unreflectively, and which are treated as true by virtue o f their 
unembedded format. Being formed from assumptions which constitute the 
individual’s representation o f the world, such a context aims at truth: the effects 
sought are not merely contextual effects but positive cognitive effects. In other 
words, in order to be relevant in such a context, a proposition must be not merely 
relevant in its own right in that context, but relevant to the individual in its own 
right. Ordinary assertions are thus cases in which the proposition expressed is 
presented as relevant to the hearer in its own right. And the performance of 
assertions is restricted to the indicative because only a proposition expressed by this 
form is capable o f having contextual effects -  and therefore cognitive effects -  in its 
own right.
The importance o f this point cannot be overstated. When asking a question using an 
interrogative form or giving a command using an imperative, the speaker is giving
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the hearer direct evidence of the message she wishes to convey: the fact that she 
expresses a proposition in that form is evidence that she has a certain attitude 
towards it. The effect on the hearer’s representation of the world is, therefore, the 
result o f direct perception of a feature o f the world. In the case of an assertion, on 
the other hand, the effect on his representation of the world is derived directly from 
the proposition expressed without any direct experience o f the state of affairs that 
the asserted proposition represents.12 To be sure, it is the fact that the speaker has 
expressed this proposition with an indicative form under appropriate conditions 
which warrants the speaker adopting the proposition expressed as a factual 
assumption. However, there is no direct link between the speaker’s behaviour and 
the resulting modification in the hearer’s representation of the world, as there is 
when a question is asked or a command given. This is clearly why questions of 
responsibility and trust are so closely tied to assertion: when a speaker asks a 
question or gives a command, the question of trust does not arise because the 
performance o f the act is itself the message; when an assertion is made, by contrast, 
the hearer is expected to modify his representation of the world in the absence of 
directly perceived evidence. In other words, he is expected to treat as directly 
relevant to him not only the speaker’s behaviour, but also the proposition she 
expresses.
Analysing assertion in terms o f relevance to an individual makes it clear why, for 
many, assertion is best seen a form of perception by proxy. Dummett puts it like 
this: “we learn to react to the statements of others in the same way that we react to 
various observed features in the environment” (1981: 355). In a similar vein, 
Williamson (1996) and Garcia-Carpintero (2004), as was noted earlier, suggest that 
assertions are specified for the communication of knowledge, while Millikan (1984; 
2002) claims that linguistic communication is a form of perception and that the
12 Cf. Barker’s claim that while an assertion A represents a speaker-independent state o f affairs, a 
question or command expressing the same proposition as A represents the speaker’s desire about a 
proto-assertion (2004: 83).
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evolutionary reason the indicative mood exists is that it has been successful in 
creating true beliefs in the minds of listeners. Although the difference between 
(justified) true belief and knowledge will not be considered here (see Williamson 
1995), it is important to relate the view o f assertion as a means o f knowledge 
transference to the account being developed here.
Cognitive science has generally adopted a strategy o f ‘methodological solipsism’ 
(Fodor 1981), on which explanations of the relationship between thought processes 
and actions should make no reference to anything outside the individual. This is not 
to deny that content is a result o f a mind-world relationship. Rather, it is to claim 
that the distinct causal effects of different content-bearing mental representations 
must be explained only in virtue of their formal properties, not their semantic 
properties. Hence the tendency in much cognitive science to talk in terms of beliefs 
or assumptions rather than knowledge.13
This strategy o f methodological solipsism is embraced by Sperber & Wilson 
(1986/1995: 263). As seen in previous sections, the only means by which an 
individual can assess the truth o f her thoughts is by aiming at consistency. However, 
this is what might be called an ‘engineering’ point o f view, which can be contrasted 
with a ‘functional’ point of view. A functional point o f view is adopted when the 
aim is to say what something’s purpose is, an engineering point o f view is adopted 
when the aim is to say how it achieves its goals. A key goal o f human cognition, 
Sperber & Wilson point out, is to produce knowledge (1986/1995: 263). Moreover, 
the notion of relevance to an individual is dependent on the fulfilling o f cognitive 
goals. Because, therefore, the acquisition o f knowledge is a means of fulfilling a 
cognitive goal, one way that a communicated assumption can be relevant to an 
individual is by providing him with knowledge.
13 Though see Williamson (2002) for arguments against this tendency.
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As noted above, ordinary assertion can be analysed as a case of ostensive 
communication in which the proposition expressed is presented as relevant in its 
own right to an individual (as opposed to merely relevant in an accessible context). 
This is to say that the proposition expressed is presented as having positive cognitive 
effects. Given that such effects are analysed in terms of fulfilling cognitive functions 
and goals, and that the acquisition o f knowledge is a key cognitive goal, it is quite 
compatible with the account developed here to say that assertion has the function of 
transmitting knowledge, in agreement with the Williamson/Garcia-Carpintero view. 
However, it is important to stress once more that humans are not concerned with any 
old knowledge, but knowledge which is relevant to them, for this will lead to a far 
greater improvement in the individual’s representation o f the world than the mere 
acquisition o f irrelevant but true information.
2.3.5 Summary o f section 2.3
The indicative contributes to utterance interpretation by marking the proposition 
expressed as potentially relevant in its own right in an accessible context. This 
allows it, uniquely, to be used to present the proposition expressed as relevant in its 
own right in a factual context, and hence as relevant in its own right to an individual. 
This is what specifies the indicative for the performance of assertions. Other uses of 
the indicative result when the proposition expressed is presented as relevant in its 
own right in an embedded context, or when it is not presented as relevant in its own 
right in any context, which context the proposition expressed should be processed in 
being determined by following a path o f least effort, as warranted by the principle o f 
relevance.
This analysis o f the indicative and its relationship to assertoric force raises a number 
o f questions. How is does it differ from the standard relevance-theoretic account? 
Does a proposition being presented as relevant in its own right to an individual 
necessarily result in assertoric force? What should be said about cases where non­
indicative forms are apparently used to perform assertions? What is the role of the
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indicative mood in conditional sentences? To what degree does assertion rely on 
convention? These issues will be discussed in the following sub-sections.
2.4 The new account compared with the standard approach
One clear distinction between this and the standard relevance-theoretic account of 
the indicative is that there is no direct link posited between mood and propositional 
attitude. Rather, the link between the indicative mood and the expression o f belief 
results from the claim that this form is unique in being able to present a proposition 
as relevant in its own right to an individual. A consequence of presenting a 
proposition as relevant in a factual context is the implication that the speaker 
believes that proposition to be true, for it could not be relevant to the hearer if it 
were not.14 As the speaker is presenting the proposition as true, she automatically 
licenses the inference, on grounds of rationality, that it is a belief o f hers.
The fact that the indicative is not directly related to belief on this account means that 
there is no need for a conception of belief as a prerequisite for linguistic 
communication. Rather, mastery of assertion can precede the acquisition o f a 
conception o f belief. As such, this account is not open to challenge by Dummett’s 
claim that assertion is conceptually prior to belief.
A major problem with the standard account was that it offered no explanation of 
why infinitival utterances could not be assertions. The assertoric potential of 
indicative clauses was explained in part by their ability to serve as representations of 
the actual world. Infinitives, on the other hand, were characterised as representing 
possible worlds. However, it was shown above that the fact that first-person belief 
reports can take an infinitive complement means that ‘possible’ here cannot be read
14 False propositions can, o f course, have true implications (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 264-265). 
The point is, however, that habitually accepting false propositions would lead to a massive decline in 
the quality o f an individual’s representation of the world.
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as ‘non-actual’. If  this is the case, then it is not clear why infinitives cannot be used 
to perform assertions.
The present account avoids this problem because it does not posit a direct link 
between mood and world-type. Indicatives are capable of representing the actual 
world (or, indeed, any particular world) because the representations they give rise to 
are potential candidates for inclusion in a consistency-aiming context. As was shown 
in chapter 2, the aim o f consistency is what makes it possible to use a set of 
propositional forms as a world representation. Infinitives, on the other hand, can 
represent a particular world only if  embedded in a form, such as a belief report, that 
specifies that world. (In other words, the representational function of the proposition 
expressed is signalled by the embedding predicate rather than the logical properties 
of the form.) Otherwise, because the proposition expressed does not have the 
potential to be relevant in its own right, and thus form part o f a consistency-aiming 
set o f mental representations, an infinitive will be interpreted as representing not a 
particular world but a feature of a world, in terms of the categorisation of 
representation types in chapter 2, section 4.2. Because assertions are clearly 
representations o f a particular world (i.e. the actual world), a form which cannot 
serve this representational function cannot be used assertorically.
This lack of a direct linkage between world-type and linguistic form also means that 
there is a clear distinction between what is natural-language encoded by the 
indicative and the truth-conditional interpretations it gives rise to. As such, the 
encoded meaning postulated is not merely a generalisation based on the observation 
o f interpretations o f utterances of this form. Rather, it is a claim about the effect this 
form has on the cognitive processes underlying utterance interpretation, such that the 
observed truth-conditional effects result in a predictable manner. There is thus a 
clear distinction between natural-language semantics as the input to the processing 
o f utterances and truth-conditional semantics as a feature of the interpretations that 
this processing gives rise to.
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One final issue is whether the indicative mood needs to be linked with the relevance- 
theoretic notion o f ‘saying that’. This serves two functions in the standard account: it 
relates the proposition expressed to the attitude of belief and it marks the speaker’s 
language production as a particular kind o f ostensive-inferential communication, 
rather than, say, elocution practice. Although the present account does not need the 
link between attitude and form to be specified, it is of course necessary to be able to 
distinguish linguistic communication from other kinds of language use. The question 
then becomes whether ‘saying that’ can be used to apply to all linguistic 
communication regardless of the attitude expressed. This will depend ultimately on 
whether accounts o f the imperative and interrogative can be formulated that do 
without the notions of ‘telling to’ and ‘asking whether’. These issues are beyond the 
scope o f this thesis.
2.5 Relevance in its own right, to an individual, without assertoric force  
It was shown above that the present account predicts that assertoric force is closely 
related to a proposition being presented as relevant in its own right in a factual 
context. However, due to the fact that the present account does not relate the 
indicative directly to truth but has it fall out from the notion of relevance to an 
individual, there is the theoretical possibility that a proposition could be presented as 
relevant in its own right in a factual context without the utterance having assertoric 
force. This would be the case if, although the proposition expressed by the utterance 
is relevant in its own right to the individual, the utterance is not truth-apt. Recall that 
truth-aptness depends on three factors: expressing a proposition, being a 
representation and having word-to-world direction of fit (whereby the state of affairs 
described by the representation must exist independently o f the representation, not, 
as in the case of complied-with imperatives, as a result o f it). If there is a way that 
the proposition expressed by an utterance can be relevant in its own right in a factual 
context despite the state of affairs described not obtaining independently of the 
utterance, then the theoretical possibility of non-assertoric presentations of 
propositions as relevant in their own right in a factual context becomes an actuality.
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One well-known feature o f explicit performatives is that they share the syntactic 
properties of assertoric utterances but are not truth-apt due to the presence o f a first- 
person subject. It was this, as was noted in chapter 1, section 3.2, that led Recanati to 
argue that the declarative is a force-neutral form. While (33) can be true or false, 
there is a highly salient reading of (34) on which the speaker is giving an order, and 
the utterance cannot therefore be described in these terms:
(33) He orders you to leave the room
(34) I order you to leave the room
On the present account, these utterances are analysed in the same way: both seek to 
achieve relevance by virtue o f their implications in a factual context. Performatives 
do not pose a problem for this analysis because there is no stipulation that main- 
clause indicatives be used for assertion or for the expression o f belief. Explicit 
performatives are simply cases where, although the proposition expressed is relevant 
in its own right in a factual context, the state of affairs described does not hold 
independently o f that representation but may come to hold as a result o f the 
utterance. In effect, where a directive act is being performed by an explicit 
performative, it is simply that what would be the higher-order explicature of an 
utterance o f the corresponding imperative (‘Leave the room!’ in the case o f (34)) is 
the explicature o f the utterance.15
Implicit performatives such as those mentioned in chapter 1 (repeated below) are 
analysable in much the same way as explicit performatives: the proposition
15 This does not hold, o f course, for other explicit, non-directive performatives such as ‘I 
warn/promise that P’, because the speech-act description does not need to be communicated when the 
act is not performed explicitly, as was discussed in section 2.1 o f this chapter. Thus, a non-explicit 
warning need not communicate a higher-order explicature giving a speech-act description o f itself as 
a warning.
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expressed is presented as relevant in its own right in a factual context even though it 
is not true independent of the utterance.
(35) It’s yours. [Said in response to “Your car is great; I wish I had one like it.”]
(36) The floor is now open to debate
(37) Prisoners condemned to death will be beheaded
In sum, then, on the account presented in this thesis, all that is encoded by the 
indicative is the potential relevance in its own right o f the proposition expressed. 
When this relates to relevance in a factual context, the hearer is left to infer whether 
this relevance is due to the fact that the proposition expressed is true independently 
o f the utterance or is made true by the utterance. Only in the former case will the 
direction o f fit be that required for assertoric force to follow; in the latter, there will 
be a world-to-word direction o f fit, which precludes assertoric force. It is in these 
cases that a performative reading will result.16
2.6 Non-declarative forms and assertion
It was noted in chapter 1 that in arguing against Dummetf s claim that assertion is 
conventionally indicated by the presence of the indicative mood, Davidson points to 
what appear to be assertoric uses of non-indicative forms, citing (38) and (39) as 
examples of cases where “assertions may be made by uttering sentences in other 
moods” (1979/2001: 110):
(38) Did you notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again?
(39) Notice that Joan is wearing her purple hat again
16 Although performatives do not pose a problem for the new relevance-theoretic account o f the 
indicative presented here, they are counted as assertions on the standard relevance-theoretic definition 
of an ordinary assertion as an utterance which communicates the proposition expressed.
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It was also noted in chapter 1 that Davidson’s own account is unable to explain how 
hearer’s pick out the content of the ‘assertion’ being made in such cases, as he 
denies that there is any link between indicative mood and assertoric force. Thus, on 
his account, even if the hearer does infer the speaker’s intention to assert something, 
he might well assume that she intends to assert the proposition expressed by the 
whole clause, rather than that expressed by the embedded indicative.
The present account handles such cases quite easily, as it predicts that the cognitive 
system will blindly seek to process the proposition expressed by any indicative 
clause in the most accessible context. In interpreting (38), the hearer will process the 
proposition expressed by the subordinate clause in the most accessible context, 
assumed here to be a factual one. If  the fact that Joan is wearing her purple hat again 
is unknown to the hearer, then this proposition will be relevant in that context and 
will contribute to the relevance o f the utterance. If this is not news to the hearer, then 
the proposition will not be relevant in that context and the utterance will achieve 
relevance mainly through its higher-order explicatures, such as (40) and (41):
(40) The speaker has noticed that Joan is wearing her purple hat again
(41) The speaker wants to know whether I have noticed that Joan is wearing her 
purple hat again
Because of the semantics of ‘notice’ (in that it relates to the acquisition of 
knowledge rather than its possession) and the fact that the imperative mood (rather 
than the interrogative) is used, the speaker of (39) must be taken to intend to 
communicate the embedded proposition. Whether one wants to call the 
communication of such embedded propositions ‘assertions’, though, is largely a 
terminological issue. The relevance-theoretic definition o f an ordinary assertion is an 
utterance which “communicates its propositional form” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995: 181 emphasis added), implying that to count as an ordinary assertion an 
utterance must communicate the proposition expressed by the whole utterance, and it 
would therefore exclude cases such as (38) and (39). However, if one wished, one
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could modify the definition so that if any propositional form explicitly expressed by 
the utterance were communicated then that utterance would count as an assertion. 
The point is that the relevance-theoretic notion o f assertion is not foundational to the 
theory but derived from foundational notions: the informative intention, explicature 
and relevance in a factual context. Indeed, the fact that one can debate whether a 
communicated proposition is asserted indicates that the term is not picking out a 
natural class but a set o f features, any o f which may be more central to the concerns 
of a particular theorist than another. Recall that Geach (1965: 456) wants any 
proposition to which the speaker is committed to count as an assertion so that the 
speaker o f (42) (originally discussed in chapter 1), on Geach’s terms, asserts (46)':
(42) Peter is under the illusion that he is the son of God
(42)’ Peter is not the son o f God
It would be o f little use to argue with Geach here, since for his purposes what counts 
as asserted is what the speaker is committed to by virtue o f his utterance. All one 
could do is argue that this is not what people normally mean by ‘assertion’. It is an 
advantage o f the present account that there is no need to resort to this line o f 
argument: the relevance-theoretic notion of an ordinary assertion is a term which can 
be decomposed into rigorously-defined theoretic vocabulary. One may feel that this 
captures intuitions about the pre-theoretical term ‘assertion’, but if anyone objects 
that it does not, there is no need to worry, as nothing hangs on it. However, as will 
be seen in the next chapter, which looks at the way the term ‘assertion’ has been 
used in the analysis o f the Spanish subjunctive, employing it as a technical term 
without firm theoretical underpinning is liable to cause problems.
2.7 Conditionals
One objection that might be raised against the present account could be that it failed 
to explain the use o f the indicative in the antecedent of conditional sentences. 
Surely, it would be argued, an ‘if-clause is never presented as relevant its own right, 
for this would leave no obvious way to explain the lack of assertoric force associated
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with indicative ‘if-clauses. As a response to this possible objection, it will be argued 
in this section that the claim that the indicative encodes the potential relevance in its
own right o f the proposition expressed is, in fact, just what is needed to explain
important differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals.
Stalnaker (1975/1999: 71) argues that a crucial distinction between indicative and 
subjunctive conditionals (such as (43) and (44) respectively) is that the former may 
only be appropriately used in a context which is compatible with the antecedent.
(43) If Peter arrives soon, the party will take off
(44) If Peter were here now, the party would take off
Thus, (43) is acceptable in a context where it is not presupposed that Peter will not 
come to the party. This is in contrast to (44), which is acceptable in a context in 
which the proposition expressed by the antecedent (<at the party, Peter>) is not 
compatible with the presuppositions o f the context (i.e. that Peter is not at the party).
These restrictions on usage can be explained in terms o f the proposition expressed 
by the indicative being potentially relevant in its own right. In saying that the 
antecedent must be compatible with the context, Stalnaker is in effect saying that the 
proposition it expresses must have the potential o f having an effect on that context 
set (in his terms, o f reducing it by eliminating all those possible worlds in which it 
does not obtain). In the terms o f this thesis, this is tantamount to saying that the 
proposition expressed must be potentially relevant in its own right, for only when 
expressed by such a form may a proposition directly affect a context.
Characterising conditionals in this manner suggests an explanation for the fact that 
while indicative conditional have, broadly speaking, two possible uses, subjunctive 
conditionals have only one. In uttering an assertion o f the form ‘If P, Q ’, the speaker 
can either be asserting that there is a relationship between P and Q such that given P
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one can assume Q; or she could mean to communicate Q if P holds. The first of 
these is an assertion o f a conditional, the second a conditional assertion.
(45) If you heat water to 100 degrees centigrade, it boils
(46) If the queen only has one eye, it’s a fake
(47) If you want a sandwich, there’s some ham in the fridge
The speaker of (45) is making a generic statement, and the relevance of her utterance 
lies in the relationship she is asserting between water’s temperature and its physical 
reaction. (46) is different in that it is possible that the speaker is making a statement 
about a particular banknote, such that if that banknote has the feature described in 
the antecedent o f the conditional, then the consequent is true o f that banknote. The 
difference between the two hinges on whether the speaker intends, conditionally, for 
the proposition expressed by the consequent to be relevant in the derivation of her 
intended effects on that occasion of utterance. That it is relevance rather than truth 
which is of primary concern is shown by (47): clearly the speaker is not claiming 
that the truth of the consequent is dependent on the antecedent, as the ham is in the 
fridge regardless o f the hearer’s desires.
In assertions o f conditionals, then, it is the relationship between antecedent and 
consequent which is relevant, whereas in conditional assertions the relevance of the 
consequence is dependent on the truth of the antecedent (which may or may not 
influence the truth o f the consequent). What is interesting for the current analysis is 
that subjunctive (i.e. non-indicative) conditionals can be used only to assert 
conditionals, not to perform conditional assertions: the speaker o f (44) cannot under 
any contextual conditions, be said to be asserting the consequent on the condition 
that the antecedent is true.17
17 For discussion o f the distinctive features of indicative and subjunctive conditionals, see McCawley 
(1981: 311-326).
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In one sense, the reason for this is clear: the antecedents o f subjunctive conditionals 
are counterfactual. As they entail their own falsehood, there is no possibility that 
they can be true and hence the relevance o f the consequence cannot depend on truth 
of the antecedent. However, this explains the phenomenon in truth-conditional 
terms. The question for this thesis is how the natural-language semantics proposed 
for the indicative can explain why there are two possible routes for the interpretation 
of indicative conditionals, but only one for subjunctive conditionals. The reason 
should be clear by now: an indicative encodes the information that the proposition it 
expresses is potentially relevant in its own right. Preceding an indicative clause with 
‘i f  signals that the potential relevance in its own right of the proposition expressed 
is dependent on its truth. Thus, when a conditional assertion is made, the potentiality 
of the relevance o f the antecedent is signalled, by ‘i f , to be dependent on the trnth o f 
the proposition expressed: if the antecedent is true, it is relevant in its own right and 
its specified implication (i.e. its consequent) follows. So conditional assertions 
specify a proposition (the antecedent) which, if true, will be relevant in its own right 
and specify (in the consequent) how it will achieve relevance. As subjunctive 
conditionals do not have an indicative antecedent, their antecedents cannot be 
relevant in their own right and hence cannot be used to perform conditional 
assertions, only to assert conditionals.
2.8 Assertion and convention
Related to Dummett’s claim that assertion is conceptually prior to belief is the view 
that assertion is an act which involves using a form conventionally marked for the 
performance of that act. The argument is that in order to attribute a conception of 
truth to an individual, it is necessary to identify a behaviour which justifies such an 
attribution. This behaviour, Dummett argues, is the correct use o f a form 
conventionally specified for uttering truths, i.e. the assertoric use of indicative 
sentences. As the account of the contribution made by the indicative to utterance 
interpretation developed here does not relate the indicative directly to the utterance
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of truths, it is necessary to consider whether, contrary to appearances, it is 
compatible with Dummett’s claims.
Here, the important thing to note about the indicative, as was mentioned in section 
2.2, is that while it is not restricted to the performance of assertions, the performance 
o f assertions is restricted to the indicative mood. What allows it to be used for non- 
assertoric ends is the human ability to metarepresent sets of propositional forms 
sharing the inferential features associated with belief: implying further propositional 
forms, aiming at consistency, and not necessarily being true. As was seen above, 
propositional forms o f these types constitute the contexts in which non-assertoric 
uses o f the indicative are interpreted.
However, it was also noted in chapter 2 that the ability to metarepresent beliefs 
appears to be lacking during the early stages of language acquisition. It is tempting 
to argue, therefore, that in the early stages of language acquisition the indicative 
mood is indeed a marker o f assertoric force, because children are unable to interpret 
indicative utterances in any other way, due to an inability to metarepresent beliefs or 
belief-like contents, such as fictions.18 Moreover, given that the form of the 
indicative differs from language to language, if it is a sign of assertion then it must 
be so by virtue of the same sort o f conventions that make words signs. Thus, the 
claims made about the indicative in this thesis are compatible with Dummett’s 
claims that assertion is a conventional activity that must be learnt. Indeed, arguing 
that a form has a conventional use does not commit one to the view that it can only 
be used for that purpose. On the view presented in this thesis, though, it is a grasp of
18 One possible problem with this view is that children are able to engage in pretend-play prior to 
passing false-belief tests, suggesting that they may have the ability to attribute mental states 
representing non-actual states o f affairs to an individual. There is some evidence, though, that young 
children view pretence in purely physical terms and do not attribute the propositional attitudes that, to 
an adult, would appear to be the natural accompaniment of pretence (Lillard 1993; see also Rakoczy 
et al. 2004).
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the representational nature of assertion that is a pre-requisite o f a conception of truth 
and falsity, and hence belief.
This is not to say that the encoded meaning o f the indicative changes once 
sophisticated metarepresentational abilities have developed. Rather, what changes is 
the nature of the contexts in which the proposition expressed by an indicative can be 
relevant in its own right. The only type o f context available to the non- 
metarepresenting child will be a factual one, and hence encoding potential relevance 
in its own right will be a de facto  marker of assertion, conventional in the way that 
worlds are (given, as noted above, that the indicative mood is marked differently in 
each language). Once other types of contexts are available to the child, however, 
propositions expressed by the indicative will not necessarily be processed in a 
factual context, and assertoric effects will not necessarily follow.
It is also worth considering whether the claim that the indicative encodes that the 
proposition expressed is potentially relevant in its own right entails that this is its 
function. Millikan (1984: 52-60) argues that the proper function o f the indicative 
form is to cause true belief in the addressee. This is its ‘proper function’, in her 
terms, because it is the effect which has led to the continual and widespread use of 
this form. Again, the view presented here is not incompatible with this. One can 
readily accept that its success as a means of information transfer is the reason that 
the indicative is here today. What the view of the indicative as encoding relevance in 
its own right does is to say how that effect is achieved and why it can be put to 
further uses, such as the telling of stories.
2.9 Assertion and the main point
In chapter 1, some attention paid to Abbott’s (2000) arguments that the claim that 
certain elements of sentences, like non-restrictive relative clauses, which pass tests 
for presupposition should not be analysed as elements o f the common ground but 
instead be thought o f as ‘non-assertions’. Abbott, it was noted, does not offer a 
detailed account o f what constitutes an assertion, instead relying on the intuitive
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notion o f an “ideal assertion” being which is “one atomic proposition, consisting of 
one predicate with its unanalyzed arguments” and which typically corresponds to the 
main clause o f the utterance (2000: 1431).
Abbott’s work raises an important point for this thesis. It has been argued in this 
chapter that the indicative marks a proposition as potentially relevant in its own 
right. However, nothing has yet been said about how the main point o f an utterance 
is identified in utterances containing more than one indicative clause. Consider a 
sentence such as (48), for example:
(48) C, who had been granted refugee status in 2000, was arrested in December 
2001, just after the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act - which 
sanctioned detention without charge or trial and was introduced after the 
September 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington - gained royal 
assent.19
This sentence contains a number o f propositions expressed by indicative clauses, as 
listed in (49):
(49) a. C was arrested in December 2001 just after the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act gained royal assent
b. C had been granted refugee status in 2000
c. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act gained royal assent
shortly before December 2001
d. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act sanctioned detention
without charge or trial
19 Taken from The Guardian website 1st February 2005: 
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1403335,00.html.
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e. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was introduced after the 
September 2001 terror attacks on New York and Washington
Intuitively, the main point of the utterance is (49)a. The question is, however, why 
this is the case: what gives this proposition priority over other propositions also 
expressed by an indicative clause and thus also potentially relevant in their own 
right? The obvious answer, that it is syntactically dominant, is clearly central. That is 
to say, the main clause of a complex sentence is likely to be the main point of the 
utterance. However, there are cases, such as main-clause parentheticals, when it is 
the subordinate clause that conveys the main point.20 What is needed, then, is an 
account o f the conditions under which the main clause o f an utterance will not 
express the main point of an utterance.
Consider a main-clause parenthetical, such as (50):
(50) 1 think we’ve missed the train
Here the proposition that the speaker intend the hearer to derive effects from is likely 
to be the one expressed by the embedded indicative. The effect o f the complex 
proposition expressed by the whole sentence is merely to communicate that the 
utterance is made without certainty. The issue here is how the speaker identifies the 
embedded proposition as the main point. The answer clearly involves effect. It was 
suggested above (section 2.3.3) that the utterance-processing system blindly seeks to 
derive effects from any indicative clause it comes across. If this is the case, then 
intuitions about main point-hood can be explained in terms o f which proposition 
leads to the greatest number of contextual effects. In a case such as (50), the 
embedded proposition will achieve a greater number o f effects that the main clause,
20 O f course, there are also cases where the main clause conveys no information it its own right at all, 
as in example (28) o f chapter 2: ‘You’ve had your hair cut’.
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and will thus be felt to be the main point. In such a case, the contextual assumptions 
accessible to the hearer will be determined by the situation (suppose the speaker and 
hearer are in a taxi on their way to the train station), and the speaker can be 
confident that the hearer will override the syntactic dominance given to the 
proposition expressed by the main clause.
In cases where the situation does not make accessible the necessary contextual 
assumptions, however, the addressee will be less likely to override syntactic clues 
concerning from which proposition he is expected to derive greatest effect. This is 
the case in written communication such as the newspaper report from which (48) is 
taken, for example. In such cases, however, it is important to note that being the 
main point is not simply a case o f indicating from which proposition greatest effects 
should be derived, but also involves creating expectations concerning the nature of 
subsequent utterances. That is to say, in presenting a certain proposition as the main 
point, the communicator indicates that subsequent utterances will achieve effects in 
a context made accessible by processing that proposition. Thus, in presenting (49)a 
as the main point, the communicator indicates that the next sentence will be most 
efficiently processed in a context containing assumptions about C, rather than in a 
context o f assumptions about The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act. In other 
words, the addressee is justified, on the basis o f the fact that the communicator has 
presented (49)a as the main point, in expecting the next sentence to be about C. And 
indeed this is the case. (51) is the next sentence:
(51) He had been sentenced in absentia to 15 years imprisonment in Egypt for 
trying to recruit army officers to a terrorist group
By syntactically subordinating the propositions (49)b to e, the writer indicates that 
the effects derived from processing these are not likely to play a significant role in 
the processing o f subsequent sentences. In indicating thus their comparative lack of 
relevance, the writer ensures that, even though these forms are relevant in their own
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right, the reader will devote less effort to processing these. Hence the backgrounding 
effect.
In sum, then, the main point of an utterance will be the proposition which has 
greatest effect. Being expressed by a main clause is an important indicator o f main 
point-hood, but this can be overridden by contextual factors. In the absence o f such 
factors, an addressee will use syntactic information as an indicator o f which 
indicative clause he should expect to make the greatest contribution to the relevance 
not only o f that utterance but also of the discourse as a whole. Thus, in extended 
discourse, the choice o f which proposition to present as the main point is determined 
both by the desire to maximise the effects derived from a given proposition and to 
reduce the effort involved in processing subsequent utterances, both o f which 
contribute to the relevance of the discourse as a whole.21
3 C o n c l u s io n
In this chapter, a relevance-theoretic account o f the contribution to utterance 
interpretation made by the indicative mood has been developed. This account differs 
from the standard relevance-theoretic account in that it does not posit a link between 
mood and propositional attitude or world-type, but rather identifies a unique 
processing potentiality that the indicative encodes. This is the potential for the 
proposition expressed by that mood to have an effect on a context in its own right. 
This potential explains why the indicative is so closely associated to assertion, for to 
assert a proposition is to present it as relevant in its own right to an individual 
because it will lead to true implications in a factual context.
This account has the advantage of both respecting and meshing well with important 
philosophical insights into the nature o f assertion, such as its special role in the 
transfer o f knowledge and as the basis of truth-aiming inference. It also has 
interesting parallels with (and has drawn inspiration from) the Heim/Stalnaker view
21 For extended discussion o f the notion of discourse relevance, see Unger (2001).
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of a sentence’s meaning as being its context change potential (which will be 
discussed in some detail in the next chapter). In the account proposed by Heim 
(1992), indicatives have context change potential (CCP) in that they can exclude 
worlds from the context set, while non-indicatives may merely affect the ranking of 
accessible worlds. What the CCP picture lacks, though, is any attempt to unite the 
representational nature o f utterance interpretations with their semantic nature, as 
characterised in terms o f their effect on a Stalnakerian context set. The account 
developed in this and the previous chapter, by contrast, explicitly relates, through the 
consistency-aiming notion o f relevance, a propositional form’s ability to act as a 
representation to its ability to reduce a context set. On the one hand, to reduce a 
context set, a proposition must aim at consistency with other members of the 
context. On the other, it is the aim o f consistency that allows a proposition to 
function as a representation o f a particular world. The indicative is used to perform 
assertions and thereby represent the world because it can give rise to consistency- 
aiming mental representations.
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C h a pter  4: T he  Spanish  su bju n ctiv e
1 I n t r o d u c t io n
In the previous chapter, an analysis o f the indicative mood was developed on which 
this form encodes the information that the proposition it expresses is potentially 
relevant in its own right. This was shown to provide the basis for an adequate 
explanation o f the assertoric use of the indicative as well as its non-assertoric uses. 
Moreover, it was possible to specify the conditions under which an indicative would 
not receive an assertoric interpretation, regardless of whether it was embedded or 
not. As was noted in that chapter, one point that makes these claims stronger than 
they might at first appear is that the propositions encoded by non-indicative forms 
cannot be presented as relevant in their own right, but must make an indirect 
contribution to the relevance of the utterance. In this chapter, this point will be 
developed by taking a close look at the Spanish subjunctive. This form is of 
particular relevance to the concerns o f this thesis because it has often been analysed, 
in contrast to the indicative, as a ‘non-assertive’ form (Hooper 1975; Krakuskin & 
Cedeno 1992; Lavandera 1983; Lunn 1989a, b, 1992; Mejias-Bikandi 1994, 1998; 
Terrell 1976; Terrell & Hooper 1974). However, as will be seen, these accounts, 
although insightful and stimulating, suffer from attempting to employ the notion of 
assertion as a theoretical primitive, when, as the previous two chapters have shown, 
it is best analysed as a higher-order term reducible to notions o f relevance, 
explicitness and truth.
This work will be reviewed and contrasted with another approach taken to the 
analysis o f mood, not only in Spanish but across the Romance (and, in some cases, 
Germanic) languages. This more formal approach seeks to account for the moods in 
possible-world terms and is exemplified by the work o f a number o f authors, 
including Farkas (1985; 1992; 2003), Giorgi & Pianesi (1997), Huntley (1984), 
Portner (1997), and Villalta (2000). Quer (1998; 2001) also provides a formal- 
semantic analysis, but in terms of model-shift rather than possible worlds. Like the 
assertion/non-assertion approach, these more formal analyses will inform the
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treatment of the subjunctive proposed here. However, the present work is distinct in 
that it seeks to develop a processing-oriented account o f how the truth-conditional 
effects which the formalists attempt to capture relate (to the extent that they are 
correct) to the cognitive process of utterance interpretation.
This chapter starts, then, with a look at the assertion/non-assertion approach to the 
indicative/subjunctive contrast in Spanish before moving on to look at formal- 
semantic treatments o f the distinction. It is then shown how the present account 
handles the data, in particular those that present problems for the approaches 
reviewed.
2 T h e  a s s e r t i o n / n o n - a s s e r t io n  a p p r o a c h
The assertion/non-assertion approach to the indicative/subjunctive contrast in 
Spanish has its roots in observations that relate mood selection to the possibility of a 
parenthetical interpretation of certain clausal complements. In order, therefore, to 
appreciate the attraction o f seeking to explain the mood contrast in these terms, it is 
worth taking a short look at the work o f two important precursors of this approach: 
Urmson (1952) and Bolinger (1968). As is well known, Urmson showed that certain 
verbs, which he termed ‘parentheticals’, can function not primarily to contribute to 
the information communicated by an utterance, but to “prime the hearer to see the 
emotional significance, the logical relevance and the reliability of our statements” 
(Urmson 1952: 484). (1) to (3) below illustrate each of these uses:
(1) a. I regret your application has not been successful
b. Your application has not, I regret, been successful
c. Your application has not been successful, I regret
(2) a. I admit your idea has some merit
b. Your idea has, I admit, some merit
c. Your idea has some merit, I admit
(3) a. I guess they’ll be here by ten
b. They will, I guess, be here by ten
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c. They’ll be here by ten, I guess
In (l)a  to (l)c  the speaker communicates both that the application has been 
unsuccessful and that she recognises that this is likely to cause the speaker sadness. 
Although on one reading of (l)a  she could be said to be expressing her regret that 
the hearer’s application has been unsuccessful (hence a non-parenthetical reading), 
there is an equally likely reading in which her aim is to inform the hearer of this fact 
and to acknowledge that it is likely to cause the hearer distress (a parenthetical 
reading). In (2) the speaker commits herself to the truth o f the proposition that the 
hearer’s idea has some merit and uses ‘1 admit’ to signal her acknowledgement that 
this goes against the general thrust of her argument. In (3) the function of the phrase 
‘I guess’ is to qualify the assertion that they will arrive by ten.
These examples are presented in triplets to illustrate a defining feature of 
parenthetical verbs: that they are syntactically independent of their complement 
clauses and can be positioned either prior to, within or after that clause. It is this 
mobility of the main clause that is of interest to Bolinger, who notes that it correlates 
negatively with the presence of a subjunctive clause in Spanish.1 He expresses the 
correlation thus:
If in English it is possible to drop that and move the main verb phrase away from its 
position in front o f the clause, then the verb in the corresponding Romance noun clause will 
be indicative; if not it will be subjunctive. (1968: 6)
In addition to the fact that the English equivalents of Spanish subjunctive clauses are 
not separable from their main clauses, it also needs to be noted that the Spanish 
subjunctive clauses themselves do not enjoy this kind of freedom, as (4) to (6) show:
(4) a. Me alegro de que venga
1 As Farkas (1985: 75) points out, the correlation is in fact not perfect ( ‘hope’, for example, raises 
problems). It is, though, highly suggestive and needs explaining.
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myself please+lSG of that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘I ’m happy that he’s coming’ 
b. *Venga, me alegro2
come+3SG+SUBJ myself please+lSG
* ‘He’s coming, I ’m happy’
(5) a. Es raro que venga
is strange that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘It’s strange that he’s coming’
b. *Venga, es raro
come+3SG+SUBJ is strange
* ‘He’s coming, it’s strange’
(6) a. Me sorprende que venga
me surprise+3SG that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘I ’m surprised that he’s coming’
b. *Venga, me sorprende
come+3SG+SUBJ me surprise+3SG
* ‘He’s coming, I’m surprised’
Terrell & Hooper’s (1974) motivation for seeking to explain this fact by 
distinguishing between two types of predicates -  assertive and non-assertive -  can
2 It might be objected that while (4)b is unacceptable, (i) is quite acceptable:
(i) De que venga, me alegro
of that come+3SG+SUBJ, myself please+lSG  
‘That he’s coming, I’m happy about’
This may be the case, but it is important to note that (i) is not a true parenthetical, as the post-posed 
clause is not syntactically independent of the main clause. To see this, compare the intonation 
patterns o f (i) and (ii), a true parenthetical:
(ii) Ven, te ruego 
come+2SG+IMP, you beg+lSG+IND  
‘Come, I beg you’
In (i) there is a rise on the first clause, while in (ii) there is a fall on the first clause.
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now be appreciated. Assertive predicates, on their account, are those open to a 
parenthetical reading; that is, those that allow the embedded clause (in certain 
contexts) to be interpreted as the main point of the utterance, perhaps, but not 
necessarily, as a result o f ‘complement preposing’ (though all assertive predicates 
allow this). Non-assertive predicates are those that do not allow the embedded clause 
to be treated in this way because it is either -  so the argument goes -  presupposed, 
unrealised or doubtful. Presuppositional cases are illustrated by (4) to (6) above. 
These so-called ‘factive-emotive’ cases3 cannot felicitously be used to inform 
someone o f the state o f affairs described by the complement clause.4 Unrealised and 
doubtful cases are illustrated by (10) and (11) respectively, while (12) and (13) 
exemplify desideratives and directives in turn:
(10) Aviso/Ordeno que venga 
advise/order+lSG that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘I advise/order that he come’
(11) Dudo que venga
doubt+lSG that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘I doubt he’s coming’
(12) Me gustaria que viniera
me please+3SG+COND that come+3SG+PAST+SUBJ 
‘I’d like it if  he cam e’
(13) Ordeno que vengas 
order+3SG that come+2SG+SUBJ 
‘I order you to come’
3 The extent to which they are a homogenous class deserving of the label ‘factive’ is not as certain as 
is generally thought, as will be seen in section 4.5.
4 There is an exception: ‘regret’ can be used to make announcements. Such usage is highly restricted 
and genre-dependent, however. See Abbot (2000) and references therein.
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As a number o f authors have noted (Guitart 1991; Mejias-Bikandi 1994), one 
problem faced by Terrell & Hooper’s account is how to deal with the complements 
of so-called ‘semifactive’ predicates. These are cases such as those listed in (14) to 
(16), which contrast with those in (4) to (13) in that, while both have complements 
which can survive under negation (a standard test for presupposition), this 
commonality is not reflected in their selection o f mood.
(14) a. Se ha enterado de que viene
REFL has found-out of that come+3SG+IND 
‘She’s found out that he’s coming’
b. No se ha enterado de que viene
not REFL has found-out of that come+3SG+lND 
‘She hasn’t found out that he’s coming’
c. No se ha enterado de que venga
not REFL has found-out of that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She hasn’t found out if  he’s coming’
(15) a. Se ha dado cuenta de que viene
REFL has notice of that come+3SG+IND 
‘She has noticed that he’s coming’
b. No se ha dado cuenta de que viene
not REFL has notice o f that come+3SG+IND 
‘She hasn’t noticed that he’s coming’
c. No se ha dado cuenta de que venga
not REFL has notice of that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She hasn’t noticed if he’s coming’
(16) a. Sabe que viene
know+3SG that come+3SG+IND 
‘She knows he’s coming’
b. No sabe que viene 
not know+3SG that come+3SG+IND 
‘She doesn’t know he’s coming’
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c. No sabe que venga 
not know+3SG that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She doesn’t know if  he’s coming’
The semifactives (14) to (16) are presented in triplets because they have a wider 
choice o f complement than the factive-emotives: the indicative is required for 
affirmative predicates while either the subjunctive or the indicative can follow a 
negative. W hat’s more, it is the indicative complement that may be presupposed in 
these cases (i.e. the subjunctive complements of the third case in each triplet are not 
presupposed but presented without any speaker commitment to either their truth or 
falsity, hence the use o f ‘i f  in the glosses), whereas in (4) to (6) the presupposed 
complement is marked with a subjunctive, as Terrell & Hooper’s account predicts. 
Hooper (1975) considers this point and shows that semifactives such as ‘enterarse’ 
( ‘find out’), ‘darse cuenta’ (‘notice’) and ‘saber’ (‘know’) demonstrate many of the 
characteristics o f so-called assertive predicates. Most notably, the English 
equivalents allow post-posing of the matrix clause:
(17) John had been deceiving her, she found out
(18) The door was locked, she noticed
(19) Peter, she knew, was a compulsive liar
Hooper therefore concludes that they are assertive and do not pose a problem for the 
Terrell & Hooper analysis. However, this still leaves unexplained the fact that the 
subjunctive in one supposedly factive environment marks presupposition, while in 
another it marks the absence o f presupposition.
Guitart’s (1991) solution to this problem is to point to a distinction between what is 
semantically presupposed and what is pragmatically presupposed, the former being 
dependent on tests such as survival under negation and the latter depending on 
speaker-hearer assumptions about the background to the conversation and whether 
information is new to a hearer. Following Kempson (1975), Guitart argues that it is
199
pragmatic presupposition that is mutually exclusive with assertion: a proposition 
which is semantically presupposed may be asserted, but a proposition must be either 
pragmatically asserted or pragmatically presupposed, never both. As an example of 
the assertion o f a semantically presupposed proposition, Guitart offers (20) (his 
(14)): the fact that the bar is closed is clearly something the speaker assumes to be 
unknown to the hearer, and hence she might be said to be asserting this. However, 
this proposition is semantically presupposed, for it is preserved (remains entailed) 
under negation, as (21) shows.
(20) Note que el bar estaba cerrado: no te molestes en ir
notice+lSG+PST that the bar be+3SG+IMPERF closed: not yourself 
disturb+2SG+SUBJ in go
‘I noticed that the bar was closed, don’t bother to go’
(21) No note que el bar estaba cerrado
not notice+1 SG+PST that the bar be+3SG+IMPERF closed 
‘I didn’t notice that the bar was closed’
On this view, the fact that a proposition is semantically presupposed does not mean 
it cannot be pragmatically asserted. However, Guitart offers no explanation why 
subjunctive complements such as those in (4) to (6), which are semantically 
presupposed on his account, cannot be pragmatically asserted. Rather, he argues that 
these form a distinct class of predicates (in that they do not relate to knowledge or its 
acquisition, unlike the semi-factives), and that an account o f mood selection that 
holds across all matrix types should not be sought: “if our interest is to correlate 
mood choice both with meaning and with sentence use, we should analyze 
separately the different types of matrices that take sentential complements” (1991: 
191). In essence, then, Guitart’s response to the problem faced by Terrell & Hooper 
is to suggest that one should not expect the factors contributing to mood choice to be 
the same across embedding predicates, a move which seriously undermines the 
whole assertion/non-assertion approach.
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A more promising solution is offered by Mejias-Bikandi (1994). He starts by 
defining assertion as follows, where P is the proposition expressed by the utterance:
a speaker asserts a proposition P when the intention o f the speaker is to indicate that P 
describes the world as s/he or some other individual perceives it (p. 892)
This is, o f course, a rather idiosyncratic view o f assertion, given the review of the 
notion in chapter 1. On Mejias-Bikandi’s view an utterance of a sentence such as 
(22) would involve two assertions:
(22) Jimmy believes that the tooth-fairy left a coin under his pillow
The first assertion would be ‘Jimmy believes the tooth-fairy left a coin under his 
pillow’, which, the speaker would be indicating, describes the world as she sees it; 
while the second would be ‘the tooth-fairy left a coin under Jimmy’s pillow’. If the 
speaker is assumed to be an adult who does not believe in the existence of the tooth- 
fairy, she would be indicating that this embedded proposition describes the world as 
Jimmy perceives it. Or at least this is what Mejias-Bikandi appears to have in mind, 
for one serious problem with this definition is that it entails that it is the speaker who 
asserts both the matrix and  the embedded clause. Another problem is that 
presuppositions and implicatures are, on this account, classed as assertions: in both 
cases the intention is to describe the world as the speaker sees it. In other words, 
Mejias-Bikandi’s definition o f assertion makes no reference to either the informative 
function or the explicit nature o f assertions.
However, Mejias-Bikandi could reply that his aim is not to give an analysis of 
assertion but to define a term that accounts for mood alternation in Spanish. Indeed, 
what he clearly wants is a notion that correlates with the use of indicative clauses, 
whether embedded or otherwise. He attempts to develop such a notion by 
characterising a speaker’s beliefs about the world as a domain R(s) which contains 
the propositions that the speaker assumes to be accurate representations o f reality. 
Contained within this domain will be further sub-domains which represent other
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people’s views o f reality (or, one might add, which represent the content of works of 
fiction, suppositions and so on). These domains, Mejias-Bikandi (following 
Fauconnier 1985) labels ‘mental spaces’. Thus, to assert P, on this view, is to say 
that P is contained in a particular mental space R. So (22) presents ‘Jimmy believes 
the tooth-fairy left a coin under his pillow’ as contained in the mental space which 
constitutes the speaker’s view of reality, while ‘the tooth-fairy left a coin under 
Jimmy’s pillow’ is presented as contained in the mental space which constitutes the 
speaker’s view of Jimmy’s view of reality.
Mejias-Bikandi is then able to explain the use of indicative complements in 
affirmative semifactive cases such as (14), (15) and (16) by arguing that the speaker 
is making an assertion about her representation of the third person’s view of the 
world. In cases such as (4) to (6), by contrast, the speaker has no intention of 
indicating that the proposition expressed by the complement is contained in any R 
and thus the subjunctive is employed. What determines mood choice in negative 
semifactives is whether the proposition expressed by the complement is presented as 
holding in the speaker’s representation of the world, despite the fact that it does not 
hold in the subject’s. Negative semifactives with an indicative complement (such as
(14)b, (15)b, and (16)b) thus present the proposition expressed by the complement 
clause as contained in the mental space which constitutes the speaker’s world view, 
but not in that R which constitutes the subject’s view o f the world. Negative 
semifactives with a subjunctive complement (such as (14)c, (15)c, and (16)c), by 
contrast, do not present the proposition expressed by the complement clause as 
contained in any R.
There are clearly similarities between the mental spaces approach adopted by 
Mejias-Bikandi and the notion of embedded contexts introduced in chapter 2, and 
the semifactives will certainly be dealt with in a similar manner in this thesis. 
However, it will later be shown that an advantage of the present account is that it can 
also deal with data relating to the use of mood switching for information-structure 
purposes, something which Mejias-Bikandi’s approach has difficulty coping with, as
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can be seen by considering the data relating to mood choice after ‘el hecho de que’ 
(‘the fact that’).
Krakuskin & Cedeno (1992) analysed mood choice after ‘el hecho de que’ in a ten- 
year series of magazine articles by a particular columnist. Among their findings was 
that subjunctive clauses tended to appear before the main verb (when the nominal 
clause introduced by ‘el hecho de que’ was the subject o f the main verb), while the 
indicative generally appeared after the main verb (when the nominal clause was the 
complement). This is illustrated by (23) and (24):
(23) El hecho de que un cigarrillo sea denominado como bajo en brea o nicotina no 
significa que el cigarrillo contenga menos nicotina 5
the fact of that a cigarette be+3SG+SUBJ denominated as low in tar or nicotine 
not signify+3SG+IND that the cigarette contain+3SG+SUBJ less nicotine 
‘The fact that a cigarette is described as low in tar or nicotine does not mean 
that the cigarette contains less nicotine’
(24) En Microsoft, nunca perdemos de vista el hecho de que nuestro exito depende 
del suyo 6
in Microsoft, never lose+lPL+IND of sight the fact o f that our success 
depend+3SG+IND of.the yours
‘At Microsoft, we never lose sight o f the fact that our success depends on 
yours’
Krakuskin & Cedefio relate mood choice in this linguistic context to the information 
value o f the propositions expressed. As is well known, presupposed or non- 
controversial information tends to come earlier in a sentence than new information.
5 Example taken from website of Centers for Control and Prevention, U.S. Department o f Health and 
Human Services on 16 December 2002. (http://www.cdc.gov/spanish/tabaco/nodejaque.htm)
6 Example taken from Microsoft Website on 16 December 2002. 
(http://www.microsoft.com/colombia/isv/downs/guia_rapida.doc)
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Krakuskin & Cedeno argue that this is reflected in the choice o f mood, the 
subjunctive marking information of low information value and the indicative 
marking the main point of the utterance. That the indicative/subjunctive contrast in 
Spanish is exploited in this way has also been suggested by other authors (Lavandera 
1983; Lunn 1989a, 1992), and is clearly quite open to an analysis in terms o f 
assertion and non-assertion. Unfortunately, however, once one gets as far from the 
standard notion of assertion as Mejias-Bikandi’s account takes one, it becomes very 
difficult to explain the information-structure role of the mood contrast. Indeed, on 
Mejias-Bikandi’s account, an utterance will involve as many ‘assertions’ as there are 
indicative clauses in the sentence uttered, but he offers no account o f how the 
foregrounded information (i.e. that which conveys the main point of the utterance) is 
to be picked out.7 Furthermore, his account wrongly predicts that any use of ‘el 
hecho de que’ should take the indicative because, being presented as a fact (‘un 
hecho’) it should feature in the speaker’s R.
Thus, while the assertion/non-assertion account has great intuitive appeal, it suffers 
as a result of trying to put a pre-theoretical term to serious theoretical uses. To call a 
form ‘assertive’ is to suggest that it might be used for the act o f asserting, and the 
fact that the so-called ‘assertive predicates’ correlate with parenthetical predicates 
might at first seem to justify labelling them as such, for the whole point about 
parenthetical predicates is that the speaker can use them to assert the embedded 
clause. However, if  the term is to be applied to more than first-person uses, one must 
take a step away from the standard use of ‘assert’ to something like ‘reported 
assertion’ or ‘disposition to assert’, for only then can verbs such as ‘say’ or ‘believe’ 
be called assertive. This is the move Hooper (1975) makes when she says that 
assertives commit the speaker or the subject of the matrix verb to the truth of the
7 Mejias-Bikandi (1994) is aware o f the need to deal with data such as the ‘el hecho de que’ cases and 
suggests a link between assertion, foregrounding and relevance. This is not developed, however, and 
in later papers (1995; 1996; 1998; 2002) Mejias-Bikandi is primarily concerned with the inheritance 
o f presuppositions by embedding domains.
204
proposition expressed by the complement. This makes the prediction that any verb 
that takes an indicative complement must commit someone, be it the speaker or the 
subject, to the truth of the proposition expressed. However, as Farkas (1992) points 
out, fiction verbs, which govern the indicative, do not commit anyone to the truth of 
the complement.8
Mejias-Bikandi’s account copes with this objection in the following way: one can 
treat the domain o f a work o f fiction in much the same way as one treats one 
person’s representation of another’s beliefs. This can be viewed as constituting an 
R(flction) that the speaker is making assertions about. However, it has been shown 
that following Mejias-Bikandi here removes any possibility of being able to explain 
indicative/subjunctive alternation after ‘el hecho de que’ ( ‘the fact that’).
This section can be summed up by noting that there is something about the 
indicative/subjunctive contrast that makes its analysis in terms of assertion and non­
assertion initiated by Terrell & Hooper intuitively very appealing. In particular, it 
meshes very nicely with the evidence from parenthetical verbs and the information 
structure use of the contrast exemplified by ‘el hecho de que’. However, once one 
starts to use the notion of ‘assertivity’ as a serious theoretical tool, it becomes 
necessary to move so far from the standard conception that the original insights 
garnered from employing this term are lost. What should be retained from this 
approach, then, is its emphasis on information structure and the role mood choice 
can play in foregrounding and backgrounding information. What needs to be 
abandoned is the notion of ‘assertivity’ as a theoretical primitive. The discussion in 
the previous chapters suggests how this might be done using Sperber & Wilson’s 
Relevance Theory. Before attempting to develop this suggestion, however, formal- 
semantic approaches to mood alternation must be considered.
8 Farkas also provides a convincing dismissal o f the direction-of-fit accounts o f indicative/subjunctive 
alternation, as employed by James (1986). The crucial point is that direction o f fit and mood 
alternation do not co-vary, although there is some overlap.
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3 T h e  m o d e l -t h e o r e t ic  a ppro ach
In this section, the focus will be on two approaches to the indicative/subjunctive 
contrast. The first is that of Farkas (1985; 1992), who seeks to relate mood choice to 
whether a proposition is evaluated against a particular world or a set of worlds. The 
second is Quer (1998; 2001), who relates mood choice to a change in the type of 
model at which a proposition is evaluated. In other worlds, it is not the type of model 
per se that determines mood choice, but the shift to a different type o f model from 
that at which the embedding proposition is evaluated.
Both of these authors adopt a dynamic approach to semantics, citing Stalnaker, Heim 
and Kamp as key influences. This section will therefore begin with a look at this 
approach to linguistic meaning, paying particular attention to the foundational work 
o f Stalnaker and its ‘radical elaboration’ (Heim 1992: 185) by Heim (1988) and 
Kamp (1981).
S. 1 Stalnaker and the dynamic turn in semantics
Some aspects o f Stalnaker’s work on assertion have already been discussed in 
chapter 2. There, the focus was on comparing it with the relevance-theoretic notion 
of an ordinary assertion and considering the extent to which modifying the common 
ground could be considered an essential effect of assertion. Here, the concern will be 
with those elements of Stalnaker’s account of assertion that have informed the 
dynamic view o f semantics.
Recall the Stalnakerian picture of assertion. People make and attend to assertions 
because they can be informative. To explain how they are informative, Stalnaker 
makes use of the notion of ‘common ground’, where this is, roughly, the set of 
propositions assumed by the participants to form the background to a conversation. 
This set o f propositions will pick out a set of possible worlds (those in which they 
are true) which Stalnaker terms the ‘context set’. These are candidates for the actual 
world: any one o f the context set could, as far as the participants are concerned, be 
the actual world, and the aim of participants in a conversation is to reduce this
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uncertainty. If they accept an assertion, the proposition expressed is added to the 
common ground and, because this forms a consistent set, the context set will be 
reduced and, along with it, uncertainty as to the nature o f the actual world (Stalnaker 
1978).
One aspect o f Stalnaker’s account which is not often discussed is its representational 
nature. Participants in a conversation aim to improve their shared representation of 
the world. That the common ground is viewed in representational terms is made 
clear in Stalnaker (1978: 316): “A proposition -  the content o f an assertion or belief 
-  is a representation o f the world as being a certain way”.9 As the common ground is 
made up o f propositions, it must therefore itself be a representation. But while 
functions from possible worlds to truth values (which is how Stalnaker describes 
propositions) are abstract, representations cannot be abstract: there can be no 
representation without a mode of presentation. It is necessary, therefore, to think of 
the common ground in terms of a physical representation o f how the world might 
well be.10 However, although the common ground is a representation of the actual 
world, one must not make the mistake of treating it as world-like. The propositions 
expressed by a belief-representation o f the world can never be determinate enough to 
pick out just one world. As Stalnaker himself puts it, “for any given representation 
of the world as being a certain way, there will be a set of all the possible states o f the 
world which accord with the representation -  which are that way. So any 
proposition determines a set of possible worlds ” (1978: 316).
The account of mental representation and assertion developed in chapters 2 and 3 
was employed to show how the indicative mood, whether used assertorically or not, 
gives rise to consistency-aiming mental representations. Although these pick out sets
9 As was argued in chapter 1, though, propositions themselves, being abstract entities, cannot 
represent anything. It would be better to say that an assertion or belief represents the world as being a 
certain way by virtue o f its propositional content.
10 For Stalnaker’s views on mental representation, see his Inquiry (1984).
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of possible worlds, as do non-consistency-aiming mental representations, they are 
able to function as representations o f a particular world by virtue of the fact that 
they aim at consistency. Non-consistency-aiming mental representations, by 
contrast, only represent world-parts. An assertion is then true if  the set of worlds the 
proposition expressed picks out contains the actual world.
Stalnaker’s account, however, has nothing to say about the truth o f assertions: for his 
concerns, what matters is the effect that assertions have on the common ground if 
they are accepted (i.e. treated as true). The consequences of acceptance have little to 
do with objective truth: an accepted assertion will have the same effect on a context 
set regardless o f whether it is in fact true or false. This is no doubt why the 
representational side o f his account has not been hitherto much discussed: the nature 
o f the world represented and its relation to the proposition expressed by an assertion 
is o f little consequence to the issues of presupposition accommodation and 
projection which have largely motivated his account. (These comments, by the way, 
are not meant as a criticism of Stalnaker. The aim is merely to delineate the nature 
and concerns of his project so that it can more easily be related to the model- 
theoretic accounts o f mood selection that cite it as an influence.)
Before going on to look at these accounts, it is necessary to say something about 
how Stalnaker’s work on assertion has been recast as a theory of linguistic 
semantics. In this respect, it is important to recognise that Stalnaker has always seen 
his work as aiming at removing from semantics the burden of dealing with a range 
o f problems that might be better dealt with by pragmatics, presupposition and the 
associated problems o f projection and accommodation being key here (see Stalnaker 
2002 for a recent expression of his views). The radical elaboration of his work that 
has become known as ‘dynamic semantics’, however, takes his insights in a very 
different direction.
‘Dynamic semantics’ is the term applied to accounts o f linguistic meaning which 
explicate meaning not in terms of truth conditions, but in terms of a sentence’s
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ability to modify a context in the way described by Stalnaker. Given an information 
state and a sentence, a new information state can be derived. Thus, rather than a 
function from a possible world to a truth value, a sentence of natural language is 
seen as a function from an information state to an information state. In Heim’s 
(1992) terms, the meaning of a sentence is its Context Change Potential (CCP). 
Dynamic semantic theories have been proposed by a number o f authors, Kamp 
being, along with Heim, perhaps the most celebrated proponent. His Discourse 
Representation Theory (DRT) and Heim’s earlier File Change Semantics are 
outlined in Kadmon (2000). Beaver (2001) is a recent application o f dynamic 
semantics, while a recent critique of the dynamic approach can be found in Breheny 
(2003). These theories will not be discussed in any detail here. Rather, relevant 
features will be explained as necessary in the following discussion o f model- 
theoretic approaches to mood that adopt a dynamic stance.
3.2 Mood and possible worlds
Farkas (1992) argues that what unites verbs that govern the indicative is that the 
proposition expressed by the complement must be evaluated at a particular world 
‘anchored’ to the individual who is the referent o f the subject o f the matrix clause. 
This is what, according to her, belief predicates, reported speech verbs and fictional 
verbs such as ‘dream’ and ‘imagine’ have in common. ‘Anchoring’ thus means that 
the objects of belief predicates are to be evaluated at the world ‘represented as 
reality’ by the individual to whom the belief is attributed; the objects of reported 
speech at the world that the participants in the conversation took to be reality; the 
objects of fiction verbs at an unreal fictional world. These predicates contrast with 
those that govern the subjunctive across the Romance languages, notably directives 
such as ‘order’ and desideratives such as ‘want’, in that the objects o f the latter are 
to be evaluated not at a particular world but at a set o f worlds. In the case of a 
desiderative, for example, the set is made up of ‘the worlds towards which the 
referent of the subject has a positive attitude’ (1992: 90-91). Farkas calls predicates 
whose complements are assessed, on her account, at a particular world ‘extensional
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predicates’, and those whose complements are evaluated at a set of worlds 
‘intensional predicates’.
It is clear what motivates Farkas’ account: non-modal assertions are evaluated as 
true or false at a particular world, viz. the actual world; if  it can be shown that 
indicative complements are also evaluated at particular worlds, then a commonality 
between embedded and unembedded instances of the indicative has been found. 
However, it will be seen below that Farkas’ conception o f how belief reports are 
evaluated is very much at odds with standard possible-worlds accounts of belief 
attribution. Indeed, it will become clear that it is difficult to maintain the view that 
the objects o f belief reports are interpreted as true or false at particular world. This 
then undermines the distinction Farkas attempts to draw between ‘extensional’ and 
‘intensional’ predicates.
Dating back to Hintikka (1962), the truth conditions of belief reports have generally 
been given along the following lines:
(25) ‘Peter believes it is raining’ is true in a world w iff its is raining in every world 
w ’ that is doxastically accessible to Peter in w
Notice that this makes reference to a set of worlds accessible to the referent o f the 
subject of the main predicate in a particular world. In other words, it makes 
reference to a modal context. The justification for this move can be given in 
Stalnakerian terms: what Peter believes constitutes his representation o f the world. 
However, for any propositional representation of the world there will be a number of 
possible worlds which support that representation (i.e. in which the propositions it 
expresses obtain). Therefore, in describing someone’s beliefs, the best one can hope 
for is to identify a proposition which picks out only those worlds. One cannot hope 
to pick out a particular world which constitutes an individuals beliefs (even if it were 
possible to somehow look inside his head and examine all his beliefs), because that 
representation will not be a complete description of any particular world.
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Note that this is not to say that Peter’s beliefs do not constitute a representation o f a 
particular world. They are clearly a representation of the actual world. However, the 
truth of the object of a belief report cannot be evaluated in the actual world, for this 
would be to deny the semantics o f ‘believe’, which stipulates that its object need not 
obtain in the actual world.
As a way of illustrating these points, imagine it were possible to list all o f the beliefs 
in your head, and all their implications. Also, make the further assumption that these 
formed a consistent set, so that there existed at least one possible world in which 
they were true. However, because you are not omniscient, there would in fact be 
more than one world in which all you believed is true. For example, if  you have a 
pet dog, then it will have either an odd or an even number o f hairs on its body, and 
your set of beliefs will be true both in worlds where it has an odd number and in 
worlds here it has an even number. There is thus no particular world at which we 
could evaluate your beliefs as true. Your beliefs are related to a particular world, of 
course, as they seek to represent the actual world, of which there is only one. But it 
would be wrong to evaluate the object of a belief ascription, such as ‘P ’ in ‘You 
believe that P ’, in the actual world, because P here serves as a representation o f your 
representation o f the actual world, not o f the actual world itself.
In other words, one cannot agree with Farkas that the objects o f belief reports (or 
reported speech or fictions, for that matter) are evaluated at a particular world. 
Farkas (1992) fails to distinguish the representational nature o f beliefs from their 
semantic (i.e. propositional) nature. Because this distinction is made by the present 
account, however, it is able to maintain Farkas’ insight into the common feature of 
embedded and unembedded indicatives while at the same time adopting a 
straightforward modal semantics for belief. Assertions, the objects o f belief reports, 
reported speech and fictions all give rise to mental representations which aim at 
consistency and can therefore function as representations o f particular worlds. The 
objects o f want-type predicates, on the other hand, result in mental representations
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that do not aim at consistency, and thus these are unable to act as representations of 
particular worlds. Rather, they act as representations o f world-parts. Being 
propositional forms, though, both consistency-aiming and non-consistency-aiming 
mental representations pick out sets of worlds.
In her 2003 paper, Farkas takes a line much closer to Stalnaker’s, when she works 
within Heim’s context-change-potential approach to linguistic semantics, itself, as 
was noted above, inspired by Stalnaker’s work on assertion, presupposition and 
common ground. Recall that the view Heim takes is that sentences should be viewed 
not only in terms of their truth-conditions but also in terms of their effect on the 
Stalnakerian context set, i.e. their context-change potential or CCP. That truth- 
conditions are not enough to determine a sentence’s CCP is due to the fact that even 
when an assertion is rejected, its presuppositions can still have an effect on the 
context. Consider, for instance, the sentence in (26) (uttered by someone unrelated to 
Leo Tolstoy):
(26) My brother wrote ‘War and Peace’
Even if this sentence is rejected and the worlds in which Leo Tolstoy wrote ‘War 
and Peace’ are not eliminated from the context set, the fact that the speaker has a 
brother may still be accommodated and the context adjusted accordingly. 
Alternatively (though equivalently), CCPs may be seen as a restriction on the type of 
contexts that can be modified by a sentence: thus because (26) presupposes that the 
speaker has a brother, it only has the potential to change a context in which the 
speaker has a brother in all worlds in the context set.
Farkas (2003) argues that what unites assertions and the indicative objects of 
positive epistemic predicates such as ‘believe’ and ‘know’, predicates of assertion 
such as ‘say’ and ‘claim ’, and fiction predicates such as ‘dream’ and ‘imagine’, is 
that whereas assertions have a CCP in the context set, the complements of these 
predicates have ‘assertive CPP’ in an embedded context. These contrast with the
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complements of desideratives and directives, which have no CCP in an embedded 
context, and which generally select a non-indicative complement.
In her later work, then, Farkas is closer to the position adopted in this thesis, which 
also makes the claim that indicatives can have similar effects on both embedded and 
unembedded contexts, though she appears to have had to drop the view that the 
indicative is linked to particular worlds. On the current representational/processing 
account, however, both this position and the view that assertions and ‘assertive 
complements’ are processed in the same way, albeit in distinct types o f context, can 
be maintained.
Farkas’ main aim in her 2003 paper is to explain, in optimality-theoretic terms, the 
cross-linguistic variation on mood distribution in the clauses o f the factive-emotive 
predicates (e.g. ‘happy that’, ‘surprised that’, etc). Her earlier model has difficulty 
dealing with these data, because their factive-nature suggests that their complements 
are linked to a particular world (i.e. the actual world), but in many Romance 
languages (Spanish, Catalan and French, but not Romanian) they take a subjunctive 
complement, contrary to what her account would predict. In her 1992 paper she 
attempts to explain this by pointing to that fact that these forms are, on the one hand, 
presented as true in the actual world, but, on the other hand, they “classify situations 
according to the reaction/emotion they produce, or according to some explicit set of 
criteria (what one considers good/just etc.)” (1992: 101). In this, she argues, they are 
like desideratives, directives and modals and one would therefore expect a 
subjunctive complement. Languages thus face a dilemma in mood selection for the 
complements o f these predicates and hence the cross-linguistic variation.
Farkas (2003) proposes that mood choice is determined to some extent by whether a 
predicate is assertive or evaluative on the one hand, and decided or undecided in the 
output context on the other. What it means for a predicate to be assertive has been 
explained: its complement must have a CCP in an embedded context. An evaluative 
predicate, by contrast, is one whose complement merely alters the ranking o f worlds
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in an embedded context, rather than eliminating any o f them. The decided/undecided 
distinction is as follows: a sentence is positively decided if the proposition it 
expresses is included in the set of possible worlds that constitutes the context set; it 
is negatively decided if the intersection of the context set and the proposition 
expressed is empty; and it is undecided if neither o f these conditions obtains. An 
informative assertion is undecided in relation to the input context set and decided 
(either positively or negatively) in relation to its output. That is to say, it is not a 
member of the context set prior to the utterance and subsequently has either been 
accepted or rejected as an addition to the common ground. A felicitous 
presupposition is positively decided in relation to both input and output context sets: 
i.e. it is a member of the context set prior to the utterance.
On Farkas’ optimality-theoretic approach to mood selection, there are constraints 
that penalize the use of the subjunctive with decided predicates and the indicative 
with non-assertive predicates. This explains the general preference across the 
Romance languages for what she terms ‘strong intensional predicates’ (such as 
‘believe’, ‘say’ and ‘imagine’, which are assertive on her account) to select the 
indicative and for ‘weak intensional predicates’ (such as ‘command’ and ‘want’, 
which are evaluative on her account) to select the subjunctive. The problem is that 
the complements of factive-emotive predicates are both positively decided and 
evaluative, so that whatever mood is chosen it will violate one of the constraints, 
either that of using the subjunctive with a decided predicate or the indicative with a 
non-assertive predicate. Languages differ, then, in which constraint they rank higher: 
if it is the use of the subjunctive with decided predicates, then the indicative will be 
preferred for factive-emotives, as in Romanian; if  it is the use of the indicative with 
non-assertive predicates, then the subjunctive will be chosen, as in Spanish and 
French.
While this is a detailed and well-thought out OT/CCP account of the facts, it is not 
clear what light it sheds on the data. In particular, it is not clear what it offers over 
and above an account couched in terms of assertion and non-assertion. One could
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say that assertion involves a commitment to truth and an informative function: when 
both are present the indicative is used, when neither is present the subjunctive, and 
when one is present languages will differ. In other words, the formalism Farkas 
brings to the issue doesn’t appear to buy much explanatory power. This will only be 
the case if the constraints she identifies can be related to other cross-linguistic 
variations.
Before concluding this section, it is neccesary to consider briefly the work o f two 
other authors who have sought to explain mood-choice in terms o f possible worlds: 
Huntley (1984) and Portner (1997). Huntley aims to account for the fact that 
imperatives cannot be true or false while indicatives can, by arguing that the latter 
are deictically linked to particular worlds while non-indicatives are not. 
Consequently, when making an assertion, a speaker commits herself to truth because 
she specifies at which world the proposition expressed by her utterance should be 
evaluated, while there is no such specification with the imperative. This approach is 
similar to Farkas (1992), but differs in that it does not claim that truth is relativised 
to individuals, merely that speakers can make claims about different worlds. On his 
account, though, novel fictions should still be evaluable as true or false, as they are 
about a particular world. But one cannot accuse the teller of a novel tale o f uttering 
falsehoods, even though linguistically her story may have all the same features as a 
testimony given under oath. In short, although a step in the right direction, Huntley’s 
account says nothing about assertoric force. It must be noted, though, that Huntley 
himself acknowledges that his is a semantic account that needs to be accompanied 
by an appropriate pragmatic theory. Indeed, the account developed in this thesis 
might be seen as just that.11
11 Huntley’s position has been repeatedly misunderstood in the relevance-theoretic literature on mood 
(see Clark 1991; Rosales Sequeiros 2002; Rouchota 1994b; Wilson & Sperber 1988a), where it is 
often claimed that he relates the indicative to the actual world, whereas he actually relates it to a 
particular world: “the indicative mood locates states of affairs in a way that makes essential reference
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Portner’s approach is interesting in that he employs a distinction between worlds (or 
world-like situations) and situations, which reflects to some degree the present 
distinction between representations of worlds and o f world parts. On Portner’s view, 
the essential difference between indicatives and non-indicatives (he considers the 
‘for’-infinitive, mood-indicating may, the mandative subjunctive -  including the 
imperative, and the Italian subjunctive) is that the propositions expressed by 
indicative clauses are added to an information state that is expandable, while those 
expressed by non-indicatives are not. This is not to say that Portner assigns the same 
semantics to all non-indicatives, but rather that he claims that all the non-indicatives 
that he considers have this feature in common.
What exactly does it mean for a context to be expandable? To answer this question 
one needs first to look at Portner’s characterisation o f a proposition. On his terms, a 
proposition is a set of situations, where a situation is a spatiotemporal chunk of a 
world. A proposition P is true in a situation S if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) P 
must contain S; (ii) S must be a world or world-like. The second condition is 
stipulated to allow for the fact that certain propositional forms (such as imperatives, 
for example) cannot be true or false. For a situation to be a world, or at least world­
like, it must, among other things, be spatiotemporally extended and support 
counterfactuals. A ‘normal world’, for Portner, is one which has the features worlds 
are generally assumed to have, such as a distant past, far away things such as stars, 
and so on. Propositions that contain only situations that are normal worlds or world­
like are termed ‘expandable’.
Like Farkas, Portner also adopts a Stalnakerian view of assertion, on which, the new 
common ground following a successful assertion is the intersection of the set of
to this world (i.e. the actual world) or some contextually specified alternative” (1984: 120, italics 
Huntley’s, bold mine).
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situations contained in the common ground prior to the utterance with the set 
contained in the proposition expressed by the assertion. For this intersection to be 
non-null, argues Portner, the proposition asserted must contain normal worlds, as the 
common ground will generally contain only normal worlds, for participants in a 
conversation will generally presuppose a distant past, far way things such as stars, 
and so on.
By thus specifying that only the propositions expressed by indicatives contain 
normal worlds, Portner is able to offer an account o f why only indicatives can be 
uttered assertorically, and he accounts for the non-assertoric use of embedded 
indicatives, such as the complements of ‘believe’-sentences, in a parallel manner. 
The context to which the proposition expressed by the complement o f (22) would be 
added is made up of the set of situations taken to be doxastically accessible to 
Jimmy.
(22) Jimmy believes that the tooth-fairy left a coin under his pillow
The important point here is that this set is also expandable, as it will contain only 
normal worlds, the fact being that people generally only have beliefs about normal 
worlds. The same analysis holds for fiction verbs such as ‘dream’, for, as Portner 
points out, even the strangest dreams are grounded in a common-sense view of 
reality.
The contrast between situations and normal worlds, and the way in which these are 
related to mood choice emphasises, through the notion of an expandable context, 
that the context at which indicative clauses are interpreted must be one which 
licences common-sense assumptions. In other words, plain assertions, belief reports 
and fictions require background assumptions with which they can be integrated. 
Thus, the similarities between Portner’s and the present account should be evident: 
as was noted above, his distinction between world-like and non-world-like situations 
parallels the current distinction between world and world-part representation
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introduced in chapter 2. Like the other model-theoretic accounts discussed in this 
section, though, Portner is unable to deal satisfactorily with the information-structure 
use o f the indicative-subjunctive contrast, whereby the subjunctive is used to express 
backgrounded propositions. He might want to claim that as backgrounded 
information is presupposed, it is already present in the context set and hence does 
not need to be added to it. This would create a tension, though, between a 
proposition that, on the one hand, must contain world-like situations if it is to be 
compatible with the context set, but, on the other hand, must contain no world-like 
situations if it is to be expressed by a non-indicative.12
3.3 Mood shift as model shift
Despite its problems, the assertion/non-assertion account of the 
indicative/subjunctive contrast in Spanish has the particular appeal of being able to 
account easily for the alternation of mood where this appears to have no truth- 
conditional import, i.e. in its information-structure usage. It was shown above that 
neither Portner nor Farkas could explain this phenomenon. Indeed, it seems fair to 
say that the very nature o f model-theoretic approaches precludes them from being 
able to cope with such data, for they are concerned with explicating the difference in 
meaning between the two clauses rather than their function  in utterance 
interpretation. For this reason Quer’s (1998; 2001) account is o f significant interest: 
although it lies within the model-theoretic tradition, it claims to be able to handle not 
only the complement-selection cases o f mood alternation, but also the information- 
structure data.
Quer does not attempt to assign specific interpretations to the indicative and 
subjunctive moods but rather argues that a switch from one mood to another
12 It is interesting to note, though, a convergence between the assertion-theorists, in particular Mejias- 
Bikandi, and some o f the mode 1-theorists, notably the early Farkas and Huntley. All see the notion of 
a particular world or world-representation being central to an adequate account o f the indicative/non­
indicative contrast. As should be amply clear by now, this is also the view maintained in this thesis.
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indicates a shift in the type of model against which the proposition expressed should 
be evaluated. Like Farkas (1992), Quer employs the notion of individual anchors to 
domains o f interpretation. In his use of the notion of anchoring, Quer distinguishes 
between weak and strong intensional predicates (referring to then-unpublished work 
by Farkas, which appears to have surfaced as Farkas 2003). The former include 
those interpreted against an epistemic model (‘believe’, ‘think’), those interpreted 
against a dream or fiction model and those interpreted against a model o f a reported 
conversation; the latter are those, such as ‘want’ and ‘order’, that are interpreted at 
“a set o f worlds that model alternative realizations of the actual world according to 
the preferences o f the matrix anchor” (Quer 2001: 85).
Mood shift, according to Quer, correlates with and signals a change in the type of 
model at which the proposition expressed is to be evaluated. Take (27) and (28) as 
examples:
(27) [Maria cree [que Pedro esta l o c o ] ME(Maria)]ME(sPeaker)
Mary believe+3SG+IND Peter be+3SG+IND 
‘Mary believes Peter is insane’
(28) [M aria  q u iere  [que Pedro se m arch e]MBui(Maria)]ME(sPeaker)
Mary want+3SG+IND Peter REFL leave+3SG+SUBJ 
‘Mary wants Peter to leave’
On Quer’s account, both the embedded clause and the main clause in (27) are 
interpreted against the same type of model: the main clause against the epistemic 
model o f the speaker and the embedded clause against the epistemic model of Mary. 
In (28), by contrast, two types of model are employed: the epistemic model o f the 
speaker, against which the main clause is interpreted, and the buletic (i.e. desire 
state) model o f Mary. For Quer, where mood selection is obligatory, it is this shift in 
model type which is crucial, rather than the type of model per se.
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Quer distinguishes between cases where mood is selected by a predicate and those 
where the choice is free. In the former case, a change in the anchor cannot trigger a 
change in mood. In cases where the choice is open, by contrast, Quer suggests that a 
change in the anchor can result in mood alternation. The example he gives concerns 
negated attitude descriptions such as (29) and (30) (these are Spanish versions of 
Quer’s(17)):
(29) El jurado no cree que es inocente
the jury not believe+3SG+IND that be+3SG+IND innocent 
‘The jury doesn’t believe he’s innocent’
(30) El jurado no cree que sea inocente
the jury not believe+3SG+IND that be+3SG+SUB innocent 
‘The jury doesn’t believe he’s innocent’
What distinguishes (29) and (30), according to Quer, is that the indicative 
complement in (29) is interpreted against the same model as the main clause, i.e. the 
epistemic state anchored to the speaker, while the subjunctive complement o f (30) is 
interpreted against the jury’s epistemic state. Moreover, when a mood change is 
triggered by a change in anchor, the way in which the context is changed differs 
from that found when it is triggered by a change in model type: rather than being 
added to the model in question, the proposition expressed by the embedded clause is 
marked as not to be added, according to Quer. In (29), by contrast, the embedded 
proposition is added to the model of the speaker’s epistemic state (by a process of 
accommodation, for according to Quer the indicative complement o f an attitude 
description passes tests for presupposition).
In short, on Quer’s account, when mood is selected by a predicate, change in mood 
signals a change in the type of model at which the proposition expressed is to be 
evaluated; when mood is not selected but there is a free choice, then a mood shift 
signals a change both in the anchor and in the manner in which the proposition 
expressed is to affect the relevant model.
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Quer argues that the main advantage his model has over alternative model-theoretic 
accounts is that the semantics he assigns to the moods is ‘non-rigid’ in that no 
specific interpretation is posited: in particular the subjunctive is not directly linked to 
modality. This allows him to account for the information-structure cases, such as ‘el 
hecho de que’, where a subjunctive complement is most successfully analysed as 
signalling presupposition or low information value. On Quer’s account (although he 
doesn’t discuss this particular form), what happens here is that the shift to the 
subjunctive signals that the proposition expressed is to be interpreted against the 
model of the participants’ common ground (as opposed to a model of the speaker’s 
epistemic state). In a similar manner, he is able to deal with the fact that a 
subjunctive complement o f ‘aunque’ (‘although’) can signal either non-factivity or 
factivity:
(31) Aunque me pagues, no lo hare
although me pay+3SG+SUBJ, not it do+lSG+FUT
‘Even if you pay me, I won’t do it’
(32) Aunque sea su hijo, no le ayuda
although be+3SG+SUBJ her son, not him help+3SG+IND
‘Even though he’s her son, she doesn’t help him’
As the English glosses show, the ‘aunque’-clause in (31) has a non-factive reading, 
while in (32) the corresponding clause has a factive reading, even though both are 
subjunctive. According to Quer, this is because both readings require a model shift. 
In (31) the shift is to a version of the model of the speaker’s epistemic state which 
has been extended to include even those worlds the speaker considers highly 
unlikely; in (32) the shift is to a model o f the common ground, reflecting the fact 
that the factive reading o f the subjunctive is only possible when the proposition 
expressed is assumed by the speaker to be common ground.
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Crucial to Quer’s account is the view that the notion o f truth needs to be relativised 
to individuals (Quer 1998: 23). But while one might accept that this is a necessary 
move in order to explain the semantics of belief reports, so that ‘x believes that P ’ is 
true iff P is true in the worlds compatible with x ’s doxastic state, Quer wants to go 
further than this when he says that:
For unembedded assertions the individual anchor is the speaker and the relevant model is the 
epistemic model o f the speaker, ME(speaker), which is the default one: it stands for the 
speaker’s worldview and it represents his or her epistemic status, what s/he knows and 
believes (Quer 2001: 84)
This represents a significant departure from Stalnaker’s view o f assertion, on which 
the information state that a successful assertion modifies is the common ground. In 
effect, what Quer suggests is that one should treat the objects of belief reports and 
unembedded assertions in essentially the same way, i.e. as true if the proposition 
expressed obtains in all worlds compatible with an individual’s beliefs. The 
attraction of this view is that it accounts for the embedded and unembedded 
indicatives in the same way. However, there are also significant disadvantages.
First, rejecting the Stalnakerian view that the informational state that assertions have 
their effect on is the common ground leaves unanswered the question o f how 
assertions convey information about the world. A crucial property o f the objects o f 
belief reports is that they are opaque: the objects and properties referred to and 
denoted need not exist in the actual world. Assertions involving main-clause 
indicatives without intensional operators, on the other hand, are transparent. On the 
Stalnakerian picture, adding propositions to the common ground is informative 
because it reduces uncertainty about the nature of the world (though, as has been 
noted above, there is nothing in his account concerning whether this reduction in 
uncertainty is warranted). If one follows Quer, though, then the effect o f an assertion 
is simply to reduce uncertainty about the speaker’s beliefs, not about the wider 
world. Thus, the view of communication that results is one in which participants 
develop ever more fine-grained accounts of the world according to their fellow 
participants without ever agreeing on the nature of the world they are in.
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Second, Quer’s account offers no explanation o f the different semantics for basic 
assertions and first-person belief reports. On his account, both (33) and (34) will 
have the same effect, whereas on the Stalnakerian picture (33) will remove all those 
worlds in which it is not raining from the context set, while (34) will remove all 
those worlds in which the speaker does not believe that it is raining. On Quer’s 
story, though, both will simply update a model of the speaker’s epistemic state.
(33) It’s raining
(34) I believe that it’s raining
i o
Given Moore’s paradox, the equivalence for Quer of (33) and (34) might be 
thought to recommend his account. However, his account offers no explanation of 
why a speaker might be prepared to assert (34) but not (33), as could well be the 
case if the speaker had cause to doubt the reliability of her senses or cognitive 
performance. Indeed, on Quer’s account there is no reason why anyone would ever 
utter (34).
Moreover, as Breheny (2003) points out, anyone who wants to claim that non-modal 
assertions are interpreted against an epistemic model will have a hard time 
accounting for the fact, discussed in some detail in chapter 2, that young children 
who are unable to demonstrate the ability to attribute belief are, nevertheless, 
capable of making and interpreting assertions.
There are, therefore, good reasons to doubt that unembedded indicatives are 
evaluated at the speaker’s epistemic state. However, this greatly undermines Quer’s 
story. If there is a shift from some other type of model to an epistemic model in
13 The paradox rests on the oddness o f a speaker uttering ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s 
raining’.
223
belief reports, then his account predicts that the object of positive belief reports 
should be in the subjunctive. As (27) shows, however, there is no mood shift in these 
constructions.
To sum up this section, both Quer and Farkas (1992) seek to account for mood 
choice by identifying a similarity between the object of belief reports and assertions. 
For Quer, it is that both are interpreted against a model of an epistemic state. For 
Farkas, both are evaluated at particular (as opposed to sets of) worlds. Neither o f 
these positions is without serious problems. That there is a similarity between the 
two uses of the indicative cannot be denied, though. The similarity is that both 
represent particular worlds by virtue of the fact that the mental representations they 
give rise to aim at consistency. In other words, both present the proposition 
expressed as relevant in its own right. The following section will show how this 
claim is able to explain the distribution and effects of the subjunctive mood.
4 A RELEVANCE-BASED APPROACH TO THE INDICATIVE/SUBJUNCTIVE CONTRAST
The general direction o f the approach to be taken here should be clear, given the 
analysis o f the indicative presented in chapter 3. It was argued there that what 
distinguishes the indicative from other moods is the potential for the proposition it 
expresses to contribute directly to the utterance’s contextual effects. In other words, 
such propositions are potentially relevant in their own right. Thus, the contribution 
made by the subjunctive must be explained in terms of these propositions being 
presented as not relevant in their own right. In order to test this hypothesis against 
the data, however, it is first necessary to consider the possible ways in which a 
proposition expressed by a linguistic form may be presented as not relevant in its 
own right, either in a context or to an individual.
4.1 How can a propositional form  not be relevant in its own right?
In answering this question, it is necessary to consider both embedded and 
unembedded forms and explicit and implicit forms. This will largely be a recap of 
parts o f chapter 3, but it will be useful to recall this material before starting the 
analysis o f the subjunctive.
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A propositional form is not relevant in its own right if it is not employed as a 
premise in the derivation of contextual effects. Such a propositional form can play a 
role in utterance interpretation in two distinct but not exclusive ways: either as a 
constituent o f a complex propositional form, or by making more accessible a context 
in which effects can be achieved and thereby contributing to the overall relevance of 
the utterance by reducing processing effort.
Some examples o f the first o f these are imperatives and the complements of what 
Hooper and Terrell term non-assertive predicates:
(35) Stand up
(36) 1 doubt that you know him
(37) I wish you wouldn’t do that
(38) He commanded her to write the letter
As was seen earlier, what all o f these have in common is that the complement, or the 
main-clause itself in the case o f the imperative, have no effect on any context in their 
own right. In the imperative case, this is because there is no ‘base-level explicature’ 
constituted by the proposition expressed by the utterance. Imperatives communicate 
only higher-order explicatures.
The second type o f case where a propositional form is not relevant in its own right is 
exemplified by the contrastive-stress example (39) (repeated from chapter 3, 
example (19)), which employs the already-manifest (39)b to activate a context in 
which (39)a can achieve relevance.
(39) a. JOHN gave Peter a lift
b. Someone gave Peter a lift
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This type of effect is not restricted to implicit propositions, though. As Unger (2001: 
chapter 5) discusses in some detail, speakers can explicitly state a proposition which 
has a context-activating role. In the dialogue in (40), the first sentence of B’s 
response is not intended to inform A that he has known Peter for a long time. Rather, 
it activates contextual assumptions that provide the basis for interpreting the second 
sentence of his reply. Pre-verbal instances of ‘el hecho de que’, as in (23) (repeated 
below), are subordinate-clause examples of this phenomenon, in that the proposition 
expressed by the ‘el hecho de que’-clause is not intended as informative in its own 
right:
(40) A: Peter looks sad. Someone should speak to him.
B: You’ve known him a long time. You should speak to him.
(23) El hecho de que un cigarrillo sea denominado como bajo en brea o nicotina no 
significa que el cigarrillo contenga menos nicotina
the fact of that a cigarette be+3SG+SUBJ denominated as low in tar or nicotine 
not signify+3SG+IND that the cigarette contain+3SG+SUBJ less nicotine 
‘The fact that a cigarette is described as low in tar or nicotine does not mean 
that the cigarette contains less nicotine’
Although B’s first sentence in (40) is indicative yet not relevant in its own right, it 
does not pose a problem for the current analysis as this claims only that the 
indicative marks the potentiality of relevance in its own right.
Having recapped these types of cases, it is now time to proceed to examine the 
Spanish subjunctive in more detail.
4.2 Mood selection
It might be thought that when mood selection is prescribed by the matrix clause, 
there is no need for semantics or pragmatics to get involved in what is essentially a 
syntactic (sub-categorisation) issue. However, to adopt this position would be to 
ignore the fact that there is a certain semantic homogeneity among the predicates
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which mandatorily select the subjunctive, which suggests that there is something 
more than just syntactic prescription at work.
As has been seen in the above discussion o f other accounts o f the subjunctive, verbs 
which most robustly select this form are expressions of desire and of doubt. The 
current approach can account for the objects of desire reports in essentially the same 
way as it does the imperative: these forms do not present the proposition expressed 
by the complement clause as relevant in any context, embedded or otherwise. 
Indeed, the mental representations to which the objects o f desire ascriptions give rise 
do not aim at consistency, as they represent features that worlds fulfilling a desire 
must have, rather than worlds themselves. Thus, like the propositions expressed by 
imperatives, they are not presented as relevant in their own right and hence are not 
expressed by an indicative.
Expressions of doubt, disbelief or uncertainty deny the relevance of the proposition 
expressed by their object in an accessible context. The aim of such utterances is 
either to remove from, or to prevent the addition of, the proposition expressed by the 
complement clause to that context. On the present account, the preference for the 
subjunctive is therefore unsurprising. (O f course, the removal of a proposition from 
the context set is a contextual effect, but the effect is not derived by using the 
proposition expressed as a premise, as when a propositional form is relevant in its 
own right. Rather, the offending proposition is simply removed from the set.)
4.3 Double-selection
More interesting than cases o f mandatory subjunctive selection are those cases 
where the mood o f the complement is variable, for these provide a real test for any 
account of the effect of mood selection on interpretation.
Verbs like ‘creer’ (‘believe’) and ‘opinar’ (‘think’, in the sense of ‘to be of the 
opinion that’) are verbs expressing epistemic attitude. With such verbs, there is room 
for a large amount of variation in whether the attitude is positive or negative,
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whether the subject is first-person or not, and, if it is not first person, whether the 
speaker shares the attitude he is ascribing to the subject of the verb. Consider the 
following examples:
(41) a. Creo que Pedro es inocente
believe+lSG+IND that Peter be+3SG+IND innocent 
‘I believe that Peter is innocent’
b. No creo que Pedro sea inocente
not believe+lSG+IND that Peter be+3SG+SUBJ innocent 
‘I don’t believe that Peter is innocent’
c. No creo que Pedro es inocente
not believe+lSG+IND that Peter be+3SG+IND innocent 
‘1 don’t believe that Peter is innocent’
(42) a. Maria cree que Pedro es inocente
Mary believe+3SG+IND that Peter be+3SG+IND innocent 
‘Mary believes that Peter is innocent’
b. Maria no cree que Pedro sea inocente
Mary not believe+3SG+IND that Peter be+3SG+SUBJ innocent 
‘Mary doesn’t believe that Peter is innocent’
c. Maria no cree que Pedro es inocente
Mary believe+3SG+IND that Peter be+3SG+IND innocent 
‘Mary doesn’t believe that Peter is innocent’
d. *Maria cree que Pedro sea inocente
Mary believe+3SG+IND that Peter be be+3SG+SUBJ innocent 
‘Mary believes that Peter is innocent’
In positive first-person cases, such as (41)a, the indicative is the only choice as the 
speaker presents the complement as relevant in, at least, an embedded context 
constituting the hearer’s representation of her (the speaker’s) world-view, though, of 
course, she may also be presenting it as relevant in a factual context. As was noted 
above, the presence of the subjunctive in the negative (41 )b is not surprising either,
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given that in expressing disbelief in a proposition the speaker implies that it would 
not be relevant in any context, either one representing his world-view or a factual 
context. However, the indicative is also found in (41)c as in (42)c, a negative third- 
person belief ascription.
These two examples require some discussion as the most obvious analysis for (42)c 
will clearly not work for (41)c. This is that there is a difference in attitude between 
the speaker and Maria, such that while Maria, according to the speaker, does not 
believe the speaker is innocent, the speaker does (de Bustos & Aliaga 1996: 29-31; 
Quer 2001: 91). Thus, on the present account, the speaker is indicating that although, 
as the negative epistemic indicates, the proposition expressed is not relevant in an 
embedded context constituting a representation of M aria’s world view, it is 
potentially relevant in a factual context (and hence in a context representing the 
speaker’s own world view). This won’t work for (41)c, though, as the speaker 
cannot be claiming that the proposition expressed is not relevant in its own right in 
an embedded context constituting her own world view but is relevant in a factual 
context, for this would imply that the speaker refused to believe what she presented 
as true. Rather, what needs to be noted about cases such as (41)c is that they are 
limited to instances o f “an echoic or citing construction, that is, as a quasi-literal 
mention of the words by the speaker or as an immediate answer to a previous 
assertion” (Aliaga & de Bustos 2002: 141). This echoic analysis is further supported 
by the fact that, as both Lunn (1989b: 253) and Quer (1998: 61, fn. 61) note, right 
dislocation of the subordinate clause in first-person negative belief sentences does 
license the indicative, as in (43):
(43) Que Pedro es inocente, no creo
Such a construction is only acceptable in a discourse in which the proposition 
expressed by the subordinate clause has already been introduced. As cases of 
mention rather than use, examples such as (41)c and (43) do not undermine the 
present analysis.
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Positive third-person belief reports with a subjunctive complement are not found in 
Spanish, thus the ungrammatically of (42)d. Were they permitted, however, the 
present analysis would predict that they functioned to indicate that the proposition 
expressed was not relevant in an accessible context. As the speaker, by the use of a 
positive epistemic verb, has indicated that the proposition would be relevant in an 
embedded context, the accessible context in which this is not relevant would be a 
factual one. This is indeed the effect that is achieved in languages that do allow 
subjunctives in such cases: German and Italian (examples are from Giorgi & Pianesi 
1997: 199 & fn.195).14
(44) Hans glaubt, dab er krank ist/sei (German)
Hans thinks that he ill be+3SG+IND/be+3SG +SUBJ
‘Hans thinks that he is ill’
(45) Gianni crede che Mario ha/abbia mangiato troppo (Italian)
Gianni believes that Mario has+3SG +IND/has+3SG +SUBJ eaten too.much 
‘Gianni thinks that Mario has eaten too much’
In cases such as (44) and (45), the subjunctive allows the speaker to make explicit 
his lack of commitment to the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause, 
while in languages such as Spanish and English whether or not the speaker 
subscribes to the view she attributes to another has to be determined by pragmatic 
considerations. One interesting question the present analysis raises concerns whether 
German and Italian speakers opt for the subjunctive with these types o f constructions 
only if they believe that, should they use the indicative, there is a chance that the 
audience will process the proposition expressed in a context more accessible than the 
one intended by the speaker. Some evidence that this is indeed the case comes from
14 Giorgi & Pianesi offer an interesting cross-linguistic account o f mood selection in Germanic and 
Romance languages which is similar to that of Farkas (1992).
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Unger (2001), who notes that German speakers recounting a dream may begin in the 
subjunctive and then shift to the indicative. On the present account, this is because 
once the context in which effects are to be derived has been identified, there is no 
benefit to be gained from continuing in the subjunctive. That is to say, once the 
context in which the proposition expressed is to be processed has been established, it 
becomes the most accessible, thus warranting the use o f the indicative.
While speakers of belief-attributing sentences may want to make it clear whether or 
not they subscribe to the attributed belief, the factive nature o f positive knowledge- 
ascribing sentences means that there is no such ambiguity to be resolved in these 
cases, and thus one only finds indicative complements in such cases. As (14)c, (15)c 
and (16)c (repeated below) show, the effect o f a subjunctive complement in a 
negative knowledge-ascription sentence is to remove the factivity. In terms of the 
present analysis, an indicative complement to a negative knowledge-sentence 
indicates that the proposition is potentially relevant in its own right in a factual 
context, while a subjunctive complement does not indicate this. Rather, it indicates 
that the only way the subjunctive clause can contribute to the relevance of an 
utterance is as a constituent of a complex proposition, not in its own right in either 
an embedded or a factual context.
(14) c. No se ha enterado de que venga
not REFL has found-out of that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She hasn’t found out if he’s coming’
(15) c. No se ha dado cuenta de que venga
not REFL has notice of that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She hasn’t noticed that he’s coming’
(16) c. No sabe que venga
not know+3SG that come+3SG+SUBJ 
‘She doesn’t know if he’s coming’
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There is one form of double selection that has received particular attention due to the 
fact that mood selection actually appears to influence the semantics of the 
embedding verb. This phenomenon has been discussed recently by Ahem & Leonetti 
(2004; though see Bosque 1990: 43-46 for earlier discussion and references), and 
centres on the manner in which certain verbs that relate to the expression of thoughts 
can be seen as reporting either an assertion or a directive depending on whether they 
have an indicative or subjunctive complement clause. Two examples that Ahem & 
Leonetti give are (46) and (47) (their (9) and (10)):
(46) a. Dice que pones mucha sal
say+3SG that put+2SG+IND much salt 
‘S/he says that you put a lot o f salt in’ 
b. Dice que pongas mucha sal 
say+3SG that put+2SG+SUB much salt 
‘S/he tells you to put a lot of salt in’
(47) a. He pensado que pones mucha sal
have+lSG thought that put+2SG+IND much salt 
‘I thought you put a lot o f salt in’
b. He pensado que pongas mucha sal 
have+lSG thought that put+2SG+SUB much salt 
‘I’ve decided that you should put a lot of salt in’
As Ahem & Leonetti point out, this phenomenon occurs across an entire group of 
verbs, such as ‘gritar’ (‘shout’), ‘escribir’ (‘write’), ‘repitir’ ( ‘write’), ‘indicar’ 
( ‘indicate’) and advirtir (‘notify’). The obvious solution of lexical ambiguity runs 
into immediate problems when it is noted that verbs such as these may take co­
ordinated complements o f opposing moods, as (48) (Ahem & Leonetti’s (11)) 
shows:
(48) Avisa que viene el tren a su hora y que vaya el taxi a recogerle
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wam+3SG+IND that come+3SG+IND the train at its time and that 
go+3SG+SUB the taxi to collect.him
‘S/he says that the train is coming on time and for the taxi to go and collect 
him/her’
Ahem & Leonetti suggest that this phenomenon is best explained by positing that 
the contribution to utterance meaning of the embedding predicate is influenced by 
mood choice, with the indicative resulting in an assertive reading o f the predicate, 
the subjunctive in a directive reading. The process involved is suggested to be along 
the lines o f contextually motivated conceptual adjustment discussed by Carston 
(2002b), and outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis. Procedurally encoded information 
made available by the choice of mood, they argue, influences the conceptual 
representation that results from processing the embedding predicate. (The 
conceptual/procedural distinction is also discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis.)
The key question that this account raises is one o f just what procedure is encoded by 
mood. Ahem & Leonetti suggest that the procedural information encoded by the 
indicative is that the proposition expressed is an assertion, while the subjunctive 
encodes non-assertion. Unfortunately, Ahem & Leonetti don’t offer an account of 
what ‘assertion’ means in this case. They express some sympathy with the view put 
forwards by Mejias-Bikandi, which was discussed in some detail in section 2 o f this 
chapter and found to be problematic, but claim that their main aim is not to argue 
that the subjunctive be treated as an indicator o f non-asserted information. Rather, 
they say, it is to show that the subjunctive’s content is procedural.
The claim that the subjunctive encodes procedural information is worth making to 
the extent that (a) there are competing claims that it is conceptual; and/or (b) a 
description of the procedure encoded can be given. Ahem & Leonetti do not show 
that it is a commonly held view that the subjunctive is a case o f conceptual 
encoding. As regards a description o f the procedure given, throughout their paper 
they repeatedly describe the subjunctive as indicating that the proposition expressed
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is not asserted (despite their unwillingness to sign up to any account of assertion). 
As has been shown clearly in this chapter, it is very unlikely that a conception of 
assertion can be found that will do all the work needed to explain 
indicative/subjunctive mood alternation (recall the problems faced by Mejias- 
Bikandi’s account, for instance). As a result, the claim that the subjunctive 
procedurally encodes non-assertion still leaves a great deal to be explained.
In contrast, this thesis gives a very precise account of how the mood system 
contributes to the processing of utterances. On this account, what is encoded by 
mood is clearly non-conceptual. However, the term ‘procedural’ has been avoided 
for two reasons. First, a great number o f linguistic forms have been discussed in 
these terms (determiners, tenses, pronouns, discourse particles, interjections) and 
employing the same term for mood might suggest a commonality that, while 
possible, would have to be shown. Second, in assigning a phenomenon a positive 
term (such as ‘procedural’) one is liable to think that something has been explained, 
when perhaps little has in fact been said; a negative term such as ‘non-conceptual’, 
by contrast, is a reminder that the nature of the phenomenon under examination is 
unknown and in need o f further analysis.
How, then, does the present account deal with cases such as (46) and (47)? In the 
cases where an indicative complement is chosen, the proposition expressed is 
potentially relevant in its own right and thus the report can safely be assumed to be a 
report of a consistency-aiming mental representation such as belief. When a 
subjunctive is used, the proposition expressed is not relevant in its own right and the 
inference that the attitude reported is belief-like is blocked. However, as Ahem & 
Leonetti point out, it is not immediately clear why a directive interpretation should 
follow. The subjunctive is also associated with possibility and doubt, for example. 
Why then, should (47)b, say, not receive an interpretation on which it is an 
expression o f doubt?
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One possible solution to this question can be found by considering again the nature 
o f linguistic communication. In acting ostensively, the speaker invites the hearer to 
attribute to her a mental state on the basis of her behaviour. The basic mental 
attitudes are belief and desire. Belief is a consistency-aiming form of mental 
representation; desire is not. Consequently, the objects of desire reports cannot be 
relevant in their own right. On being presented with a report o f an attitude towards a 
mental representation which is not relevant in its own right, the most accessible 
assumption is therefore likely to be that this is a report of an expression o f a desire, 
for this is the most basic mental state associated with this type o f mental 
representation. This would explain the so-called suppletive use of the subjunctive 
exemplified by (49), on which it receives an imperative interpretation (see Silva- 
Villar 1996 for a discussion o f the suppletive/non-suppletive distinction):15
(49) a. jComa!
Form: eat+3SG+SUBJ; Use: second-person singular imperative, formal 
‘Eat!’
b. jComan!
Form: eat+3PL+SUBJ; Use: second-person plural imperative, formal 
‘Eat!’
c. jNo coman!
Form: not eat+3PL+SUBJ; Use: negative second-person plural imperative,
formal
‘Don’t eat!’
The directive interpretation given to cases such as (49) results, on the current 
account, because the speaker has expressed a proposition using a form which marks 
it as not aiming at consistency. Not aiming at consistency is a feature o f desire
15 In Spanish, the subjunctive is used for all forms o f the imperative except the positive second-person 
singular informal form (where the 3rd person singular present indicative form o f the verb is used) and 
the positive second-person plural informal form (where the stem plus ‘-ad’, ‘-ed’ or ‘-id’ is used).
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representations and hence the directive reading is highly accessible. This is not to 
say that the imperative use of this form is not now standardised, but rather to suggest 
what drove it to be standardised in this way.
In sum, then, the claim that the subjunctive marks the proposition expressed as not 
relevant in its own right is able to explain the effects of mood alternation. In belief 
attributions, mood choice serves to indicate whether the view attributed to another is 
also held by the speaker. In knowledge attributions, mood choice indicates whether 
the fact that someone does not have knowledge is due to ignorance or to the absence 
o f knowledge to be had. In verbs reporting expressions of mental states, mood 
choice serves to indicate whether the mental state attributed relates to belief or 
desire. Because the indicative presents a proposition as potentially relevant in its 
own right and hence consistency-aiming, it is able to represent particular worlds and 
so is suitable for belief expression; because the subjunctive presents the proposition 
expressed as not relevant in its own right, it does not invite the hearer to process it 
for consistency and so it is the optimal choice for the expression of and 
representation of desires.
It is important to stress, though, that while the objects o f desire reports are 
representations o f world parts rather than of worlds, that a world part is represented 
is not what is encoded by the subjunctive complement o f a sentence reporting a 
desire. As always, what is encoded by the subjunctive complement is that the 
proposition expressed is not presented as relevant in its own right. Representations 
of world parts are never relevant in their own right, but a proposition’s not being 
presented as relevant in its own right does not entail it being a representation of a 
world part. In a case such as (50) (which was discussed in chapter 2), the proposition 
expressed by the infinitive complement clearly represents a world. The fact that the 
complement is non-indicative means, though, that the hearer should not attempt to 
derive the relevance o f the utterance from the embedded proposition but only from 
the complex proposition.
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(50) I believe you to be the best person for the job
While the very nature of ‘believe’ is an unfailing indicator that the attitude reported 
is towards a world representation, other predicates are indeterminate concerning 
whether they are reporting an attitude towards a world-part representation or a world 
representation. In these cases, the choice of mood is decisive: a subjunctive indicates 
that the attitude expressed is towards a world-part representation, the indicative that 
it is towards a world representation, as in (46) and (47) above. In other words, that a 
proposition is not presented as relevant in its own right may or may not be due to a 
its being employed as a world-part representation. Presenting a proposition as (not) 
relevant in its own right is no the only way that representational function may be 
signalled: it can also be signalled by an embedding predicate, as is the case in (50).
4.4 Information structure
As has been noted throughout this chapter, a major attraction of the assertion/non­
assertion approach to the indicative/subjunctive contrast is that it lends itself easily
to an analysis o f the discourse function for which these forms are exploited. Clear 
examples of this are the ‘el hecho de que’ cases exemplified by (23) and (24) 
(repeated below):
(23) El hecho de que un cigarrillo sea denominado como bajo en brea o nicotina 
no significa que el cigarrillo contenga menos nicotina
the fact of that a cigarette be+3SG+SUBJ denominated as low in tar or
nicotine not signify+3SG+IND that the cigarette contain+3SG+SUBJ less 
nicotine
‘The fact that a cigarette is described as low in tar or nicotine does not mean 
that the cigarette contains less nicotine’
(24) En Microsoft, nunca perdemos de vista el hecho de que nuestro exito 
depende del suyo
in Microsoft, never lose+lPL+IND of sight the fact of that our success 
depend+3SG+IND of.the yours
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‘At Microsoft, we never lose sight of the fact that our success depends on
yours’
These provide a neat illustration o f how whether information is foregrounded or 
backgrounded can influence mood choice. Further examples of mood alternation 
motivated by similar concerns are provided by Lunn (1989a; 1989b; 1992). She 
points in particular to the habit of journalists o f using the past subjunctive ‘-ra’ form 
in relative clauses where the information is assumed to be known to a readership. 
The clearest cases are when information given in a headline is repeated in the text of 
an article. Consider the following, which Lunn (1989b: 252) cites from the magazine 
Hola (26/10/1985):
(51) a. Headline: La bandera que beso es la que, en su dia, tambien beso (IND) el 
Rey don Juna Carlos, y bordo (IND) su tatarabuela la Reina dona Maria 
Cristina
‘The flag that he kissed is the one that one day King Juan Carlos also kissed 
and his great-grandmother Queen Maria Cristina embroidered’ 
b. Text: Y, al final beso la bandera roja y gualda que hace treinta anos besara 
(SUBJ) su padre el Rey y que un dia bordara (SUBJ) su tatarabula la Reina 
dona Maria Cristina
‘And, at the end, he kissed the red and gold flag that his father the King kissed 
thirty years ago, and that his great-grandmother Queen Maria Cristina once 
embroidered’
This is a clear example o f already manifest information being marked as such by the 
use o f the subjunctive, but Lunn points out that the information thus marked does 
not necessarily have to be present in the co-text. It is often enough for the writer to 
assume it to be known to her readers for her to opt for the subjunctive.
Lunn suggests, on the basis of her examples and the more general pattern of 
distribution o f the subjunctive in complement clauses, that subjunctive morphology
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serves to mark information as less than optimally relevant (in the sense of Sperber & 
Wilson) (1989b: 251). This claim is distinct from the view being developed in this 
thesis, on which the difference between the two moods is accounted for in terms of 
two distinct types of contribution that can be made towards the overall relevance of 
the utterance. For Lunn, by contrast, the subjunctive merely marks the information 
encoded as less worthy of attention than information encoded by a clause with an 
indicative verb form. While this might work for cases such as (51), it is hard to see 
how this could account for the use of the subjunctive as an imperative form. One 
would surely not want to say that utterances such as (52) are less than optimally 
relevant, nor that in uttering such an imperative “a speaker licenses a hearer to pay a 
low degree o f attention” (Lunn 1989b: 251) to that clause.
(52) jNo hagas eso!
not do+2SG+SUBJ that 
‘Don’t do that!’
On the account developed in this thesis, by contrast, the intuition that the 
information expressed by clauses containing a subjunctive verb in (51 )b is less 
attention-worthy than other information in the sentence can be explained without 
having to say that imperative sentences are less worthy of a hearer’s attention than 
declaratives. Recall that in section 4.1 it was pointed out that there are two ways a 
proposition can fail to be relevant in its own right in a context: either as a constituent 
o f a complex propositional form or by making more accessible a context in which 
effects can be achieved and, therefore, contributing to the overall relevance of the 
utterance by reducing processing effort. A restrictive relative clause can play both an 
informative and a context-activating role. That is to say, on the one hand, it can 
provide the hearer with information about the referent of the noun phrase it modifies, 
while on the other, it can reduce processing effort by making the conceptual 
representation of the referent o f the noun phrase more accessible. In (51)a, the 
relative clause has an informative function (as evidenced by its post-verbal position), 
and thus one would predict that the indicative would be used, as the writer intends
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this information to have implications in its own right (that the flag is one of great 
historical importance, etc.). The relative clause in (51 )b, however, has only an effort- 
reducing role, identifying the flag as the one familiar to the reader from an earlier 
part o f the text: hence the subjunctive, as this time no implications are intended to be 
derived from the propositions expressed by the subjunctive clauses. It is fair to say, 
therefore, that in this case the subjunctive has the effect o f marking the information 
expressed as less worthy of the reader’s attention. But the present analysis has gone 
further than Lunn in that it has shown how this effect is achieved by signalling how 
the proposition expressed is to be processed. Moreover, it is also able to show how, 
in an imperative such as (52), the subjunctive, while still encoding a lack of 
relevance in is own right, can result in a different effect, in this case resulting in the 
proposition expressed being processed as a constituent o f a complex proposition of 
the form (52)':
(52)' <wants, speaker <not do that, h e a re r»
But while restrictive relative clauses can play an effort-reducing role in that they 
make more accessible the referents o f noun phrases, non-restrictive relative clauses 
do not play this role, as they are only acceptable when the referent is independently 
identifiable. It is surprising, therefore, to find the subjunctive in cases such as (53):
(53) La pareja, que se hiciera (SUBJ) famosa por interpretar el papel de marido y 
mujer en ‘El pajaro espino’, es en la vida real un matrimonio feliz
‘The couple, who became famous for their role as husband and wife in ‘The 
Thom Birds’, are happily married in real life’ (Hola, 6/7/85, cited in Lunn 
1989b: 254)
Lunn claims that cases such as these are found when the relative clause contains “old 
information that assiduous readers might have been expected to know already” 
(1989b: 254). If this is the case, then in the terms o f the present analysis the writer is 
acknowledging that, for many of her readers, the proposition expressed will not be
240
relevant in its own right in the most accessible context, as it is already present in that 
context.
This section has shown how the claim that the subjunctive blocks the proposition 
expressed being processed as a potential source of relevance in its own right is able 
to explain the information-structure use of this form. However, although much of 
this section has dealt with mood choice in relative clauses, perhaps the most 
commonly made claim relating to mood variation in relative clauses, i.e. that it is 
related to the referential/attributive distinction, is yet to be discussed. This will be 
the topic o f the next section.
4.5 Relative clauses and the referential/attributive distinction16
The most robust observation that has been made about mood selection in relative 
clauses is that subjunctive relatives are generally licensed by a range of intensional 
linguistic contexts, and that the proposition expressed by the subjunctive relative 
falls under the scope o f that operator. Examples of the intensional contexts in which 
subjunctives are found include predicates of desire such as ‘querer’ (‘want’), 
negation, future tense, interrogatives, conditionals and imperatives. These are 
illustrated by (54) to (59), which are adapted from Quer (1998: 105-106):
(54) Quiero mandarle regalos que le hagan feliz
w ant+lSG send.him/her gifts that him/her make+3PL+SUBJ happy 
‘I want to send him/her gifts that make him/her happy’
(55) No le envio regalos que le hagan triste
not him/her send+lSG gifts that him/her make+3PL+SUBJ sad 
‘1 don’t want to send him/her gifts that make him/her sad’
(56) Le mandare regalos que le sorprendan
him/her send+lSG+FUT that him/her surprise+3PL+SUBJ 
‘I ’ll send him/her gifts that will surprise him/her’
16 Thanks to George Powell for useful discussions on this section.
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(57) ^Le mandas regalos que le entretengan?
him/her send+2SG gifts that him/her entertain+3PL+SUBJ 
‘Do you send him/her gifts that entertain him/her?’
(58) Si le mandas regalos que le hagan feliz
if him/her send+2SG gifts that him/her make+3PL+SUBJ happy 
‘If you send him/her gifts that make him/her happy’
(59) Mandale regalos que le hagan feliz 
send.him/her+2SG+IMP that him/her make+3PL+SUBJ happy 
‘Send him/her gifts that make him happy’
In the absence of an intensional context, a subjunctive restrictive relative clause is 
ungrammatical. This is not to say, though, that such contexts necessarily select a 
subjunctive relative: indicatives are also possible. Indeed, the difference in 
interpretation between pairs such as (60) and (61) is largely what motivates claims 
that the indicative/subjunctive contrast in restrictive relative clauses is best explained 
in terms of the referential/attributive distinction.
(60) Quiero casarme con un chico que tiene ojos azules
want+1 SG marry.myself with a boy that have+lSG+IND eyes blue 
‘I want to marry a boy who has blue eyes’
(61) Quiero casarme con un chico que tenga ojos azules
want+1 SG marry.myself with a boy that have+lSG+SUBJ eyes blue 
‘I want to marry a boy who has blue eyes’
This distinction, which comes originally from Donnellan (1966), rests on the 
observation that a description can be used either to refer to a specific individual or 
object, or to describe an unknown individual or object. Thus, in Donnellan’s famous
242
example (62), ‘Smith’s murderer’ could be a claim either about a specific individual 
(Jones, say) or, if  Smith’s murderer is unknown, about whoever murdered Smith.17
(62) Smith’s murderer is insane
Although originally applied only to definite descriptions, it has been suggested that 
that the distinction can also be applied to indefinite descriptions (see Rouchota 
1994a and references therein). This issue will not be discussed here. Rather, what 
will be addressed is whether the claim that the subjunctive marks the proposition 
expressed as not relevant in its own right is capable of explaining the difference in 
interpretation between cases such as (60) and (61).
In terms of the referential/attributive distinction, the presence of the indicative in the 
relative clause o f (60) requires a referential reading, while in (61) the subjunctive 
requires an attributive one. That is to say, in uttering (60) the speaker indicates that 
she has a particular blue-eyed boy in mind, while in uttering (61) she indicates that 
having blue-eyes is a necessary feature that her future husband must have, whoever 
he turns out to be.
However, there is a problem with discussing the difference in interpretation between
(60) and (61) in terms o f the referential/attributive distinction. The modified NPs in 
these examples are indefinite, indicating that the speaker takes the referent of the NP 
to be unknown to the hearer (or ‘new’ rather than ‘given’). Therefore, the hearer 
cannot be said to derive an interpretation o f (60) which has a constituent the specific 
individual referred to by the hearer. Rather, what (60) appears to communicate that
(61) doesn’t is the implication that a specific referent known to the speaker exists.
17 Strictly speaking, one could use the description attributively even if one knew full well who the 
murderer is. The point is that one is saying something about anyone/whoever satisfies a certain 
description. In practice, though, this will occur most often when one does not know who the referent 
is.
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This difference in interpretation is best captured not in terms o f the 
referential/attributive distinction but in terms of scope differences. The logical forms 
of (60) and (61) can be represented as (63) and (64) respectively:
(63) 3x (boy(x) & blue eyes (x) & WANT (speaker, MARRY (speaker, x)))
(64) WANT (speaker, [3x (boy(x) & blue eyes (x) & MARRY (speaker, x))])
The crucial difference is that the logical form for the subjunctive example (64) has 
the existential quantifier within the scope of the intensional operator, while the 
reverse is the case for (63). This is just the sort of result that is predicted by the 
current analysis, on which the proposition expressed by an indicative relative clause 
should be potentially relevant in its own right. A proposition’s being relevant in its 
own right entails that it must be able to have effects on a context independently, and 
this capacity is what the representation in (63) highlights.
However, the data is not quite so neat, as can be seen when (65) is prefaced by the 
adverbial ‘por fin’ (‘finally’) to form (66):18
(65) He encontrado un libro que entiendo/*entienda 
have+lSG+IND found a book that understand+lSG+IND/
*understand+1SG+SUB J
‘1 have found a book 1 understand’
(66) Por fin he encontrado un libro que entienda
by end have+lSG+IND found a book that understand+1 SG+SUB J 
‘I have finally found a book 1 understand’
18 (65) and (66) are based on examples discussed by Ahem & Leonetti (2004).
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That the relative clause in (65) is acceptable in the indicative but not in the 
subjunctive is what one would expect given that one cannot find something that does 
not exist. The addition o f ‘por fin’ in (66), though, licences the subjunctive and adds 
another layer of meaning, namely that finding such a book was significantly 
desirable to the speaker. What is happening here is that there is a tension between 
the mood choice and the semantics of the embedding clause: one cannot, one the one 
hand, claim to have found something while, on the other, refusing to acknowledge 
that thing’s existence. This fact forces a specific reading of the modified noun phrase 
despite mood choice. However, mood choice still needs to be accounted for, and this 
can be done by deriving an implicature in which the proposition expressed by the 
subjunctive clause is not relevant in its own right. In the case of (66) this would be 
something like (67):
(67) Deseaba un libro que entendiese
want+1 SG+IMPERF a book that understand+1 SG+SUBJ+PAST 
‘I wanted a book I could understand’
4.6 Factive-emotives
As has been indicated on a number o f occasions already, the so-called ‘factive- 
emotives’ are a significant class of predicates for any analysis of 
indicative/subjunctive contrast. As the name suggests, these relate to emotional 
responses to states of affairs and have generally been believed to have the feature of 
requiring a factive reading o f the complement ((4), (5) and (6), repeated below, are 
examples). Complement selection by these predicates shows significant cross- 
linguistic variation, with Romanian preferring the indicative (Farkas 1992; 2003), 
French being happy with both (Farkas 1992), and Spanish and Catalan displaying a 
strong preference for the subjunctive (Quer 1998).19
(4) Me alegro de que venga
19 Although, as Quer (1998) notes, non-Iberian Spanish does seem to be happy with the indicative.
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myself please+lSG of that come+3 SG+SUB J 
‘I ’m happy that he’s coming’
(5) Es raro que venga
is strange that come+3 SG+SUB J 
‘It’s strange that he’s coming’
(6) Me sorprende que venga
me surprise+3SG that come+3 SG+SUB J 
‘I ’m surprised that he’s coming’
Quer (1998), however, shows that, despite appearances, factivity is not an inherent 
feature o f the lexical semantics of these predicates, which is not to say that they
cannot be given a factive interpretation. Quer distinguishes between episodic and
generic interpretations and shows how this determines whether the complement is 
presupposed ((68) and (69) are Spanish versions of Quer’s (1998: 95) (9) and (10)):
(68) Me gusto que los alumnos me hicieran preguntas
me please+3SG+IND+PAST that the pupils me make+3PL+SUBJ+PAST 
questions
‘I liked it that the students asked me questions’
(69) Me gusta que los alumnos me hagan preguntas
me please+3SG+IND that the pupils me make+3PL+SUBJ questions 
‘I like it if the students ask me questions’
As the English glosses suggest, only the episodic complement of (68) is presupposed 
and receives a factive interpretation. Moreover, as (70) and (71) show, the indicative 
is possible where this episodic/factive reading results, but not with the non-episodic 
(generic) reading (these are the Spanish equivalents o f Quer’s (11) and (12). Quer
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marks the Catalan equivalent of (70) as doubtful, but my (Iberian) Spanish-speaking
20informant finds it quite acceptable.) :
(70) Me gusto que los alumnos me hicieron preguntas
me please+3SG+IND+PAST that the students me make+3PL+IND+PAST 
‘I liked it that the students asked me questions’
(71) *Me gusta que los alumnos me hacen preguntas
me please+3SG+IND that the students me make+3PL+IND 
‘I like it that the students ask me questions’
Like Farkas (1992), Quer argues that these complements are interpreted against a 
modal context. His grounds for this are as follows. Firstly, he argues (as do Bosque 
1990; Giorgi & Pianesi 1997; and Heim 1992) that what is crucial to understanding 
this class of predicates is that the complement clause is presented as the cause of the 
emotional response described by the matrix clause. This observation alone is not 
enough for Quer, though, as he needs a model shift if  he is to explain the use of the 
subjunctive here. Consequently, he claims, following Lewis (1973a), that 
interpreting a causal link requires counterfactual reasoning (i.e. along the lines of ‘if 
P had not happened, Q would not have resulted’). This move allows him to posit a 
model shift in the case of the non-factive readings o f factive-emotive predicates, for 
interpreting a counterfactual requires reference to a set of worlds (Lewis 1973b). 
Quer finds support for his view from the fact that non-episodic readings of these 
predicates are both paraphrasable by conditionals (see, for example, (69)) and
20 What is crucial for (70) to be judged acceptable is that it be suitably contextualised. As part of the 
following sort o f dialogue, it is generally judged acceptable:
A: ^Como fue el curso que diste? ( ‘How did the course you gave go?’)
B: Muy bien. Me gusto mucho (‘Very well. I enjoyed it a lot.’)
A: i,Si? cQue te gusto? (Yes? What did you like about it?)
B: Me gusto que los alumnos me hicieron preguntas, me gusto que....
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require a subjunctive complement (which, for him, entails a model shift). Episodic 
interpretations conceal this inherent modality, he argues, and it is in such situations 
that the indicative is felt to be acceptable.
While one would not want to deny that causal relationships can to some extent be 
paraphrased by conditional statements, it is too strong to say that linguistic 
expressions o f causality must therefore be considered modal in nature. In particular, 
one would expect an understanding of causality to develop much earlier in children 
than the ability to reason counterfactually, indicating that at a cognitive level at least, 
the two must be treated distinctly. It also needs to be noted that Quer’s sole 
motivation for adopting a modal analysis of causation is to preserve his account of 
mood selection, for without this he has no explanation for the mood shift in the 
subjunctive cases. Moreover, on the sort of Stalnaker/Heim picture that Quer is 
assuming, the CCPs of causal statements and counterfactuals would be very 
different. Compare (72) and (73):
(72) I am happy because you are here
(73) If you were not here, I would not be happy
Being an assertion in the indicative mood, (72) will have an effect on the common 
ground, if accepted, such that it will remove all worlds in which the proposition 
expressed does not obtain. By contrast, interpreting (73) will require establishing a 
revised version of the common ground (see Heim 1992: 204).
Thus, while one can agree with Quer, and the other authors who make the same 
point, that causality is crucial to the analysis of the factive-emotives, it is not 
necessary to follow him in seeing this as necessitating their analysis as modal 
statements. Rather, the choice of the subjunctive in the complements of these 
predicates can be seen as being motivated by a preference for the subjunctive where 
the proposition is not relevant in its own right because it is either unrealised or
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mutually manifest. Where neither of these factors holds, one would expect the 
indicative, and Quer’s data support this view.
What is most convincing about these data is the variation in mood choice after 
‘what’-clefts. These structures presuppose the information in the ‘what’-clause and 
present the other clause as the main point o f the utterance:
(74) What I prefer is for her not to talk to me
(75) What bothers me is that she doesn’t talk to me
Notice that being the main point, in this sense, does not equate with a proposition’s 
being relevant in its own right. The proposition expressed by ‘for her not to talk to 
me’ in (74) cannot be relevant in its own right as it is presented as unrealised and 
therefore not intended to have an effect on any context in its own right. Contrast this 
with ‘that she doesn’t talk to me’ in (75): the episodic nature o f this proposition 
means that it is potentially relevant in its own right, though whether the speaker 
wishes to present it as such will depend largely on whether the hearer is aware of 
this episode. If the speaker does want to present it as relevant in its own right, he 
should use the indicative mood.
With the Spanish equivalents of (74) and (75) in non-clefted structures, only the 
subjunctive is acceptable:
(74)' Prefiero que no me hable/*habla
Prefer+ISG+IND that not me speak+3SG+SUBJ/*speak+3SG+IND 
‘I prefer for her not to speak to m e’
(74)' Me preocupa que ella no me hable/*habla
me worry+3SG+IND that not she me speak+3SG+SUBJ/*speak+3SG+IND 
‘I’m worried that she doesn’t talk to m e’
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In the clefted versions, however, the indicative is acceptable in the case in which it is 
possible for the complement to be relevant in its own right, as (74)” and (75)” (which 
are based on Quer’s (1998: 101) (36) and (34)) show:
(74)” Lo que prefiero es que ella no me hable/*habla
it that prefer+1 SG+IND be+3SG+IND that she not me 
speak+3 SG+SUB J/* speak+3 SG+IND 
‘What I prefer is for her not to talk to me’
(75)” Lo que me preocupa es que ella no me hable/habla
it that me worry+3SG+IND be+3 SG+IND that she not
speak+3 SG+SUB J/speak+3 SG+IND
‘What worries me is that she won’t talk to me’
Note that opting for the subjunctive in (75)” would be a result o f both the fact that 
something is worrying the speaker and the fact that the female in question won’t 
speak to her being mutually manifest. In this case, the main relevance of the 
utterance lies in the causal relationship between these two manifest states o f affairs, 
a relationship not manifest to the hearer prior to the utterance o f (75)”. The 
indicative will be chosen when neither the fact that the female in question is not 
talking to the speaker nor the fact that this is a cause for concern is manifest to the 
hearer. In other words, both the complex proposition expressed by the whole 
utterance and the proposition expressed by the ‘that’-clause are relevant in their own 
right.
The choice o f the subjunctive in syntactically unmarked factive-emotives is likely to 
be due to a preference to indicate a causal relationship between two propositions by 
presenting them as relevant only as a complex proposition, especially if there is no 
other marker of causality or the causal relationship is ambiguous. Consider, for 
example, the following data, from Lunn (1992):
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(76) El mundo no va dejar de girar porque me hayan dado el Nobel (remark 
attributed to Camilo Jose Cela by Lunn)
the world not go+3SG stop of turn because me have+3PL+SUBJ given the 
Nobel
‘The world’s not going to stop turning because they’ve given me the Nobel’
The motivation for (76) is, according to Lunn, modesty: by expressing in the 
subjunctive mood the fact that he has won the Nobel Prize, Cela downplays its 
importance. This can be explained by the hypothesis that the subjunctive marks 
information as not presented as relevant in its own right, for by expressing 
information in this way the speaker distracts attention from it while remaining 
committed to it by virtue o f the factive connective ‘porque’ ( ‘because’).
However, there is another explanation of Cela’s choice of mood that Lunn does not 
mention. The English translation of (76) is ambiguous (depending on intonation) 
between (77) and (78):
(77) [Not[the world is going to stop turning]] because they’ve given me the Nobel
(78) Not[the world is going to stop turning because they’ve given me the Nobel]
In (77), the fact that the world is not going to stop turning is presented as the result 
o f Cela having been awarded the Nobel prize, while in (78) the idea that the world 
could stop turning because he has been awarded a Nobel is denied. Clearly the latter 
is Cela’s intended meaning and the use of the subjunctive ensures that this is the 
only possible interpretation. On the current analysis: the fact that the ‘because’- 
clause is in subjunctive mood means that the propositional form it represents must 
be treated as contributing to the relevance of the utterance as a constituent o f a more 
complex representation, not as a relevant constituent in its own right. This analysis 
can be extended to the factive-emotives: because the proposition expressed by the 
complement is presented as causally related to the proposition expressed by the main
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clause, it is not presented as relevant in its own right but as a constituent of a 
complex proposition.
4.7 Causative predicates
The hypothesis that the subjunctive is chosen for complement clauses when there is 
a causal relationship is further supported by the fact that causative predicates 
mandatorily select the subjunctive. This applies both to clear causatives such as 
‘evitar’ (‘avoid’) and ‘conseguir’ (‘manage’) and verbs o f helping and letting such as 
‘ayudar’ (‘help’) and ‘dejar’ (‘allow’, ‘let’) (Quer 1998: 46-50):
(79) Evito que los estudiantes le enganaran
avoid+3SG+PST that the students him deceive+3PL+PST+SUBJ 
‘He stopped the students deceiving him’
(80) Consiguio que todos sus alumnos aprobasen 
manage+3SG+PST that all his pupils pass+3PL+PST+SUBJ 
‘He managed to ensure that all o f his pupils passed.’
(81) La acreditacion ayudo a que cada profesional conociera mejor su labor
the accreditation help+3SG+PST to that each professional 
know+3SG+PST+SUBJ better his/her work
‘The accreditation helped each professional to understand his/her job better’
(82) Dejo que los alumnos saliesen antes
let+3SG+PST that the pupils go.out+3PL+PST+SUBJ before 
‘She let the pupils out early’
But while providing some support for the present analysis, this type of construction 
also provides a challenge, as the proposition expressed by the complement clause is 
potentially relevant in its own right: the speaker of any one of (79) to (82) could 
intend both the proposition expressed by the complement clause and the complex 
proposition in which it is embedded to result in contextual effects. There is no 
requirement that the proposition expressed by the complement clause be common 
ground and, unlike in the case of the factive-emotives, there is no option to shift to
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the indicative if  the speaker wishes to emphasise the relevance in its own right of the 
complement. This raises, then, a problem: the prediction is that the propositions 
express by the complement of such verbs, due to their being expressed by a clause 
with a subjunctive verb form, should not be relevant in their own right. The data, 
however, are inconsistent with this hypothesis. And, unlike the German and Italian 
cases exemplified by (44) and (45), there is no effect explainable in terms of a lack 
o f relevance in a highly accessible context.
One possible solution to this problem is to suggest that the complements o f these 
constructions are processed in a different way to those which have an indicative 
complement. It has been suggested that the computational system which processes 
incoming utterances blindly attempts to process any proposition expressed by an 
indicative in the most accessible context, regardless of whether it is embedded or not 
(see chapter 3, section 2.3.3). In other words, the semantics of the embedding 
predicate does not determine whether an indicative clause is processed for relevance 
in its own right. Rather, the system will attempt to process any proposition expressed 
by an indicative in an accessible context, regardless o f its embedding predicate. 
Where an embedded indicative has greater effects than the clause in which it is 
embedded, then a parenthetical interpretation of the utterance results, whether the 
utterance is syntactically parenthetical or not.
The fact that causative predicates such as (79) to (82) do not have equivalent 
parenthetical constructions suggests that the way the proposition expressed by the 
complement is processed differs from that which has been posited for indicative 
complements. Rather than automatically processing the proposition expressed by the 
complement for relevance in an accessible context, in these cases the system 
processes only the indicative main clause and derives the proposition expressed by 
the complement as an entailment. Thus, in processing an utterance containing an 
indicative complement, such as (14)a (repeated below), the system will blindly seek 
to derive effects both from the complex proposition expressed by the whole 
utterance, and from the embedded proposition, devoting most resources to that
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which provides greatest effects. In processing an utterance such as those exemplified 
by (79) to (82), by contrast, the system will seek to derive effects only from the 
proposition expressed by the whole clause, one effect being the derivation of the 
proposition expressed by the embedded clause.
(14) a. Se ha enterado de que viene
REFL has found-out of that come+3 SG+IND 
‘She’s found out that he’s coming’
There are two factors which lend support to this view. First, unlike other predicates 
which entail their complements, the truth of the complement o f a causative results 
from the relationship between the embedding predicate and its complement. 
Compare (83) and (84), both o f which entail (85):
(83) Pedro sabia que Juan habia mentido
Peter know+3SG+IMPF that John have+3SG+IMPF lied 
‘Peter knew that John had lied’
(84) Pedro hizo que Juan mintiera
Peter make+3SG+PST that John lie+3SG+PST+SUBJ 
‘Peter made John lie’
(85) Juan mintio
John lie+3SG+PST 
‘John lied’
While the speaker o f (83) is not claiming any dependency between Peter being in a 
state o f knowing and John’s having lied, the speaker of (84) is indeed claiming a 
dependency between the proposition expressed by that utterance and that expressed 
by (85). In other words, the entailment relationship is distinct in each case. This can 
be seen most clearly by comparing their negations:
(86) Pedro no sabia que Juan habia/hubiera mentido
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Peter not know+3SG+IMPF that John have+3SG+IMPF/+SUBJ lied 
‘Peter didn’t know whether/that John had lied’
(87) Pedro no hizo que Juan mintiera
Peter not make+3SG+PST that John lie+3SG+PST+SUBJ 
‘Peter didn’t make John lie’
As noted in section 2, (86) has the possibility of an indicative complement, in which 
case the speaker is still committed to (85). With the subjunctive complement, by 
contrast, the commitment to (85) disappears, as it does with (87) (which is not to say 
that the truth of (85) is necessarily denied in these cases: there is simply a lack of 
linguistically-determined speaker commitment). In other words, the clausal 
entailment of a positive knowledge or acquisition-of-knowledge verb has a life of its 
own, as evidenced by the fact that it can survive the negation of the embedding 
predicate. The complement of a causative, by contrast, is dependent on its 
embedding predicate for its survival as an entailment. This lends support to the view 
that the complements of positive causatives are not automatically processed as 
candidates for relevance in their own right but that, rather, the complex proposition 
is processed for relevance in its own right, and one way it achieves this is through 
the implications of the entailed embedded clause.
The second factor in support of this hypothesis is the fact that, unlike indicative 
complements, the relevance of the subjunctive complement o f a causative must 
result from its implications in the same context as that in which the embedding 
predicate achieves relevance. In (88) the embedded proposition is likely to be 
relevant only in an embedded context constituting a representation o f Peter’s 
deranged world view. The embedding proposition, by contrast, will achieve 
relevance in a factive context. Recall that this is not necessarily the case with 
‘think’-sentences. In a context where Peter is known to be an expert weather 
forecaster, the embedded proposition in (89) is likely to achieve relevance in a 
factual context.
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(88) Peter thinks that his mother is an alien
(89) Peter thinks that it will rain tomorrow
In the case of the causatives, this flexibility over the context for the processing of the 
embedded proposition does not exist. They can only be processed in the same 
context as the embedding proposition. It thus seems fair to assume that the 
embedded proposition is derived as part o f the process o f calculating the 
implications of the embedding proposition, rather than being automatically 
processed for relevance in its own right, which is what, it is suggested, happens to 
propositions expressed by indicative clauses.
If this analysis is correct, then the proposition expressed by the complement of a 
positive causative predicate is not relevant in its own right in the same way that has 
been posited for indicative complements. These, it has been argued, are 
automatically processed for relevance in the most accessible context, regardless of 
the semantics of the embedding predicate. Causative complements, by contrast, are 
derived as entailments of the complex proposition of which they are a constituent. 
Such an implication may then go on to have implications in its own right, but the 
route by which it comes to do so is distinct from that followed by propositions 
expressed by indicatives.
5 C o n c l u s i o n
This chapter has both reviewed a range of approaches to tackling the problems of 
mood alternation in Spanish and proposed an alternative account. The assertion/non­
assertion approach was shown to be stimulating and insightful, but ultimately 
undermined by relying on an intuitive notion of assertion as a theoretical primitive. 
Moreover, identifying a notion o f assertion to serve both the aim of explaining mood 
alternation and of providing an adequate analysis o f the act of asserting proved 
impossible.
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Part of the initial attraction of the assertion/non-assertion approach was that it 
suggested a way of developing a unified explanation o f the information-structure 
effects of mood alternation and its truth-conditional effects. The section on model- 
theoretic approaches to mood selection showed that while these provide valuable 
insights into the semantic effects on interpretation that mood has, they have little to 
say about the information-structure uses. The one exception to this is Quer, who 
seeks to explain mood alternation in terms of model-shift and is therefore able to 
suggest that mood switches motivated by information-structure indicate a shift in the 
model of evaluation to that o f the common ground. However, Quer’s account is 
predicated on a view of normal assertions as being interpreted against a model o f the 
speaker’s epistemic state. This was shown to be an untenable position, not least 
because it puts linguistic communication beyond those speakers, such as three-year 
old children, who are unable to attribute belief states.
The positive proposals made in this chapter follow directly from claims made in the 
previous chapter, where it was argued that what is unique about the indicative mood 
is the potential of the proposition expressed to affect a context in its own right. As an 
instance of the non-indicative, the subjunctive is predicted to be incapable of 
presenting the proposition expressed as relevant in its own right. This has been 
shown to explain both the truth-conditional and information-structure effects o f the 
subjunctive: in neither case does the proposition expressed have an effect on the 
context in its own right. In truth-conditional cases, only the proposition expressed by 
the embedding complex propositional form will have an effect on the context, while 
in the information-structure cases, the result will be simply to make more accessible 
certain contextual assumptions, thereby contributing to relevance by reducing effort 
rather than by increasing contextual effects.
Thus, the ability of the present account to handle these data lends it further credence. 
It has already been shown to mesh comfortably with important philosophical 
insights into the nature of assertion, such as its role as a form of perception by proxy.
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In this chapter, it has met the challenge o f explaining important empirical
i
observations relating to mood alternation in Spanish.
21 De Bustos & Aliaga express a view o f the indicative/subjunctive contrast that is very sympathetic 
to the one developed in this chapter. On their view, the indicative serves to add to the consistency of  
the context, while the subjunctive leaves it unaltered (Aliaga & de Bustos 2002; de Bustos & Aliaga 
1996). It has not been discussed in this chapter, however, because it appears never to have been 
worked through in any detail. In particular, there is no discussion o f the nature of the context or the 
manner by which it is affected by the indicative, other than suggesting that this might be done using 
Fauconnier’s (1985) mental spaces framework
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C o n clu sion
1 W hat  is a sser tio n ?
The view developed and defended in this thesis is that assertion is best analaysed in 
terms of explicitness, relevance and truth. Acts of assertion involve employing, in 
linguistic communication, a particular type of linguistic form in a manner such that 
the proposition expressed by that form will have an effect on the hearer’s 
representation o f the world in its own right. The linguistic form -  i.e. the indicative 
mood -  is unique in having the potential to present the proposition expressed as 
relevant in its own right in an accessible context. When the most accessible context 
is formed of the hearer’s basic, unreflective beliefs about the actual world, then the 
proposition expressed is presented as relevant to an individual in its own right, and 
assertoric effects follow.
Acts of assertion are thus distinguished from other speech acts by the fact that not 
only is the act itself presented as relevant to the hearer, but so is the proposition 
expressed by the form used to perform the act. Explicitness is therefore a central 
feature of assertion: the speaker explicitly expresses the proposition form which the 
speaker is expected to derive the intended effects. This distinguishes assertion from 
directives performed by the use of an imperative, for example, which derive their 
effect from the fact that the speaker has expressed that proposition, rather than from 
the proposition itself. Explicitness also distinguishes what is asserted from what is 
presupposed: the assumption of uniqueness communicated by a definite noun­
phrases, for example, is not explicitly expressed. In cases where a presupposed 
proposition is explicitly expressed, as in the complements of certain factive 
constructions, the subjunctive or another non-indicative tends to be used where 
languages have this option.
Another crucial feature of assertions is their representational nature. It should be 
clear by now that propositionhood alone is not enough for a form to serve as a 
representation o f a particular world. The fact that a form expresses a proposition
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merely endows it with the propensity to pick out a set o f worlds. In order for it to 
serve as a representation o f a particular world, a form not marked explicitly as such 
must aim at consistency with other propositional forms so that it may be used to 
reduce uncertainty about the nature o f the world it represents by excluding, though 
the search for consistency, incompatible candidate worlds.
Because the proposition expressed by an indicative clause is capable of having an 
effect in its own right on a context formed of the hearer’s most basic assumptions 
about the world, it is therefore capable o f being relevant to the speaker in its own 
right. It is this which gives it the potential to commit the speaker to the truth of the 
proposition expressed. That is to say, the fact that assertoric uses of the indicative 
mood commit the speaker to the truth o f the proposition expressed follows on 
grounds o f rationality: to be relevant in such a context (given its function of 
representing the world), a proposition must normally be true; a rational speaker must 
therefore take to be true that which she presents as relevant in such a context. It is 
from this that the association o f responsibility and assertion stems, for, in asserting, a 
speaker offers not only information but presents herself as the source of that 
information.
The fact that the content o f assertions is intended to have a direct effect on the 
hearer’s representation of the world also underlies its functional characterisation - 
i.e. assertion as a form of perception by proxy or information transfer. Looked at in 
this way, assertion and the forms specified for its use exist because o f its role in 
allowing humans to benefit from information acquired not only via their own 
perceptual organs, but also from the experiences of others.
A system may treat a proposition as true by virtue o f it being held in an assertoric 
mode o f presentation. This notion o f an assertoric mode o f presentation is what is at 
play in Frege’s use o f an assertion sign in his logical symbolism and in Sperber & 
Wilson’s notion of a factual assumption as one which is treated as true by the 
cognitive system by virtue of its format. This mode o f presentation is related to, but
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distinct from, the act o f assertion: making an assertion presents a proposition as 
worthy o f being entertained in an assertoric mode o f commitment, while the use of 
certain ‘as’-parentheticals, as Green points out, can indicate that a proposition is 
entertained under an assertoric mode of presentation without performing an 
assertion.
The act o f assertion is related to the indicative mood through this form’s ability to 
present a proposition as relevant in its own right. Relevance entails consistency, and 
consistency is what enables a propositional form to represent a particular world. 
Being a representation, such a propositional form can be assessed as true or false in 
the world represented. Thus, the aim for consistency is the factor that unites acts of 
assertion, the indicative mood and assertoric modes of presentation.
2 R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  l i n g u i s t i c  m e a n in g
Chapter 1 highlighted the claim made by Dummett that a theory of meaning based 
on truth needs to be grounded in a theory of assertion, for only through the act of 
assertion, Dummett says, is it possible to characterise what it means to take 
something as true. All that a truth based theory which makes no reference to 
assertion can hope for, Dummett argues, is to be a theory of Fregean sense.
A related point emerges from this thesis. Truth-conditional theories of linguistic 
meaning generally make no use of the notion of representation. That is to say, truth- 
conditional approaches to semantics attempt to account for linguistic meaning by 
formulating mapping rules from sentences to models or from sentences to in an 
object language to sentences in a metalanguage. The representational function of the 
forms that express propositions is rarely considered. The reason for this no doubt 
stems from desire, dating back to Frege, to keep psychology out of semantics, for 
once representation is allowed to play a role in semantic theory, it becomes hard to
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exclude the psychological notion o f intention: what makes something a 
representation depends on the intention with which it is used.1
However, a central claim o f this thesis is that the uniqueness o f the indicative mood 
cannot be explained except by recourse to its representational potential. The 
indicative is unique in having assertoric potential, and is preferred for belief reports 
and fictions, because the propositional forms it gives rise to when processed aim at 
consistency and are therefore able to serve as representations o f particular worlds. 
Accounts o f the indicative which fail to consider its representational potential 
flounder because they are unable to distinguish it adequately from other moods, such 
as the infinitive and the subjunctive.
On the language-first story of belief attribution put forward in chapter 2, section 3, it 
is the representational nature of assertions that children must grasp before they can 
attribute false beliefs to others. This is because grasping the notion o f representation 
is essentially grasping the notion of truth and falsity. To treat an assertion as a 
representation rather than as information is to understand that it might be false. The 
next step is to realise that false representations can guide behaviour in the way that 
true ones can. On this view, then, it is because assertions are public representations 
that they are conceptually prior to beliefs, which are private representations.
It might be argued that, as assertion relates to the use of language, the fact that it has 
a representational core is o f no threat to semantic theory, which can leave the study 
of assertion to pragmatics. However, what is at issue is the contribution to meaning 
played by a linguistic form, i.e. the indicative mood. And what has been argued in 
this thesis is that the contribution made by the indicative cannot be explained except 
by recourse to its representational potential. Thus, this potential, at least, must be
1 Though as was noted in chapter 2 function can also be determined by evolutionary considerations.
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taken into consideration by truth-conditionalists (which is not necessarily to say that 
one has to go as far as Barker and reject the whole Fregean project).
Thus, there are two reasons that semanticists need to take the notion of assertion -  
and hence representation -  seriously. The first is that, according to Dummett, if they 
don’t, then they don’t have a theory of truth in which to ground their semantic 
theories. The second is that, as shown by this thesis, if they don’t, then they won’t be 
able to account for the contribution to meaning made by the indicative mood.
263
R eferen ces
Abbott, B. (2000) Presuppositions as nonassertions. Journal o f  Pragmatics 32: 
1419-1437.
Ahem, A. & M. Leonetti (2004) The Spanish subjunctive: Procedural semantics and 
pragmatic inference. In Marquez-Reiter, R. & M. E. Placencia (eds) Current 
trends in the pragmatics o f  Spanish. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Aliaga, F. & E. de Bustos (2002) Mental spaces and epistemic attitudes: On the
Spanish subjunctive/indicative alternation. In Gutierrez-Rexach, J. (ed) From 
words to discourse: Trends in Spanish semantics and pragmatics. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 135-144.
Alston, W. P. (2000) Illocutionary acts and sentence meaning. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Austin, J. L. (1976) How to do things with words. 2nd edn. Oxford: OUP.
Barker, S. (2003) Truth and conventional implicature. Mind 112(445): 1-33.
Barker, S. J. (2004) Renewing meaning. Oxford: OUP.
Baron-Cohen (1995) Mindblindness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Beaver, D. I. (2001) Presupposition and assertion in dynamic semantics. Stanford: 
CSLI.
Blakemore, D. (1987) Semantic constraints on relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Blakemore, D. (1990/91) Performatives and parentheticals. Proceedings o f  the 
Aristotelian Society 91: 197-213.
Blakemore, D. (2000) Indicators and procedures: nevertheless and but. Journal o f  
Linguistics 36: 463-486.
Blakemore, D. (2004) Relevance and linguistic meaning: The semantics and 
pragmatics o f  discourse markers. Cambridge: CUP.
Bloom, P. (2002) Mindreading, communication and the learning o f names for things. 
Mind and Language 17(1 & 2): 37-54.
Bolinger, D. (1968) Postposed main phrases: An English rule for the Romance 
subjunctive. Canadian Journal o f  Linguistics 14(1): 3-30.
264
Bosque, I. (1990) Las bases gramaticales de la altemancias modal. Repaso y 
balance. In Bosque, I. (ed) Indicative* y  subjuntivo. Madrid: Taurus 
Universitaria.
Brandom, R. (1983) Asserting. Nous 17(4): 637-650.
Brandom, R. (1994) Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive 
commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Breheny, R. (2003) On the dynamic turn in the study of meaning and interpretation. 
In Peregrin, J. (ed) Meaning: The dynamic turn: Elsevier.
Breheny, R. (forthcoming) Communication and folk psychology. Mind and 
Language.
de Bustos, E. & F. Aliaga (1996) Indicative, subjunctive and context. In Gutiererez- 
Rexach, J. & L. Silva-Villar (eds) Perspectives on Spanish linguistics. Los 
Angeles: UCLA. 1, 15-33.
Call, J. & M. Tomasello (1999) A nonverbal false belief task: The performance of 
children and great apes. Child Development 70(5): 381-395.
Carruthers, P. (2005) The case for massively modular models of mind. In Stainton, 
R. (ed) Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
Carston, R. (2002a) Linguistic meaning, communicated meaning and cognitive 
pragmatics. M ind and Language 17(1 & 2): 127-148.
Carston, R. (2002b) Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics o f  explicit 
communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
Clark, B. (1991) Relevance theory and the semantics o f  non-declaratives. PhD 
thesis, University of London.
Clement, F., M. Koenig & P. L. Harris (2004) The ontognesis of trust. Mind and 
Language 19(4): 360-379.
Coady, C. A. J. (1992) Testimony. Oxford: OUP.
Cosmides, L. & J. Tooby (2000) Consider the source: The evolution o f adaptation 
for decoupling and metarepresentations. In Sperber, D. (ed) 
Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective. Oxford: OUP.
265
Davidson, D. (1967/2001) Truth and meaning. In Inquiries into truth and
interpretation. Oxford: OUP, 17-42. Originally published in Synthese 17: 
304-323.
Davidson, D. (1979/2001) Moods and performances. In Inquiries into truth and
interpretation. Oxford: OUP, 109-121. Originally published in Margalit, A. 
Meaning and use Dordecht: Reidel.
Davidson, D. (1984/2001) Communication and convention. In Inquiries into truth
and interpretation. Oxford: OUP, 265-280. Originally published in Synthese, 
59: 3-17.
Donnellan, K. (1966) Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review  75: 
52-64.
Dummett, M. (1981) Frege: Philosophy o f  language. 2nd edn. London: Duckworth.
Dummett, M. (1993) Mood, force and convention. In The seas o f  language. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Dummett, M. (1995) The logical basis o f  metaphysics. London: Duckworth.
Farkas, D. (1985) Intensional descriptions and the Romance subjunctive mood. New 
York: Garland.
Farkas, D. (1992) On the semantic of subjunctive complements. In Hirschbuher, P. 
(ed) Romance languages and modern linguistic theory. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 69-104.
Farkas, D. (2003) Assertion, belief and mood choice. Paper presented at ESSLLI, 
Conditional and Unconditional Modality Workshop, Vienna.
Fauconnier, G. (1985) Mental spaces. Cambridge: CUP.
Fodor, J. A. (1981) Representations. Hassocks: Harvester Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1983) The modularity o f  mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1998) Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: OUP.
Frege, G. (1918-19/1997) Thought/Der Gedanke. In Beaney, M. (ed) The Frege 
reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 325-345. Originally published in Beitrage zur 
Philosophie des deutchen Idealismus I: 58-77.
266
Garcia-Carpintero, M. (2004) Assertion and the semantics of force-markers. In 
Bianchi, C. (ed) The semantics/pragmatics distinction. Chicago: CSLI 
Publications, 133-166.
Geach, P. (1965) Assertion. The Philosophical Review 74: 449-465.
Geach, P. (1976) Saying and showing in Frege and Wittgenstein. Acta Philosophica 
Fennica 28: 57-70.
Ginet, C. (1979) Performativity. Linguistics and Philosophy 3(245-265).
Giorgi, A. & F. Pianesi (1997) Tense and aspect: From semantics to morphosyntax. 
Oxford: OUP.
Green, M. S. (1997) On the autonomy of linguistic meaning. Mind 106: 217-243. 
Green, M. S. (2000) Illocutionary force and semantic content. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 23: 435-473.
Green, M. S. (2002) The inferential significance of Frege’s assertion sign. Facta 
Philosophica 4(2): 201-229.
Grice, P. (1989) Studies in the way o f  words. Harvard: University Press.
Grice, P. (2001) Aspects o f  Reason: Clarendon Press.
Guitart, J. M. (1991) The pragmatics o f Spanish mood in complements of
knowledge and acquisition-of-knowledge predicates. In Fleischman, S. & L. 
R. Waugh (eds) Discourse pragmatics and the verb: The evidence from  
Romance. London: Routledge, 179-193.
Hare, R. (1970/1971) Meaning and speech acts. In Practical inferences. London: 
Macmillan, 74-93. Originally published in Philosophical Review LXXIX. 
Hare, R. (1971) Appendix. In Practical inferences. London: Macmillan, 22-24.
Originally published in 'Practical Reason’ unpublished thesis, 1950.
Hare, R. (1989) Some subatomic particles o f logic. Mind 98: 23-37.
Hamish, R. M. (1994) Mood, meaning and speech acts. In Tsohatzidis, S. (ed)
Foundations o f  speech act theory: Philosophical and linguistic perspectives. 
London: Routledge.
Harris, P. L. (2002) Checking our sources: the origins o f trust in testimony. Studies 
in History and Philosophy o f  Science Part A 33(2): 315-333.
267
Harris, P. L. (2004) What do children learn from testimony? In Carruthers, P., M. 
Siegal & S. Stich (eds) Cognitive bases o f  science. Cambridge: CUP.
Heim, I. (1988) The semantics o f  definite and indefinite noun phrases. New York: 
Garland.
Heim, I. (1992) Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs. 
Journal o f  Semantics 9: 183-221.
Hintikka, J. (1962) Knowledge and belief. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hooper, J. (1975) On assertive predicates. In Kimball, J. P. (ed) Syntax and 
semantics 3: Speech acts. London: Academic Press, 91-124.
Hornsby, J. (1986) A note on non-indicatives. Mind 95: 92-99.
Humberstone, I. L. (1992) Direction of fit. Mind 101(401): 59-83.
Huntley, M. (1984) The semantics of the English imperative. Linguistics and 
Philosophy 1: 103-133.
Ifantidou, E. (2001) Evidentials and relevance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
James, F. (1986) Semantics o f  the English subjunctive. Vancouver: University of 
British Colombia Press.
Kadmon, N. (2000) Formal pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kamp, H. (1981) A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Groenendijk, J., 
T. Janssen & M. Stokhof (eds) Formal methods in the study o f  language, 
Part 1. Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre Tracts. 135, 277-322.
Kaplan, D. (1978) On the logic o f demonstratives. Journal o f  Philosophical Logic 8: 
81-98.
Kempson, R. (1975) Presupposition and the delimitation o f  semantics. Cambridge: 
CUP.
Krakuskin, M. & A. Cedeno (1992) Selection del modo despues de 'el hecho de 
que'. Hispania 75: 1289-1293.
Lambrecht, K. (1994) Information structure and sentence form. Cambridge: CUP.
Larson, R. & G. Segal (1997) Knowledge o f  meaning: An introduction to semantic 
theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lavandera, B. R. (1983) Shifting moods in Spanish discourse. In Klein-Andreu, F. 
(ed) Discourse perspectives on syntax. London: Academic Press, 209-236.
268
Leslie, A. M. (1987) Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind". 
Psychological Review 94: 412-426.
Levinson, S. C. (1983) Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP.
Lewis, D. (1970) General semantics. Synthese 22: 18-67.
Lewis, D. (1973a) Causation. Journal o f  Philosophy 70: 556-567.
Lewis, D. (1973b) Counter/actuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1975) Languages and language. In Gunderson, K. (ed) Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy o f  Science. Minnesota: University o f Minnesota Press. VII.
Lillard, A. S. (1993) Young children's conceptualization of pretense: Action or 
mental representational state? Child Development 64: 327-386.
Liszkowski, U., M. Carpenter, T. Striano & M. Tomasello (in press) Twelve- and 
18-month-olds point to provide information for others.
Lunn, P. V. (1989a) Spanish mood and the prototype o f assertabilty. Linguistics 27: 
687-702.
Lunn, P. V. (1989b) The Spanish subjunctive and 'relevance'. In Kirschner, C. & J. 
de Cesaris (eds) Studies in Romance linguistics. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 249-260.
Lunn, P. V. (1989a) Spanish mood and the prototype o f assertabilty. Linguistics 27: 
687-702.
Lunn, P. V. (1992) The evaluative function o f the Spanish subjunctive. In Bybee, J. 
& S. Fleischman (eds) Modality and grammar in discourse. Amsterdam:
John Benjamins.
McCawley, J. D. (1981) Everything that linguists have always wanted to know about 
logic . . . but were ashamed to ask. Oxford: Blackwell.
McGinn, C. (1977) Semantics for non-indicative sentences. Philosophical Studies 
12:301-311.
Mejias-Bikandi, E. (1994) Assertion and speaker intention: A pragmatically based 
account of mood in Spanish. Hispania 77: 892-902.
Mejias-Bikandi, E. (1995) Presupposition inheritance and mood in Spanish. In 
Hashemipour, P., R. Maldonado & M. van Naerssen (eds) Studies in
269
Language Learning and Spanish Linguistics in Honor o f  Tracy D. Terrell. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 375-384.
Mejias-Bikandi, E. (1996) Space accessibility and mood in Spanish. In Fauconnier, 
G. & E. Sweetser (eds) Spaces, worlds and grammar. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Mejias-Bikandi, E. (1998) Pragmatic presupposition and old-information in the
explanation o f the use of the subjunctive mood in Spanish. Hispania 81: 941- 
948.
Mejias-Bikandi, E. (2002) Space accessibility and the pragmatic status of
propositions. In Gutierrez-Rexach, J. (ed) From words to discourse: Trends 
in Spanish semantics and pragmatics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 145-158.
Millikan, R. (1984) Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (1993) In defense of proper function. In Millikan, R. (ed) White queen 
psycholgv and other essays fo r  Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Millikan, R. (2002) Purposes and cross-purposes: On the evolution of languages and 
language. The Monist 84(3).
Millikan, R. (2004) The Varieties o f  meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod lectures. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (forthcoming) Semantics/pragmatics: Purposes and cross-purpses. In 
Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Noel, D. (1997) The choice between infinitives and //wtf-clauses after believe.
English language and linguistics 1(2): 271-284.
Origgi, G. & D. Sperber (2000) Evolution, communication, and the proper function 
of language. In Carruthers, P. & A. Chamberlain (eds) Evolution and the 
human mind: Language, modularity and social cognition. Cambridge: CUP, 
140-169.
Pendelbury, M. (1986) Against the power of force: Reflections on the meaning of 
mood. Mind 95: 361-372.
Pinker, S. (1998) How the mind works. London: Penguin.
270
Portner, P. (1997) The semantics of mood, complementation and conversational 
force. Natural Language Semantics 5(2): 167-212.
Quer, J. (1998) Mood at the interface. The Hague: Holland Academic Graphics.
Quer, J. (2001) Interpreting mood. Probus 13: 81-111.
Rakoczy, H., M. Tomasello & T. Striano (2004) Young children know that trying is 
not pretending: As test o f the "behaving-as-if" construal o f children's early 
concept of pretense. Developmental Psychology 40(3): 388-399.
Recanati, F. (1987) Meaning andforce: The pragmatics o f  performative utterances. 
Cambridge: CUP.
Recanati, F. (2002) Does linguistic communication rest on inference? Mind and 
Language 17(1 & 2): 102-126.
Recanati, F. (2004) Literal meaning. Cambridge: CUP.
Rosales Sequeiros, X. (2002) Non-declarative sentences in Spanish: The case of the 
infinitive. In Gutierrez-Rexach, J. (ed) From words to discourse: Trends in 
Spanish semantics and pragmatics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 95-118.
Rouchota, V. (1994a) On indefinite descriptions. Journal o f  Linguistics 30: 441-475.
Rouchota, V. (1994b) The semantics and pragmatics o f  the subjunctive in modern 
Greek - a relevance theoretic approach. PhD thesis, University of London.
Rouchota, V. (1994c) The subjunctive in modem Greek: Dividing the labour
between semantics and pragmatics. Journal o f  Modern Greek Studies 12: 
185-201.
Russell, B. (1905) On denoting. Mind 14: 479-493.
Russell, B. (1957) Mr Strawson on referring. Mind 66: 385-389.
Segal, G. (1990) In the mood for a semantic theory. Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian 
Society 91: 103-118.
Silva-Villar, L. (1996) Suppletive and non-suppletive imperatives. In Gutiererez- 
Rexach, J. & L. Silva-Villar (eds) Perspectives on Spanish linguistics. Los 
Angeles: UCLA. 1, 153-181.
Smith, N. J. (2000) Frege's judgement stroke. Australasian Journal o f  Philosophy 
78: 153-175.
271
Sperber, D. (1984) Verbal irony: Pretense or echoic mention. Experimental 
psychology: General 113(1): 130-136.
Sperber, D. (1994a) The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of
representations. In Hirschfeld, L. A. & S. A. Gelman (eds) Mapping the 
mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture. Cambridge: CUP.
Sperber, D. (1994b) Understanding verbal understanding. In Khalfa, J. (ed) What is 
intelligence? Cambridge: CUP, 179-198.
Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining culture. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. (1997) Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12(1): 67-83.
Sperber, D. (2000) Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In Sperber, 
D. (ed) Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective. Oxford: OUP, 
117-137.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1981) Irony and the use-mention distinction. In Cole, P. 
(ed) Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 295-318.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1983) Early draft o f Relevance: Communication & 
Cognition. Unpublished ms., University College London.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1986/1995) Relevance: Communication and cognition. 
2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1998) The mapping between the mental and the public 
lexicon. In Carruthers, P. & J. Boucher (eds) Thought and language. 
Cambridge: CUP, 184-200.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (2002) Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. Mind 
and Language 17(1 & 2): 3-23.
Stainton, R. (1993) Non-sentential assertions. PhD thesis, MIT.
Stainton, R. (1997) What assertion is not. Philosophical Studies 85: 57-73.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1970/1999) Pragmatics. In Content and context. Oxford: OUP, 31- 
46. Originally published in Synthese 22.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1973) Presuppositions. Journal o f  Philosophical Logic 2: 447-457.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1974/1999) Pragmatic presuppositions. In Content and context. 
Oxford: OUP, 47-62. Originally published in Munitz, K. & P. Unger (eds.) 
Semantics and philosophy. New York: University Press.
272
Stalnaker, R. C. (1975/1999) Indicative conditionals. In Content and context.
Oxford: OUP, 63-77. Originally published in Philosophia 5.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1978) Assertion. In Cole, P. (ed) Syntax and semantics 9: 
Pragmatics. London: Academic Press, 315-332.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1984) Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1988/1999) On the representation o f context. In Content and 
context. Oxford: OUP, 96-113. Originally published in Journal o f  Logic, 
Language and Information 7.
Stalnaker, R. C. (2002) Common ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 701-721. 
Strawson, P. (1950/1971) On referring. In Logico-linguistic papers. London: 
Methuen & Co., 1-27. Originally published in M ind  59: 320-344.
Terrell, T. D. (1976) Assertion and presupposition in Spanish complements. In 
Lujan, M. & F. Hensey (eds) Current studies in Romance linguistics. 
Washington: Georgetown University Press.
Terrell, T. D. & J. Hooper (1974) A semantically based analysis of mood in Spanish.
Hispania 57: 484-494.
Tomasello, M., M. Carpenter, J. Call, T. Behne & H. Moll (forthcoming) 
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins o f cultural 
communication. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
Tomasello, M. & K. Haberl (2003) Understanding attention: 12- and 18-month-olds 
know what is new for other persons. Developmental Psychology 39(5): 906- 
912.
Unger, C. (2001) On the cognitive role o f  genre: A relevance-theoretic perspective.
PhD thesis, University of London.
Urmson, J. (1952) Parenthetical verbs. M ind 61(244): 480-496.
Vanderveken, D. (1990) Meaning and speech acts. Cambridge: CUP.
Villalta, E. (2000) Spanish subjunctive clauses require ordered alternatives. In
Jackson, B. & T. Mathews (eds) SALT. Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University. X, 
239-256.
Watson, G. (2004) Asserting and promising. Philosophical Studies 117: 57-77. 
Williamson, T. (1995) Is knowing a state of mind? M ind  104(415): 533-565.
273
Williamson, T. (1996) Knowing and asserting. The Philosophical Review 105(4): 
489-523.
Williamson, T. (2002) Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: OUP.
Wilson, D. (1995) Is there a maxim of truthfulness? UCL Working Papers in 
Linguistics!'. 197-212.
Wilson, D. (1998-9a) Non-truth conditional semantics: Mood indicators I. Lecture 
notes, Dept. Phonetics & Linguistics, University College London.
Wilson, D. (1998-9b) Non-truth conditional semantics: Mood indicators II. Lecture 
notes, Dept. Phonetics & Linguistics, University College London.
Wilson, D. (2000) Metarepresentation in linguistic communication. In Sperber, D. 
(ed) Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective. Oxford: OUP, 
411-448.
Wilson, D. (2003) New directions for research on pragmatics and modularity. UCL 
Working Papers in Linguistics 15: 105-127.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber (1979) Ordered entailments: An alternative to
presupposition theories. In Oh, C.-K. & D. Dinneen (eds) Syntax and 
sematics: presupposition. London: Academic Press. 11, 299-323.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber (1988a) Mood and the analysis of non-declarative
sentences. In Dancy, J., J. M. E. Moravcsik & C. C. W. Taylor (eds) Human 
agency: Language, duty and value. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 77- 
101 .
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber (1988b) Representation and relevance. In Kempson, R. 
(ed) Mental representation: The interface between language and reality. 
Cambridge: CUP, 133-153.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber (1993) Linguistic form and relevance. Lingua 90: 1-25.
Wilson, D. & D. Sperber (2002) Truthfulness and relevance. Mind 111(443): 583- 
632.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical investigations. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Translated by Anscombe, G. E. M.
274
